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ABSTRACT
INTERCULTURAL CONTACT AND THE CREATION OF ALBANY’S NEW
DIPLOMATIC LANDSCAPE, 1647-1680

by
Holly Anne Rine
University o f New Hampshire, September, 2004

This dissertation analyzes the process o f Albany’s rise to the center o f American
Indian-European relations on the northeast coast o f North America between the years
1647-1680. By the year 1677 the Albany courthouse served as the meeting place for the
negotiations that formed the Covenant Chain between the Five Nations o f the Iroquois
and the English colonies o f North America. To reach this important development,
however, took years of political, military, economic and cultural struggle. Moreover,
these struggles were not merely between the Iroquois and the English who would
eventually negotiate the Covenant Chain, but within them as well.
Moreover, this dissertation focuses on analyzing how the actions o f the Dutch and
smaller Indian tribes such as the Esopus, Wappingers, and Hackensacks were imperative
in establishing Albany as the center of the new diplomatic landscape o f Indian and
European affairs in northeast North America. In analyzing these developments this study
explores how knowledge o f specific lands and spaces such as woods, rivers, towns, forts
and courthouses led to greater control o f those places and spaces. As knowledge and
control o f these areas changed, new places would serve as centers o f power and others
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would fall from their positions o f power. Eventually, the seemingly constant shifts of
control over certain regions would stabilize, allowing fewer groups to utilize their
knowledge and control of the area around Albany, which allowed the city to serve as the
site of future negotiations among Indians and Europeans after the 1670s.
Other events such as the Peach and Esopus Wars altered power relations between
European and Indian residents o f the Hudson River Valley and also led to shifts in the
geography o f those relations for almost all of English North America. Furthermore, far
ranging events such as Bacon’s Rebellion, Metacom’s War, the Five Nations’ war with
the Susquehannocks and the Third Anglo-Dutch War contributed to Albany’s rise to
prominence in the 1670s. This study argues that it was the combination of all these
events that created Albany as the new diplomatic landscape in northeast North America.

xi
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INTRODUCTION

“Yea ar com heir to Speake wth us off good thinges & wee will give you ane
good Ansr.” 1 Thus began the meeting between the Cayuga and Susquehannock Indians
and Col. Henry Coursy, representative of Charles Lord Baron o f Baltimore, at the Albany
courthouse on August 22, 1677. This meeting ended a busy season o f propositions,
accusations, discussions and negotiations, which began in April o f that year. During
those few months, representatives o f the Mahicans, Mohawks, Cayugas, Oneidas,
Onondagas, Senecas, Susquehannocks and smaller tribes along the Hudson River met
with representatives of the colonies of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New
York.2 These meetings were part o f the beginning o f the Covenant Chain o f alliance
between the English and the Iroquois. In the next few years, representatives from
Virginia would also journey to the Albany courthouse for more negotiations with
members o f the Iroquois Confederacy.
To get to this point in the late 1670s, however, took years o f political, military,
economic and cultural struggle. Moreover, the struggles were not merely between the
Iroquois and the English, but among them as well. Furthermore, the actions o f the Dutch
and smaller Indian tribes such as the Esopus, Wappingers, and Hackensack to name only

1 Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records: 1666-1723 (Gettysburg, PA: Pennsylvania
Historical Association, 1956).
2 Ibid., 39-49. Prior to the 1664 English takeover o f N ew Netherland, Albany was the Dutch community o f
Fort Orange and Beverwyck. Fort Orange was a Dutch military and trading post and Beverwyck was the
community attached to the fort. A lso prior to 1664, N ew York City on Manhattan Island was known as
N ew Amsterdam and was served by the fort o f Fort Amsterdam.

1
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a few were imperative in bringing about the Covenant Chain. Events such as the Peach
War and the Esopus Wars not only altered power relations among both the European and
Indian residents o f the Hudson Valley, they also led to a shift in the geography o f Indian
and European relations in the Hudson Valley as well as the entirety of English North
America. The events that brought about these changes o f power and geography were not
limited to those that took place around Albany or in the Hudson River Valley such as the
Peach War and the Esopus War. Far ranging events such as Bacon’s Rebellion,
Metacom’s War, the Five Nations’ war with the Susquehannocks and the Third AngloDutch War also contributed to the change o f geography of European and Indian relations,
from one that was fractured and took place in various locations, to one that was centered
in the Hudson River Valley. This study argues that it was the combination o f the larger,
more well known colonial events with the more overlooked events such as the Peach War
and Esopus Wars that led to Albany’s rise to prominence as the center o f Indian and
European relations in seventeenth-century.
Scholars have thoroughly studied the role o f the Covenant Chain in the history of
Iroquois and English relations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

However,

they have not thoroughly explored the origins o f how the Covenant Chain came to be or
how Albany came to be the geographic focus of these relations. This study ends with

3 Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a L andscape o f Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in SeventeenthCentury A m erica (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois
Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation o f Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to
the Lancaster Treaty o f 1744' (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984); Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion
an d Civility: English Im perialism an d N ative America, 1585-1685 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1999); Daniel K. Richter and James Merrell, eds., B eyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their
neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987); Daniel K.
Richter, The O rdeal o f the Longhouse: The Peoples o f the Iroquois League in the Era o f European
Colonization (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1992)'Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in
Colonial N ew York: The Seventeenth Century, trans. Introduction by William Stama, reprint ed. (Lincoln:

2
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what scholars hold up as the beginning o f the Covenant Chain. It argues that Albany
became the center o f Indian and European relations along the northeastern seaboard of
North America as a result o f decades o f conflict between and among the various
European and American Indian groups in the Hudson River Valley prior to the English
takeover o f the colony in 1664. Individuals such as the English Governor Edmund
Andros and the Onondaga sachem Garakontie are often the central focus of the
establishment of the Covenant Chain. However, it is my assertion that the actions of
various understudied individuals such as Jacob Jansen Stoll as well as groups such as the
Esopus Indians and Fort Orange commissioners that created the conditions for both the
Covenant Chain and the establishment o f Albany as the center o f the proceedings.
In making this argument, this study develops three main points. First, it shows
the process o f how and why Albany became the center o f Indian and European relations
by the end of the 1670s. Location played a large role. The valley’s value for fur trade,
agriculture and political and military power made the region significant on both local and
international levels. The geographic attributes of the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys
were directly linked to their economic and political importance for both European and
American Indian powers (Figure 1). Economically the interior o f what would become
New York was the source o f furs and potentially agricultural production that would both
fuel and feed European colonial enterprises, and, o f course, the Hudson River served as a
direct link between the Atlantic Ocean and the interior lands. Yet to reap the benefits of
such economic potential, Europeans needed the cooperation o f the numerous Indian
groups who occupied the land.

University o f Nebraska, 1997); Stephen Saunders Webb, 1676: The End o f Am erican Independence
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
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Politically the Hudson and Mohawk River valleys served as the meeting point of
Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and Algonquian powers and control o f this region
would allow for greater control over the diverse populations o f the area (Figure 2). New
Netherland, which claimed the region, was faced with endless threats to its already
tenuous hold on the land. Due to these constant threats, New Netherland authorities,
particularly Director General Petrus Stuyvesant, were forced to place restrictions on
individuals’, both Indian and European, movements on the land in order to retain control
of the land and its small population. Also due to these various threats on the stable
existence o f New Netherland, which came from all sides o f the colony, Dutch authority
was spread quite thin, and smaller, decentralized authorities developed throughout the
colony. This decentralized fracturing o f the colony, would also lead to Fort Orange’s
development as a center for Indian and European affairs by the end o f the 1670s.
The area was home to the Mohawks, one of the five nations o f the Iroquois
League and one o f the most influential Indian groups in the seventeenth-century.4
Numerous smaller Algonquian groups such as the Mahicans, Wappingers and Esopus
also lived in the region, and, as will be shown, their actions also contributed significantly
to the changing diplomatic landscape o f North America. Because American Indian

4 The Great League o f Peace among the Iroquois tribes o f the Mohawks, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas and
Senecas was probably formed sometime around the late fifteenth century. This peace established a peace
among those tribes and ushered in an era o f warfare between the Iroquois League and neighboring tribes.
Daniel Richter’s, O rdeal o f the Longhouse, gives a thorough explanation o f the paradox between the
Iroquois’ policy o f peace and war. In this work he stated that, “By 1600 the cultural ideal o f peace and the
everyday reality o f war had long been intertwined.” Pg. 31. See also James W. Bradley, Evolution o f the
Onondaga Iroquois: A ccom m odating Change, 1500-1655. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987;
Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a L andscape o f Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in SeventeenthCentury A m erica (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).; Dean R. Snow, “Dating the Emergence o f
the League o f the Iroquois: A Reconsideration o f the Documentary Evidence,” in A Beautiful and Fruitful
Place: S elected R ensselaersw ijck Sem inar P apers, ed. Nancy Anne McClure Zeller (Albany, N Y : N ew
Netherland Publishing, 1991), 139-144.; Bruce G. Trigger, “Prehistoric Social and Political Organization:
An Iroquoian Case Study,” in Dean R. Snow, ed., Foundations o f N ortheast A rchaeology. N ew York,
1987.

5
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societies were in physical possession o f much of the land of the Hudson and Mohawk
Valleys, they were in a strong position in their dealings with the various European groups
who wished to take possession o f the region for their own economic, military and
political gain. The ensuing struggles, political, cultural and martial, that took place among
the diverse population o f the area for control of the land created significant shifts in
power among people and places.
The second goal o f this study is to explore how knowledge o f specific lands and
spaces such as woods, rivers, towns, forts and courthouses led to both greater access and
control o f those areas. As knowledge and control of these areas waxed and waned, new
places would serve as centers o f power and others would fall from positions of power.
After the Peach War of 1655, the Dutch were able to claim greater control over the lower
Hudson River. However, instead of Manhattan becoming the center o f power for Indian
and Dutch affairs, that center shifted up-river to the Esopus region and Fort Orange
because o f the ability o f independent Indian powers to assert their authority on relations
between themselves and the Dutch. By the time the English took over the colony, this
constant shift o f knowledge and control o f specific lands and spaces had created the
conditions for Albany’s rise as the center o f Indian and European relations in North
America north o f Carolina.
With the numerous ethnic groups occupying the region, no one group maintained
enough power to assert their authority over the entire area. Therefore, although the Dutch
West India Company (hereafter referred to as WIC) claimed control o f the entire Hudson
River Valley between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, different groups would maintain
control over several smaller locations in what was identified as New Netherland. Control

7
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o f all the lands and spaces within the region held great significance because there were so
many different cultural and ethnic groups struggling for power in the region. As that
control shifted between several groups, so did power relations throughout the entire
valley. Eventually, the constant shifts in control over certain regions in the area would
stabilize somewhat, thereby allowing for fewer groups to utilize their knowledge and
control o f Albany so that it would serve as the center for future negotiations among
Indians and Europeans after the 1670s.
The third goal o f this dissertation is to show how multi-ethnic interactions in war,
diplomacy, trade and religion were integral to Albany taking its place o f prominence in
Indian and European relations. Historians have analyzed these events and interactions in
greater detail than they will be here, but often the studies of these events are in isolation
from one another.5 This dissertation illustrates how the interplay between all of these
events, as Europeans and Indians struggled against each other and among themselves,

5Randall Balmer, A P erfect B abel o f Confusion: Dutch Religion an d English Culture in the M iddle
Colonies, ed. Harry S. Stout, Religion in A m erica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Randall
Balmer, “Traitors and Papists: The Religious Dimensions o f Leisler's Rebellion,” N ew York H istory 70, no.
October (1989): 341-372; Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: P olitics an d Society in C olonial N ew
York (New York: Columbia University, 1971); Thomas E. Burke, “The N ew Netherland Fur Trade, 16571661: Response to Crisis,” H alve M aen 59, no. 3 (1986): 1-4;; David G. Hackett, The Rude H and o f
Innovation: Religion an d S ocial O rder in Albany, N ew York 1652-1836, ed. Harry S. Stout, Religion in
Am erica (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991); Donna Merwick, “Dutch Townsmen and Land Use: A Spatial
Perspective on Seventeenth-century Albany, N ew York,” William an d M ary Q uarterly 37, no. 1 (1980):
53-78; Donna Merwick, “B eing Dutch: An Interpretation o f Why Jacob Leisler D ied,” N ew York H istory
70, no. October (1989): 373-404; Donna Merwick, P ossessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English
Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Paul Andrew Otto, “N ew Netherland
Frontier: Europeans and Native Americans along the Lower Hudson River, 1524-1664.” (dissertation,
University o f California, 1996); Robert C. Ritchie, The Duke's Province: A Study o f N ew York P olitics and
Society, 1664-1691 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina, 1977); William A. Stama, “Seventeenth
Century Dutch-Indian Trade: A Perspective from Iroquois,” H alve M aen 59, no. 3 (1986): 5-8.Allen W.
Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial N ew York: The Seventeenth Century, trans. Introduction by William
Stama, reprint ed. (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska, 1997); James Homer W illiams, “Cultural Mingling
and Religious Diversity among Indians and Europeans in the Early Middle C olonies” (dissertation,
Vanderbilt, 1994). Matthew Dennis, C ultivating a Landscape o f P eace is an exception to this assertion as
he explores the interactions o f the Dutch, French and Iroquois with one another in building a new landscape
based on the Iroquois ideas o f community and warfare.

8
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altered the cultural landscapes o f Indian and European affairs on the eastern North
American seaboard through the seventeenth-century. It also explains how Albany would
stand at the center o f the newly formed diplomatic landscape that these struggles created.
In working towards these goals, this study focuses on the period 1647-1680. The
year 1647 marked the arrival o f Petrus Stuyvesant in New Netherland as the Director
General of the WIC colony. Upon his arrival Stuyvesant made a concerted effort to
establish the authority o f the WIC among other colonizing countries such as England,
France and-Sweden, spread the authority o f the WIC over the colony from a centralized
location at New Amsterdam and tried to establish WIC authority among the numerous
Indian peoples within the claimed boundaries o f the colony. The remainder of
Stuyvesant’s tenure as Director General in New Netherland was filled with examples of
these efforts including establishing a boundary with New England in 1650, removing
New Sweden from claimed New Netherland territory in 1655, and establishing new
communities, such as Esopus, and new courts in Fort Orange and Beverwyck in 1652.
The period also included events outside of his control including the Indian attack on New
Amsterdam in 1655, the Esopus Wars o f 1658 and 1663, and the interactions between
and among Indian groups and Dutch communities, such as the Iroquois and the residents
of Fort Orange.
Because many o f the events that led up to Albany taking its place as the center of
European/Indian affairs were, in fact, outside of the control o f Stuyvesant or any other
single European authority, the study does not end with the English takeover o f New
Netherland in 1664. Albany’s rise to prominence was a process, and although 1664 is
often an ending or beginning point for studies dealing with New Netherland or colonial

9
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New York, the year does not hold the same significance here.6 In this study, 1664 is
more significant as a turning point as a result o f the end o f the second Esopus War and
not as the year England established authority over the once Dutch possession.
The study ends at the close o f the decade o f the 1670s because it is in that decade
that the process o f Albany’s rise is complete. It is during the 1670s when major events
occurred outside of the boundaries of New York, but which led to the establishment of
Albany as the center o f Indian/European affairs on the eastern seaboard of North America
north o f Carolina. The end o f the study does not coincide with other more common dates
such as the Glorious Revolutions o f 1688, because, while significant in the history of
New York, the years o f 1680-1688 do not add to the significance o f Indian/European
relations in Albany.

Historiography
The scholarly literature of seventeenth-century European colonization o f the
Americas often has centered on European desires o f domination over land and people.
As James Merrell discussed as late as 1989, many historians o f European colonization
would, at most, pay lip service to the presence o f American Indians in their studies and
continue to present North America as empty or a wilderness to be claimed by European

6 For the many studies that deal with either the Dutch or the English colonization o f the area, 1664 is the
most natural ending or beginning point. See Paul Andrew Otto, “N ew Netherland Frontier: Europeans and
Native Americans along the Lower Hudson River, 1524-1664.” (dissertation, University o f California,
1996); Robert C. Ritchie, The Duke's Province: A Study o f N ew York P olitics an d Society, 1664-1691
(Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina, 1977); Joyce D. Goodffiend, B efore the M elting Pot: Society
an d Culture in Colonial N ew York City, 1664-1730 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1992); Donna
Merwick, “The Rituals o f Handelstijd: Beverwijck, 1652-1664,” in A Beautiful a n d Fruitful Place: Selected
R ensselaersw ijck Sem inar Papers, ed. Nancy Anne McClure Zeller (Albany, N Y : N ew Netherland
Publishing, 1991), 317-326; Daniel K. Richter, “Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: N ew YorkIroquois Relations, 1664-1701,” Journal o f American H istory 15, no. 1 (1988): 40-67. However,
periodization o f European affairs is not necessarily appropriate when discussing Indian affairs. See Alvin
M. Josephy Jr. ed. Am erica in 1492: the World o f the Indian P eoples Before the A rrival o f Columbus (New
York: Knopf, 1992). This collection o f essays challenges the notion o f 1492 as the crucial date for Indian
peoples that it has become for European peoples.

10
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civility. Merrell also noted that there was, however, good news for the field, as more
historians became more intent on placing American Indians back into the story of
n

European Colonization. Recent studies by historians, such as Karen Kupperman’s
Indian’s and English: Facing O ff in Early America, Michael Oberg’s Dominion and
Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 1585-1685 and Jose Antonio
Brandao’s “ Your Fyre Shall Burn No More ”: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its
Native Allies to 1701 have gone beyond merely adding Indians to the narrative o f colonial
American history. Indians have been placed as central figures instead o f victims or as
players who were merely acted upon instead o f acting in their own interest. These
scholars have also challenged the accepted narrative by discussing Indian motivation,
strength and power within the colonial context.8
Another of the most influential studies to come after M errell’s call for greater
inclusion o f Indians in the narrative of colonial American history was Richard White’s
work The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region,
1650-1815.9 White argued that because the French were unable to exert their authority

7 James H. Merrell, “Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians,” The William and Mary
Q uarterly 46, no. 1 (1989): 94-119. Along with the many monographs that have com e out in the 1990s and
into the 2000s, the William an d M ary Quarterly itself has increased their focus on American Indians within
their pages with numerous articles and most notably, an entire issue in July 1996 devoted to “Indians and
others in early America.”
8 Colin Calloway, N ew Worlds f o r All: Indians, Europeans and the Remaking o f E arly Am erica
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1997); James Merrell, The Indians' N ew World: Catawbas and
Their N eighbors fro m European C ontact Through the Era o f R em oval (Chapel Hill: University o f North
Carolina, 1988); and Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The
L ow er M ississippi Valley Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina for the Institute o f Early
American History and Culture, 1992). These authors have shown how interactions between Europeans and
Indians actually created new communities for all groups involved including Indians, Europeans and
Africans.
9 Richard White, The M iddle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the G reat Lakes Region, 16501815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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over the Indian population o f the Great Lakes, they instead became mediators helping to
broker mutual alliances between themselves and local Indian groups based on a shared
need o f survival and protection. This study, however, is not that o f a Middle Ground
located on the Hudson River. Unlike W hite’s emphasis on the creation o f mutual
alliances in a specific geographic region, this study depicts an environment of
contestation for land, power and influence.
It also illustrates how local contests over land and space moved beyond a
parochial stage into the Atlantic World. For example, Dutch wars with the Esopus
Indians, located between Forts Orange and Amsterdam, in the 1660s drew WIC attention
and resources away from maintaining and strengthening their New Netherland
possessions against English incursions. The Dutch called upon the Mohawks to intervene
and bring the Esopus to the negotiating table. While the Mohawks did intervene on
behalf o f the Dutch, they were unsuccessful. The ensuing hostilities, which would not
end until late spring 1664, then contributed to the Dutch surrender o f their North
American possessions to England in 1664. With the English establishment of New York,
the Dutch were eliminated as a power from North America, and England claimed control
o f the North American seaboard from Maine to Carolina, thereby strengthening English
colonial power in the north Atlantic.
While this dissertation is not arguing for the creation o f a Middle Ground along
the Hudson River, it does add to the body o f scholarly literature on Indian and European
relations, particularly with the Dutch and English, in the Hudson Valley.10 Allen

10 William A. Stama, “A ssessing American Indian-Dutch Studies: M issed and M issing Opportunities,” New
York H istory , no. Winter (2003): 5-31. In this article, Starna laments the state o f American Indian-Dutch
studies. On page 31, he concluded that apart from a few notable examples, such as Brandao’s “ Your Fyre
Shall Burn N o M o re ”, “the history o f Indian-Dutch relations, in spite o f forty years o f effort, is presently
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Trelease’s study Indian Affairs in Colonial New York, The Seventeenth Century stands as
the most extensive study and comprehensive narrative o f Indian-European relations in
New Netherland and New York. While he thoroughly mines the primary sources and
reconstructs events between Europeans and Indians in New York in vivid detail, he often
does not give enough emphasis to the power and significance o f smaller tribes in the area.
For example, the Iroquois are shown to have great influence, while the Esopus Indians
are described as “too shy in the presence o f [Dutch] soldiers,” and as having “begged the
director not to start a war,” and also that they “dutifully promised” that they would sell
their land to the Dutch.11 Contrary to Trelease’s depiction o f their shyness, begging and
dutiful fealty, this dissertation argues that the Esopus Indians were an independent power
and integral to the events that would elevate Albany to its place o f prominence in the
1670s. The Esopus Indians were involved in several conflicts with the Dutch in the
1650s and 1660s. As a result o f these conflicts, the Esopus were instrumental in bringing
about two fundamental changes to the intercultural landscape o f the Hudson River
Valley: the end to New Netherland, and a shift o f the geography o f Indian-European

entrenched as the intellectual underling in the broad context o f N ew World Dutch studies. The few
elaborations on themes and topics first introduced by Trelease, while useful, have only infrequently led to
original or particularly informative studies.” However, the body o f work that he cites is quite extensive,
and while not providing a synthesis o f American Indian-Dutch relations, has offered diverse and
informative studies o f those relations. See for example Matthew Dennis, C ultivating a Landscape o f
P eace; Daniel K. Richter, The O rdeal o f the Longhouse\ Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New
York; Thomas E. Burke, “The N ew Netherland Fur Trade, 1657-1661: Response to Crisis,” Halve Maen
59, no. 3 (1986): 1-4; Paul Andrew Otto, “N ew Netherland Frontier: Europeans and N ative Americans
along the Lower Hudson River, 1524-1664”; James Homer W illiams, “Cultural M ingling and Religious
Diversity am ong Indians and Europeans in the Early Middle C olonies” (dissertation, Vanderbilt, 1994);
Thomas E. Burke, “Arent van Curler And the Fur Trade at Early Schenectady,” Dutch Settlers Society
Yearbook 49 (1984-1987): 5-15; Jack Campisi, “The Iroquois and the Euro-American Concept o f Tribe,”
N ew York H istory 78, no. October (1997): 455-472; Charles T. Gehring, W illiam A. Starna, “Dutch and
Indians in the Hudson Valley: The Early Period,” Hudson Valley Regional Review. 1-25; Joyce D.
Goodfriend, “Writing/Righting Dutch Colonial History,” N ew York H istory 80, no. January (1999): 5-28;
Daniel K. Richter, “Brothers, Scoundrels, Metal Makers: Dutch Constructions o f N ative American
Constructions o f the Dutch,” de H alve M aen 71, no. 3 (1998): 59-64.
11 Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial N ew York. 149-150.
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relations in North America. This is not to argue that the smaller Algonquian groups,
such as the Esopus, located along the Hudson River, had the power or ability to sway
Indian-European relations in the same way that the Mohawks did. Still, they played a
critical role in shaping European imperial policy concerning relations with Indians in
North America. By exploring the contributions of previously neglected groups and
events, we can answer the questions of how and why the Covenant Chain was able to be
forged in Albany in the 1670s thereby altering the power relations among Indians and
Europeans on the Atlantic seaboard o f North America through the colonial period.
With its geographic focus on Albany and the Hudson River Valley, this
dissertation further adds to the study o f the middle colonies and the quite extensive body
o f literature on Albany itself. Much o f this scholarship has focused on trade, politics, and
•

ethnic and religious diversity.

12

As Merrell argued, little of the literature on the history of

New York, which does not deal specifically with Indians, such as Trelease’s work,
incorporates the significance of Indians into their narrative or analysis.13 For example,
Donna M erwick’s Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences
rightly argues that Albany was continually remade as each group and generation,

12 Bonomi, A Factious People', Thomas E. Burke, “The N ew Netherland Fur Trade, 1657-1661: Response
to Crisis,” 1-4; David G. Hackett, The Rude H and o f Innovation', Donna Merwick, “Being Dutch: An
Interpretation o f Why Jacob Leisler Died;" 373-404; Donna Merwick, P ossessin g Albany, 1630-1710',
Robert C. Ritchie, The Duke's Province', Donna Merwick, “B ecom ing English: Anglo-Dutch Conflict in the
1670s in Albany, N ew York,” N ew York H istory 62, no. October (1981): 389-414; Oliver A. Rink, “Private
Interest and Godly Gain: The W est India Company and the Dutch Reformed Church in N ew Netherland,
1624-1664.,” N ew York H istory 75, no. July (1994): 245-264; Janny Venema, “Poverty and Charity in
Seventeenth-Century Beverwijck,” N ew York H istory 80, no. October (1999): 369-390; James Homer
Williams, “"Abominable Religion" and Dutch (Intolerance: The Jews and Petrus Stuyvesant,” de Halve
Maen 71, no. 4 (1998): 85-91.
13 Literature that deals with the trade in N ew Netherland does not deal with Indians outside o f their roles as
fur suppliers, such as informants, couriers and diplomats, and often subscribes to the argument o f Indians
working to gain power as middle men in the fur trade.

14

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“understood Albany at different layers of time.” 14 She uncovered first how the Dutch and
then the English worked, competed, and compromised in order to recreate the landscape
according to their own ideas, beliefs and understandings o f society and order. However,
she introduced Indians only as minor actors who caused the major players to react in
particular, distinctly European ways. This dissertation also explores how different ethnic
groups tried to impose meaning and order on the land o f what will become New York.
However, it also tries to insert the motives and significance o f the Indian groups who
were a part o f the continual recreation o f Albany and the colony as a whole.15
While this study focuses on a specific colony, New Nether land/New York, and a
specific community, Fort Orange/Albany, it also moves beyond the traditional boundary
lines drawn for seventeenth-century North America. By showing the constant shifts in
control o f specific lands and spaces during this period, a map o f 17th century North
American political boundaries would be in constant flux with areas moving in and out o f
European and Indian control. At the same time this study works to show the connections
between and among different colonies and Indians groups, which expands Albany’s area
of influence beyond the borders o f New Netherland and New York to incorporate New
England, Virginia, Maryland and New France.16

14 Donna Merwick, P ossessing Albany, 1630-1710. 2.
15Colin Calloway, N ew Worlds f o r All. Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange
Economy, and Mechal Sobel, The W orld They M ade Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth
Century Virginia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1987). All these authors stress the interaction o f
different cultural groups to create wholly new communities instead o f mere transferences o f culture from
one region to the next.
16 See Cynthia J. Van Zandt, “Negotiating Settlement: Colonialism, Cultural Exchange and Conflict in
Early Colonial Atlantic North America, 1580-1660” (Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Connecticut, 1998).
She argues for a more inclusive geographical approach to the study o f colonial North America in an
Atlantic context instead o f focusing so narrowly on single colonies or regions as has been done
traditionally. Scholars such as Ira Berlin, “From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins o f
African-American Society in Mainland North America,” William an d M ary Q uarterly 53, no 2 (April
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William Cronon’s 1983 environmental history monograph Changes in the Land
was one o f the first studies to deal with how European and Indian contact affected the
North American landscape, thus combining historical geography and the study of
history.17 In the twenty-one years since the publication o f Cronon’s work, few historians
have looked at how the different cultural groups that occupied the land, the Dutch,
English, French and Indians, defined and utilized the land and space they fought to gain
or defend. Moreover, few studies take into account the changing meanings and uses of
land and space as several groups occupied a common area, or as possession o f a region
shifted among groups. This study explores these issues as they relate to cross-cultural
contests and negotiations in commercial and diplomatic terms in the seventeenth-century
Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys.
Because there is a central focus on how different groups tried to impose their own
authority on how people moved and worked on the land, this study also adds to the fields
o f historical geography. This dissertation is greatly influenced by the ideas of
geographers D.W. Meinig and John Stilgoe. In his 1982 study, Stilgoe differentiates the
meanings o f the terms landscape and wilderness as they are used in this study. The terms
are the antithesis o f one another. Landscape is not scenery, but “is essentially rural, the
product of traditional agriculture interrupted here and thereby traditional artifice, a mix of

1996), 251-288 and John Thornton, Africa an d Africans in the M aking o f the A tlantic World, 1400-1680,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) have been particularly successful in their Atlantic
World approach in their studies o f Europeans and Africans in North America.
17 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the E cology o f N ew England (New York:
Hill & Wang, 1983). A lso see M ichael Williams, “The Relations o f Environmental History and Historical
Geography,” Journal o f H istorical G eography 20, no. 1 (1994): 3-21.
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natural and man-made form.”

1R

By this definition, a landscape must be a place affected

by the touch o f human activity. According to the perspective o f many European
colonists, if land had not been touched by human existence and activity, a region was not
a landscape but a wilderness. The idea o f wilderness as the absence o f human activity,
according to Stilgoe, came from a combination o f pre-Christian beliefs o f trees with souls
and spirits living within the forests and Christian teachings o f wilderness as the home o f
demons.19 This antithesis was one that European settlers had to deal with in New
Netherland, but was not one that Indians had to confront when Europeans arrived.
Many Europeans viewed North America as a wilderness, as defined by Stilgoe,
although there was the presence o f numerous Indian cultures putting their marks on the
land. However, many Europeans did not consider Indians’ use o f the land as “proper
use” and therefore considered the land, in their Christian understanding, a wilderness.
Moreover, as Europeans and American Indians both continued to put their marks on the
land o f the Hudson River Valley, they did indeed create new cultural landscapes of
Indian and European interaction that were neither fully European nor fully American

18 John R. Stilgoe, Common L andscape o f America, 1580-1845 (N ew Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1982)., 3. Stilgoe looks at landscape primarily from a European perspective arising from the idea o f
landschaft. Landschaft, he explains, showed the interconnectedness between humans and the land and
included both human dwellings and human constructed structures crowded together and surrounded by
fields, m eadows and pastures, all o f which had been worked by human hands. Although the term comes
from a m edieval European perspective, it fits very w ell into a discussion o f American Indian landscapes. A
significant difference however, is that Indian landscapes did not end at their fields’ edge, but extended into
the woods and into European landscapes as well. For a discussion o f landscape and world-view from an
Iroquois perspective see
Roger Merle Carpenter, “The Renewed, the Destroyed, and the Remade: The
Three Thought Worlds o f the Iroquois and the Huron, 1609-1650” (Ph.D. dissertation, University o f
California, 1999).
19 John R. Stilgoe, Common L andscape o f America, 1580-1845. 7-12. Stilgoe argues that it was the
retention o f pagan beliefs and understandings o f wild lands and wildness that informed European
understanding o f Christianity.
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Indian.20 The new cultural landscapes would include contests and compromises over
how Indians and Europeans shared common spaces, such as towns, farms and woods.
Merwick’s study is valuable in learning how the Dutch and then the English worked to
create copies of their home cultures in Fort Orange and Albany, however, this
dissertation explores how all the different ethnic and cultural groups compromised to
create truly unique landscapes, particularly in Albany.
As Indians and Europeans created new cultural landscapes through conflicts and
compromises over who had access to certain spaces and how these spaces were utilized,
they would eventually create the new diplomatic landscape that was centered at Albany.
This process o f creating a new diplomatic landscape along the Hudson River was also
assisted in 1652 when Fort Orange was established as a political center o f New
Netherland with its own court. This particular event allowed Indians and Dutch in Fort
Orange to move beyond merely an economic relationship. With the establishment o f the
court, Indians, particularly Mohawks, were also able to negotiate for their presence in the
courthouse. This was indeed the creation o f a new cultural landscape, which developed
into a new diplomatic landscape that placed Albany at the center o f Indian and European
diplomacy by the end o f the 1670s.

20 For further reading on landscape and the idea o f wilderness see Matthew Dennis, C ultivating a
Landscape o f Peace)', William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature,” in Out o f the Woods: Essays in Environm ental History, ed. Char Miller and Hal Rothman
(Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh, 1997); Warren R. Hofstra, The P lanting o f N ew Virginia:
Settlement an d Landscape in the Shenandoah Valley (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004);
D.W . Meinig, ed., The Interpretation o f O rdinary Landscapes: G eographical E ssays (N ew York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); and D.W . Meinig, The Shaping o f America: A G eographical
P erspective on 500 Years o f History, A tlantic America, 1492-1800, 3 vols., vol. I (1986).
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Chapter Outlines
The chapters are arranged to first explain New Netherland’s relationship with its
neighbors and how these relations created conditions for the independent development of
Fort Orange as a political center within the colony. The dissertation then moves to
explore events and issues that both Europeans and Indians faced within the claimed
borders of New Netherland and New York. These events, such as the Peach War and
Esopus Wars brought Indian participation into the realm o f New Netherland politics and
diplomacy in a way that they had not prior to the establishment o f the Fort Orange court
in 1652. Finally, the dissertation once again explores New York, and specifically
Albany’s, relationship with other colonies and American Indian powers; however, at this
point, Albany’s position as a colonial center of Indian and European affairs had been
firmly established.
Chapter one explores the threats that the newly appointed Director-General of the
WIC’s colony of New Netherland, Petrus Stuyvesant, faced from outside forces, both
European and Indian. By utilizing official WIC correspondence from and to Stuyvesant
as well as council minutes and maps, this chapter demonstrates several points. First, with
Stuyvesant having to remain so focused on outside threats from New England, New
Sweden and New France, Fort Orange, as the secondary seat o f power within New
Netherland, was able to develop independently from the authority located in New
Amsterdam. Secondly, as New Netherland authorities worked to establish their authority
over the land it claimed, they were forced to shift their approach to claiming legitimate
control of the land. As a result, New Netherland utilized the presence o f forts on the land
as their main symbol o f authority, and embarked on a strategy o f land purchases and fort
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construction to bolster their claim to lands in the Hudson River Valley.

Lastly, it

introduces the Peach War o f 1655, and the rumors leading up to that war, as a major
turning point in New Netherland’s efforts to establish authority over the Indian
population as well as the beginning o f Fort Orange’s rise as an independent center of
Indian and European relations.
Chapter two explores issues o f control over the lands within the claimed borders
of New Netherland, but outside o f the actual Dutch settlements. This chapter focuses on
two major ideas. First, it explores how knowledge o f certain areas, such as woods,
villages and rivers, was related to the ability o f particular groups to control those areas.
Because of Dutch lack o f knowledge o f the land within its claimed borders, Fort Orange
and Fort Amsterdam remained isolated from one another allowing the former to develop
somewhat independently from the latter, especially in regard to Indian policy. As Fort
Orange authorities tried to establish control outside o f its walls, they did so out of
concern for trade with Indians. Fort Amsterdam officials did the same, but they did so
out of concern for safety from Indians. Furthermore, the attempts o f both to gain control
outside o f their town walls were affected by issues o f religion and European
conceptualizations about “wildness”. Secondly, this isolation led Dutch officials to
attempt to lessen the physical and political gap between the two settlements by
aggressively working to settle what was known as the Esopus. The conflict that arose
from this policy, between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians in the 1650s, would both
expose the split relations between the two Dutch centers as well as begin the shift of
power from Fort Amsterdam to Fort Orange in Dutch and Indian relations.
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Chapter three then moves inside Dutch settlements to explore the successes and
failures o f several groups including Mohawks, Mahicans, Lutherans, WIC officials, and
residents o f Fort Orange and Beverwyck and Rensselaerswyck to assert their authority
within town walls.21 The central argument o f this chapter is that as the WIC worked to
assert its authority in Dutch settlements, particularly Fort Orange and Beverwyck,
through legal, religious and military means, Indians, especially the Mohawks, began
asserting their own authority over spaces in the town, particularly the fort and the court,
the latter o f which was established in 1652. During this period, the Dutch courts of Fort
Orange and Beverwyck met within the confines o f the fort. With Indians able to gain
access to the court and the fort to advance their own agendas, they became the primary
force behind the creation o f a new diplomatic landscape in Fort Orange, and then Albany.
This new diplomatic landscape was then established as the center o f relations between the
American Indians and the Europeans in North America.
Chapter four moves back to the Esopus region in the 1660s, after the first Esopus
War, which is covered in chapter two. This chapter argues that the Dutch actions to
establish a stable interior to New Netherland, specifically the erection o f a fort in the
Esopus, led to further hostilities with the Esopus Indian population. More significantly,
these hostilities created a shift in the geography o f Indian and Dutch relations. Whereas
prior to the second Esopus War, Indian relations were split between the two Dutch
centers, Fort Amsterdam and Fort Orange, after this war, Fort Orange became the center
for such relationships. It was also after the second Esopus War that the Dutch created a

21 Beverwyck was established by the WIC directors in 1652 and was the community that Fort Orange
served. Rensselaerswyck was the name o f the Patroonship established by Killiaen van Rensselaer, and
which surrounded both Fort Orange and Beverwyck.
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stable community between Forts Orange and Amsterdam, just in time for the English to
come in and continue to expand the settlements.
The final chapter looks at the region after the English takeover and the
establishment of the colony of New York. While the wars, trade and diplomacy between
the Dutch and the Indians o f the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys allowed Fort Orange to
rise as the center o f Dutch and Indian relations, events after 1664 that took place outside
of New York, such as Bacon’s Rebellion, Metacom’s War, the Third Anglo-Dutch War
and the Five Nations’ War with the Susquehannocks led to the solidification of what was
then known as Albany as the colonial center o f Indian and European relations.
Furthermore, relations were taken out o f the fort and into the courthouse. However, by
the 1670s, Albany was not just a center for New York, but the eastern seaboard o f North
American north o f Carolina.
Moreover, the true significance in Albany’s establishment at the center for
European and Indian relations was the fact that it happened as a result o f the cooperation
and contests o f both European and Indian populations. These populations consisted of
more well known groups and individuals, such as the Mohawks and Governor Andros,
and lesser known peoples such as the Esopus Indians and Jacob Jansen Stoll, a Dutch
settler. The interactions o f these peoples that led to Albany’s role in the new diplomatic
landscape o f North America also consisted o f more well known events such as
Metacom’s War and lesser known confrontations such as the Esopus Wars. It is by
studying the combination o f all the populations and events where we gain an
understanding of the dynamics o f seventeenth-century Indian and European relations, and
how they could create a new and unique context for cross-cultural diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 1

OUTSIDE THREATS AND INSIDE RUMORS
When Petrus Stuyvesant arrived in New Netherland in 1647, he was immediately
confronted with the task o f dealing with various threats, both Indian and European, to the
stability o f the colony. Stuyvesant worked diligently on dealing with the various threats
from New England, New Sweden and New France. However, because Stuyvesant’s
attention was often drawn to the various borders of New Netherland to fend off one
challenge to New Netherland’s stability after another, Fort Orange, as a secondary seat of
power within the colony, was able to develop independently from the authority located in
New Amsterdam. This fractured nature o f the colony o f New Netherland challenged the
stability o f the colony, by having different communities act independently from one
another and the central authority o f the WIC in New Amsterdam. Moreover,
Stuyvesant’s constant shifting from one problem to the next, and Fort Orange’s
independence, created a fluid enough situation to allow for the creation o f a new cultural
landscape at Fort Orange, which would not exist in other New Netherland communities.
As a part of the creation o f new cultural landscapes resulting from the multiple
threats, the Dutch residents of the Hudson River Valley were forced to alter their
justification o f rightful ownership o f the land they claimed. As a result, New Netherland
utilized the presence o f forts on the land as their main symbol o f authority. Eventually,
the Mohawk Indians would be able to utilize this symbol o f Dutch authority and
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manipulate it to their own ends, thus helping to bring about a new diplomatic landscape at
Fort Orange and then Albany.
As part o f the creation of a new diplomatic landscape amongst a multitude of
threats, the reliance on information provided by Indians and disseminated by Indian
couriers played an important role. While the Dutch were dependent on Indian
information and Indian messengers to provide intelligence and routes o f communication
between the physically separated settlements of New Netherland, that information was
disseminated in what Europeans considered rumor, or unsubstantiated or unverified
information. Yet it would be these “rumors” that the Dutch, and eventually the English,
would have to take into consideration when making decisions or forming official policy.
Dutch dependence on Indian information and “Indian intelligence”, especially in the
isolated region o f Fort Orange would also contribute to the creation o f the new diplomatic
landscape in Fort Orange as the Mohawks would provide their information to the Dutch
in the court at the fort. Such Indian intelligence could be both the source of threats and
the source to their solutions.

The Threat to the East
The initial threats were posed by English and Swedish colonial settlements
moving into territory claimed by the Dutch Republic. Soon, Stuyvesant would also grasp
the urgency o f the threats posed by the Algonquian and Iroquoian residents in what he
believed to be the rightful possession o f the Dutch, especially along the Hudson River
Valley. While the Dutch had claimed the region from the Connecticut River to Delaware
Bay (although Stuyvesant would also at times claim Dutch jurisdiction from Cape Cod to
Cape Henlopen), their hold on the territory was tenuous, and it was threatened from all
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sides. These threats were both real and perceived. No matter the origin or the form of
the threat, the High Council o f New Netherland located on Manhattan Island, DirectorGeneral Stuyvesant and the Directors of the WIC in Amsterdam, found themselves
scrambling to maintain their grip on the colony and especially for control along the
Hudson River.
Upon his arrival in Manhattan, Stuyvesant was immediately confronted by New
Englanders exerting pressure on the border between New Netherland and New England.
Actually, part o f the problem was a lack of an agreed upon border. The first letter sent
from the Directors o f the WIC in Amsterdam to Stuyvesant and the Council o f New
Netherland expressed interest and concern over England’s activity to the east. The main
issue was a dispute over control o f the Connecticut River, referred to as the Fresh River
by the Dutch. The Directors were particularly concerned about the presence o f a new
English trading house on the Connecticut River at present day Springfield,
Massachusetts. In this letter they specifically addressed the issue o f the new trading
house posing a direct threat to Fort Orange; as they noted, the two were separated by only
ten leagues.1 They also specifically mentioned their concern over the fact that the
Indians, not naming which Indians, claimed a right to sell the land for the new trading
house to the English, because, according to the Directors, “it is within our boundaries,”
they also warned that “we must prevent their [English] locating there by all means.” The
Directors did qualify their “by all means” declaration by directing the New Netherland
officials that the Englishmen’s “doings and arrangements must be carefully
watched.. .and invasions or trespasses by them as well as by others must be prevented, if

1 However, these m iles were over quite hilly terrain that neither the English or Dutch could traverse or
defend very easily.
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possible.”2 The issue o f New England’s activities to the east o f New Netherland was the
focus of Stuyvesant’s early activities as director general o f New Netherland.
Stuyvesant actually took the initiative in facing the English challenge to Dutch
territory before he received the somewhat tentative instructions from the Netherlands.
On June 25, 1647, Stuyvesant sent a letter to Governor John Winthrop in Massachusetts.3
This would be the beginning o f a long and involved correspondence with the New
England governors. Like the majority o f Stuyvesant’s official letters, the tone was
cordial even when the message was not. Stuyvesant offered pleasantries and informed
Winthrop that he would be at the latter’s service, “always provided it may not intrench
upon the right o f my Lords & Masters, the Estates-Generall, or West Indie Company,
whose indubitable right is to all that land betwixt that riuer called Conneticut & that by
the English named Deleware.”4 With his statement, Stuyvesant not only staked his
claim, but also let Winthrop know that Christian cooperation would only go so far.
By August o f 1647, the New Englanders responded to Director Stuyvesant in a
united front. In their letter they congratulated the new Director General on his safe
arrival in Manhattan. They also made it clear that they would not back down and
concede disputed areas to the Dutch. The Englishmen placed their statements within the
context o f concern over the Dutch selling arms and ammunition to the Indians, “at long

2 Gehring, Charles T. ed. & trans., Correspondence, 1647-1653. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
2000, 5. This letter was not dated, but was sent from Amsterdam in April o f 1647 and arrived in New
Amsterdam on June 28.
3 This is the first extant letter from Stuyvesant. He wrote to Governor Eaton at N ew Haven prior to his
correspondence with Gov. Winthrop, this letter no longer exists. N ew Haven was the most immediate
threat to the stability o f N ew Amsterdam as it was located within Dutch claims.
4 Gehring, C orrespondence 1647-1653, 7.
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Island within the River o f Connecticut at the Narragansetts and other places within the
English Jurisdictions.”5 Now that it was clear that neither side had any intention to
concede its claim on the Connecticut River, relations between the Dutch and the English,
especially those at New Elaven, declined rapidly.
New Haven Governor Theophilus Eaton wrote to Stuyvesant in June 1647 to
acknowledge the new Director’s arrival and to propose an “equally proposition o f a
neighbourlie correspndencie, that justice may haue a full & free passage in all occasions
betwixt us.”6 By the time Eaton wrote his second letter in August o f that year, his goals
had changed to “witnes against your vnneighbourlie & iniurious course.” Eaton
abandoned attempts at diplomacy as he argued vehemently against Dutch claims on land
that he and the residents o f New Haven colony had occupied under the authority o f King
James and by purchase o f the land from the Indians “who were the true proprietours of
the land.”7 Stuyvesant’s actions against New Haven colony caused Eaton to accuse the
former o f “disturbing the peace betwixt the Engl: & Dutch in these partes, which hath
Q

bynne [soe long & so hapilie] maintained betwixt the two nations in Europe.”
But this was not Europe and relations between countries on one continent did not always
transfer so clearly to relations between the same countries on another continent.
The dispute over the boundary between New Netherland and New England
dominated Stuyvesant’s activity for several years. He initially tested the waters to see if
the New Englanders would back down. He discovered they would not. While continuing

5 Ibid., 9.
6 Ibid., 13.
7 Ibid., 13.
8 Ibid., 14.
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to lay claim to the area along the Connecticut River, he also asked for a meeting between
New Netherland and New England authorities in order to establish a stable and secure
eastern border with New England. Stuyvesant would then be able to turn his attention to
controlling the land and the people in other areas o f New Netherland.
The correspondence between Eaton and Stuyvesant continued in a less than
cordial manner. Governor Eaton, with his thriving settlement at New Haven, was
particularly offended at the audacity that New Netherland, a place that he refused to
recognize as a colony, but only as a mere plantation, was making claims on his colony.9
By reducing the Dutch presence in North America to the status o f a plantation, Governor
Eaton tried to establish English dominance in the region based on what he viewed was
the success o f the various settlements. Furthermore, with the colony o f New Haven, as
well as Connecticut, being within the disputed area, Governor Eaton had greater incentive
to prove the validity o f the English claim on the land.
During this correspondence Stuyvesant and his New England counterparts
illustrated the ideas behind what constituted a legal claim on North American land. As
Jaap Jacobs has pointed out in his article on the border conflict, the two European powers
had different criteria for claiming land. The legal basis for English land claim was the
right o f first occupation. The Dutch WIC however, required effective use of land by at

9 Ibid., 14, 15, 47. As Warren Hofstra explained in his book on N ew Virginia, “The term plantation
customarily applies to the designs that English policy-makers in early-seventeenth-century London
developed to impart both impetus and form to the movement o f Scottish, English, and some German and
French Protestants into the north o f Ireland in an effort to wrest the region from the native Irish and reduce
the threat o f Catholic power to the security o f England. The term was never em ployed so explicitly to
describe efforts to occupy the margins o f the English colonial world o f the eighteenth century with white,
Protestant, yeom an farm families amidst a war with French and Spanish colonists, Native Americans,
Native Americans, and enslaved Africans.” Page 4. This also seem s to apply for seventeenth-century
English North America. Eaton only used the term plantation in reference to N ew Netherland, while the
other English settlements were referred to as colonies.
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least fifty colonists.10 It is important to point out that Jacobs’s analysis o f the
negotiations was from a European perspective looking at how matters of sovereignty
were defined in Europe. He noted that with expanding colonial empires, these definitions
were in a state o f flux during the mid-seventeenth century, especially with England in the
midst of a civil war. With no mutually accepted terms concerning land possession,
Jacobs points out that, “there was neither right nor wrong in this situation; it was rather a
matter of opposing points of view.” 11 With no accepted standard, the colonists would
have to contest for the right to utilize their own terms concerning claiming land.

12

However, the correspondence between the Dutch and English governors seems to
indicate that the colonists’ definitions o f who controlled lands did not necessarily agree
with that of their rulers at home. It would seem counterproductive for Stuyvesant to
argue that the Dutch retained control o f the Connecticut River Valley based on the WIC’s
demand that the land be under effective use by at least fifty colonists. Dutch presence on
the Connecticut River was limited to a few men posted at Fort Good Hope, a place that
was quickly being surrounded by English settlers in the town o f Hartford, Connecticut.
The Dutch did not meet their own criteria for laying claim to the Connecticut River.

10 Jaap Jacobs, “The Hartford Treaty: A European Perspective on a N ew World Conflict,” de H alve Maen
68 (1995): 74.
" ib id ., 75.
12 See Patricia Seed, Cerem onies o f Possession in Europe's Conquest o f the N ew World, 1492-1640
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for a discussion on the varying cultural and political
methods European powers utilized to claim dominion over territory. See also James Muldoon, “Discover,
Grant, Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John Adams on the Legal Basis for English Possession o f North
America,” in The M any Legalities o f E arly Am erica, ed. Christopher L. Tomlins; Bruce H. Mann (Chapel
Hill: University o f North Carolina for the Omohundro Institute o f Early American History and Culture,
2001), 25-46. Muldoon argues that debates over the international nature o f land claim s does not come into
its own in Britain and British North America until the eve o f the American Revolution. At this point in the
seventeenth century, the nature o f land claims remained a very local issue with wider implications.
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Due to the difficulty in getting settlers to occupy New Netherland, the Dutch
changed their requirements for legal land holdings in North America. The Dutch claimed
they owned the land because they had purchased the land outright from the Indians. This
allowed Stuyvesant to assert to Gov. Winthrop that, “my Lords & Masters, the EstatesGenerall, or West Indie Company, whose indubitable right is to all the land betwixt that
riuer called Conneticut, & that by the English named Deleware.”

1T

Stuyvesant did not

argue about land occupation. According to him, the Dutch held the claim to the land
based purely on its legal purchase.
In the letters o f the New England governors to Petrus Stuyvesant, it continued to
be Governor Eaton of New Haven who described and defended England’s claim on the
Connecticut River. Eaton upheld the idea of right o f first occupation in his arguments
with Stuyvesant. However, Eaton went a step further and used Dutch reasoning in his
arguments against Stuyvesant. He claimed rightful ownership “by lycence & auntient
patent from King James, o f famous memorie, since confirmed by his Maiestie that now
is, first came into these ptes, & vppon due purchase from the Indians, who were the true
proprietours of the land (for we fownd it not a vacuum) haue built, planted, & for many
yeares quietlie, & without any claime or disturbance, from the Dutch or others, possessed
the same.” 14 Jacobs points out that such an argument was actually rejected by English
authorities in Europe because the Indians were not bona fide possessors o f the land.
However, it appears that the situation on the ground called for new reasoning beyond
what was deemed acceptable in Europe.

13 Gehring, C orrespondence 1647-1653, 7.
14 Ibid., 13.
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Stuyvesant, knowing his situation called for a peaceful settlement o f the
boundary, continued to press for a meeting between New Netherland and the New
England colonies to resolve the border issue. New England had a greater population than
the colony o f New Netherland thereby allowing the former to create a much larger
military force than the latter. Furthermore, many settlers in New Netherland did not feel
it necessary to provide military service to the colony since the WIC maintained a military
presence in the colony, although it was also not sufficient to protect the colony from the
numerous threats it faced. Not only was New Netherland not in a position to fight its
English neighbors, but Stuyvesant’s attention was needed throughout the colony. The
meeting was continually pushed back and rescheduled for one reason or another.
Furthermore, the location o f the meeting was a particular sticking point.
Stuyvesant wanted a meeting at Hartford, in the disputed territory and near the Dutch
Fort Good Hope. The New Englanders wished to have the conference in Boston. The
meeting was finally held in Hartford in September 1650. By dictating the location of the
meeting near the site o f the Dutch Fort Good Hope, Stuyvesant was able to illustrate the
Dutch presence and, although minimal, the Dutch power in the region and negotiate for a
more favorable boundary line for New Netherland than if the meeting took place in
Boston or even New Haven. This was one of the earliest examples o f how the competing
powers o f the region tried to exert their influence over the diplomatic landscape of the
area. Although Stuyvesant had much weaker military support to back up his claim, he
was able to mitigate this apparent weakness by including an important symbol of Dutch
power on the landscape, Fort Good Hope, to establish an element o f control during the
negotiations.
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The 1650 Hartford Treaty did help to stabilize New Netherland by removing a
significant threat coming from outside the colony. With the treaty, the border between
New England and New Netherland was finalized. New Netherland lost its claim to the
Connecticut River, although they were allowed to retain control over Fort Good Hope.
However, the Dutch really had no realistic claim on the Connecticut River as it was
populated by the English. The Dutch retention o f Fort Good Hope was merely a symbolic
gesture, and the fort was soon abandoned. However, forts were very important elements
of the Dutch presence in North America, as we will see, and the existence o f Dutch at
Fort Good Hope allowed the Dutch to negotiate from a more powerful position, than if
Stuyvesant conceded Good H ope’s loss prior to the meeting. Furthermore, although the
treaty would not be ratified in Europe for several years, it appeared to be sufficient for the
purposes o f the colonists in North America. Stuyvesant and the Council at New
Amsterdam could then turn their attention to other areas o f the colony where Dutch, and
particularly WIC, control of land and people was in doubt.

The Threat to the South
With concerns of a direct attack o f the English on New Netherland at least
temporarily allayed, Stuyvesant and the Council still had to contend with the loss of
Dutch authority along the South or Delaware River. The WIC was adamant concerning
its claim to land from the Connecticut River to the Delaware River. However, it was also
willing to give up claim to some o f that territory in return for a certain amount o f peace of
mind. The WIC directors indicated that they would be happy to agree on a boundary
with the Swedes as well as with the English, but they saw little hope in that occurring.15

15 Ibid., 58, 107, 154.
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In 1654 the Swedes did take over the inadequately defended Fort Casimir on the
Delaware River without having to fire a shot. With the Swedish capture o f the fort, the
Dutch had no real presence on the Delaware River. The Directors in Amsterdam
adamantly held to the ideas that the Delaware was Dutch territory and that they had the
strength to defend it. They therefore instructed Stuyvesant to retake the territory from the
Swedes. Stuyvesant decided that the winter o f 1654-1655 was not a good time to retake
the Delaware; he, therefore, set sail to retake Fort Casimir in September 1655. It was an
extremely quick expedition and the Dutch retook Fort Casimir and then expelled the
Swedes from their Fort Christina before the end o f the month. However, this victory
would come at a very costly price as events unfolded in New Amsterdam during
Stuyvesant’s absence. These events will be discussed below.
The Swedes did not pose the only European threat to New Netherland’s south.
The authorities in New Amsterdam were also concerned over relations with the English
in Virginia as well as those in New England. While the WIC authorities in New
Amsterdam did not foresee a possible threat to their territory by the Virginians, they did
view the Englishmen to their south as a possible economic threat and acted accordingly.
On December 16, 1653 New Netherland sent Reverend Drisius to Virginia to conclude an
“alliance, correspondence and commerce” between the two colonies.
He was also to propose and ask for a provisional continuation of the
commerce and intercourse between the two places, a free pass or
safeguard, signed by the Honorable Governor for some o f their merchants
and yachts, to pay and collect debts am ong the inhabitants of Virginia; as
we on our side have given and are still willing to give, passes to come and
go, to ships and yachts coming to us from Virginia.16

16 Edward T. Corwin, ed., E cclesiastical R ecords o f the State o f N ew York, 7 vols., vol. 1 (Albany: State o f
N ew York, 1901): 319.
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Whereas Stuyvesant was able to negotiate a boundary with the New England authorities
from an advantageous position at Hartford, where a WIC fort was located, he held no
such advantage with the Virginians. Without a previous presence on the landscape, and
without any power within the colony o f Virginia, he was forced to send a representative
to Virginia in hopes of gaining favorable trading conditions.
In 1659, Stuyvesant became alarmed again that the Swedes were purchasing
Indian land around Fort Nassau. He ordered the Dutch on the Delaware to buy the land
around the fort to prevent Swedish acquisition. He was particularly concerned that the
Swedes, through the continual purchase o f land would be able to cut off communication
between Fort Nassau and Fort Orange. Similarly, he was concerned that the Swedes had
•

designs on the Hudson River.

17

*

These threats did not come to fruition, but they

nevertheless caused Stuyvesant to keep a very wary eye on events to his south and
especially along the Delaware River. These activities continue to illustrate the fractured
nature of Indian and European relations in the mid-seventeenth century. There was no
central location for dealings with Indians and Europeans. Interactions between Indians
and Europeans continued to take place in many locales as the situation warranted.

The Threat to North
The Dutch in New Netherland did not have to contend with threats just from the
English and the Swedish; they also had to guard their northern holdings from the French
in Canada. In the 1650s, wars between the Mohawks and the Canadian Algonquians
threatened to cut off Fort Orange’s fur supply from the north. As a result, much official

17 Letter from Stuyvesant to Beekman, May 24, 1659. W illiam Beekman Letter Book, 1658-1664. N ew York Historical Society collections. Manuscript microfilm reel #20, pg. 215.
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Dutch attention was drawn to the immediate needs o f the trading enterprise around Fort
Orange.
On March 21, 1651 the Amsterdam Directors commented on the M ohawks’ attack
on Canada where they captured eight or nine Christians whom they were threatening with
torture if they did not receive a large ransom. The Directors conceded that to assist
is the duty o f all Christians, but every one is bound to care for himself and his
own people; your Honor cannot be ignorant, that some time ago men o f this
nation have been ransomed at the expense o f the Company and by the
contribution o f the community, for which we have never been repaid; so that we
think, that when the complaints reach France, they will take care o f their own
countrymen.18
While the Dutch were not directly involved in this war, the residents of Fort Orange and
Rensselaerswyck could not avoid the repercussions o f such a war. Furthermore, the Fort
Orange authorities would tend to ignore the advice o f the WIC Directors to let France
take care o f their own countrymen. By ransoming captured Frenchmen from the
Mohawks the Dutch at Fort Orange placated both Mohawks and French in order to keep a
peaceful border to their direct north. The Dutch may not have liked ransoming captured
Frenchmen, but they saw it as necessary. These actions also contributed to the constant
evolution o f a new cultural landscape as Dutch, Mohawks and French remained in
contact from these interactions. By the summer o f 1653, war between the Iroquois and
the French eliminated peaceful relations along the northern borders o f New Netherland,
and drew much o f New Netherland’s attention north as well.

18 Berthold Fem ow, ed., Documents Relative to the H istory an d settlem ents o f the towns along the Hudson
and M ohawk R iver (with the exception o f Albany) fro m 1630-1684, and also illustrating the relations o f the
settlers with the Indians (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, 1881), 27. Hereafter cited as Femow, DRCHNY 13
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English Incursions into New Netherland
One o f the most significant barriers to maintaining control o f the territory claimed
by the Netherlands was lack o f population. Although the Dutch believed that purchasing
land from its rightful Indian owners guaranteed their legal claim to the territory, without a
human presence on the land, it was vulnerable to take over, particularly by the larger
English population to their east. Stuyvesant harbored much resentment towards nonDutch residents within the colony. However, members o f the WIC in Europe did not
share this sentiment. The WIC Directors usually supported English settlement within the
boundaries o f their colony as long as the groups were in manageable numbers and swore
to uphold the laws and rights o f the company.19 These individuals and groups were not
necessarily seen as threats by the Directors o f the WIC in Amsterdam, because they did
not challenge the W IC’s dominance in the beaver trade.
However, when a group o f Englishmen expressed their desire to settle and trade in
New Netherland, the WIC Directors vehemently objected to the presence o f an “English
tradinghouse ten leagues from Fort Orange.” Not only did the Directors wish to keep the
English traders away from Fort Orange, but they also indicated that they must prevent
“by all means” the Indians selling land to the English within New Netherland
boundaries.20 As long as the Englishmen were not challenging WIC authority they were
welcomed by those in Amsterdam. However, Stuyvesant did not share the Directors’
opinion on English settlements within New Netherland. He would argue against English

19 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 4.
20 Ibid., 5. All land within N ew Netherland had to be purchased from the Indians by the WIC and then
granted to individuals. It was acceptable, according to som e WIC officials, for English settlers to occupy
and farm land that they acquired from the WIC after the WIC acquired it from the Indians. Direct purchase
o f land by anyone, regardless o f nationality, that bypassed the WIC was not considered legitimate.
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presence within the WIC colony on economic, political, and religious grounds, with
much of his arguments focused on the use and control o f land.
The WIC recognized their vulnerability from lack o f population. In March 1650,
the Committee o f the Amsterdam Chamber o f the WIC contracted a charter to transport
200 settlers to New Netherland. One half o f the compliment were to be farmers and farm
laborers, the other half were to be “conversant with agriculture” and the WIC would
furnish them with the necessary supplies for the voyage.

01

In this way the Dutch would

be better able to defend their territory and to illustrate to English settlers that the Dutch
possessed the land by both legal purchase and by proper occupation and use o f the land.
These terms satisfied both Dutch and English definitions of land possession. The need to
populate New Netherland, especially the most vulnerable area between New Amsterdam
and Fort Orange, would be an issue throughout the colony’s existence. Unfortunately,
there is no record that the requested settlers ever arrived in the colony.
Even with limited but growing Dutch population and military force in the region,
the English governments in New England and Maryland did not directly invade the Dutch
colony. However, the influx o f individual and small groups o f English settlers into the
colony created its own set o f problems for the WIC. The Dutch authorities’ insistence on
a boundary between the English and Dutch colonies underscored their desire to keep the
English contained in New England and Maryland. Throughout 1650, the WIC was
concerned with continued reports of a possible war between the English to the east of
New Netherland and the Wappinger Indians, a Munsee speaking group along the Hudson
River. An English victory over the Wappinger Indians would allow the English to

21 E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., D ocum ents R elative to the C olonial H istory o f the State o f New York, 14 vols.
(Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1856), 1: 370.
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occupy the land by the right o f conquest. According to his official writings, Stuyvesant
did not see this as an imminent threat, however, he feared the possibility enough to reach
out to the English he wished to keep out o f New Netherland.22
In order to prevent English incursion as a result of a war between them and the
Wappingers, New Netherland proposed a joint Anglo-Dutch alliance in order to avert war
with the Wappinger Indians altogether. The reasoning behind such an alliance was that
the Dutch and Wappingers already had signed a treaty after K ieft’s War, and a Dutch
alliance with the English could help to bring about a peace between the Wappingers and
the English before a war ever started.

Such a course of action would then eliminate the

possibility of the English moving into the Wappingers’ land along the North River as part
of a right of conquest. Furthermore, such an alliance would allow the Dutch to keep a
wary eye on their English neighbors and their military capabilities. While this
arrangement made sense to Stuyvesant, the New Englanders saw little advantage for them
in an alliance with their Dutch neighbors, and the alliance never came about. Moreover,
these events continued to illustrate the fractured nature o f Indian and European
interactions at this time. W ithout a single, coherent policy, the Dutch, as well as the New
Englanders, were forced to react to controversies with the different Indian groups,
whenever and wherever they happened to present themselves.
Although the threatened war between the English and the Wappingers never came
about, WIC authorities continued to fear the usurpation of what they considered to be

22 Fem ow, DRCHNY 13: 27.
23 Kieft was the Director o f N ew Netherland before Stuyvesant. The colony experienced a devastating war
with Indians in the 1640s.
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Company land. In March 1651 the WIC directors warned Stuyvesant not to grant land to
anyone without properly acknowledging the authority o f the WIC. He was also forbidden
to grant land to anyone who could not prove that he had the means to populate and
cultivate the land.24 This statement reflects the precarious nature o f Dutch land claims.
The WIC claimed land based on the supposed legal purchase o f it from the rightful
owners, the Indians. They also controlled the distribution of that land to individuals who
were able to make right and proper use of the land. Proper use o f the land in this instance
was agricultural use, which would not threaten Dutch fur trading enterprises in the
region. However, those who were able to meet the WIC’s requirements o f populating and
working the land often found themselves at odds with the Company concerning land use.
This was the case with foreign settlers (meaning both non-Dutch and non-Dutch
Reformed) as well as Dutch landholders such as the Rensselaers around Fort Orange.
On December 11, 1653 George Baxter and several Dutchmen petitioned DirectorGeneral Stuyvesant concerning the legitimacy o f the settlements on Long Island that were
populated by both Dutch and English. Baxter was an Englishmen who cultivated land on
western Long Island. He started his petition by stating, “first o f all, we acknowledge a
paternal government which God (in nature) has established in the world for the
maintenance and preservation o f peace and the good o f m ankind.... We therefore humbly
conceive our privileges to be the same, harmonizing in every respect with those of the
Netherlands, being a member dependent on that state and not a conquered or subjugated
people.”

Baxter’s petition for privileges and protections under the WIC, based on fealty

24 Feraow, D R C H N Y 13: 27.
25 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 90.
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to the Dutch authority, was met with derision by Petrus Stuyvesant and members of the
Council. According to the Directors o f the WIC, Baxter met the conditions for land
ownership in the colony. He and his neighbors pledged their willingness to obey the laws
of New Netherland and also settled and cultivated the land. Therefore there should have
been no issues regarding Baxter’s and his neighbors’ rights to live peacefully in the
borders of New Netherland.
Stuyvesant, however, did not see the situation quite in those terms. He was
primarily concerned with the fact that the petition was written in English and translated
into Dutch. The idea that “a foreigner or Englishman has to tell them what to remonstrate
and demand” was an insult to Stuyvesant. In his reply, Stuyvesant noted that other New
Netherland jurisdictions were “unaware o f such a remonstrance and should be considered
too careful to sign what an Englishman has drafted, as if there was no one o f Dutch origin
intelligent enough and capable to draft a petition to the Director General and Council.”

96

The other jurisdictions that he mentioned consisted of populations o f Dutch majority that
did not have to prove themselves as loyal to the WIC to the same extent as the
communities on Long Island and other communities made up o f large numbers of nonDutch, and particularly, large numbers o f English. Furthermore, the fact that an
Englishman was speaking for an otherwise Dutch community showed Stuyvesant’s
discomfort with the creation o f new cultural landscapes where non-Dutch played a
significant role. Stuyvesant was trying to create an extension o f the Dutch Republic in
North America, and he wished to do so with no English interference. However, in the
atmosphere in which he lived, one o f constant challenges and negotiations for power, he

26 Ibid., 90-97.
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was unable to stop the formation of new cultural landscapes which incorporated
significant non-Dutch elements.
Despite Stuyvesant’s personal feelings towards the English presence within New
Netherland, by 1654 greater numbers o f English settlers were moving into what the
Dutch called Vreedlandt and the English called Westchester, as well as other areas along
the Hudson River. Like the English settlers on Long Island, this community had been in
existence north of Manhattan well prior to Stuyvesant’s arrival in the colony, and they
also pledged fidelity to the WIC. They had also established farms and continued to
populate the land. Again, the community lived up to the requirements on legal
settlements set forth by the WIC. However, WIC representatives in the colony perceived
the majority English community between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange as a threat to
the internal stability o f New Netherland. Therefore, those WIC representatives who
made up the Council in New Amsterdam ordered the group in W estchester to leave.
Officially they were accused o f “usurping” WIC land.

77

The concerns o f the people o f New Netherland surrounding the infiltration of the
English into Dutch territory were compounded early in 1654. In February of that year,
the Council took up a discussion on the scarcity of lead and powder among the Mohawk
nation. They, and the residents o f Fort Orange, were concerned that if munitions were
cut off completely to the Mohawks, the trade at Fort Orange and Beverwyck would come
to an end. The council minutes show that their concern was not that the Indians would be
unable to hunt beaver for the international trade, but “that the aforesaid nation might seek
the munitions from our neighbors the English and be successful therein, which in these

27 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 36-38.
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dangerous times might bring more and greater misfortunes to this province.”28 That
greater misfortune was seen as the possible end o f the Dutch alliance with the Mohawks.
The members o f the Council reasoned that should the Mohawks turn to the English for
trading purposes, then the Mohawks would in turn switch their friendship to the English
at which time New Netherland would be completely isolated.

9Q

Although the colony was

short on lead and powder for their own supply, the Council deemed it necessary to
provide the Mohawks with what they could. With the Council taking the lead on these
negotiations, it shows that Indian policy was not only being driven from New
Amsterdam, even though the Mohawks were located just west o f Fort Orange, but also
continued to be a part o f Dutch policy with their European rivals.
With their elevated concern that the Mohawks would ally themselves with the
English, the New Netherland authorities proceeded with extra urgency to try to remove
the English from the Hudson River valley. On April 19, 1655 the Council o f New
Netherland once more warned Thomas Pell and others against settling on the lands of the
Vreedlandt. Again, to the Dutch the land was clearly theirs because Gov. Kieft
purchased it years earlier from the Indian residents o f the area who they believed to be
the rightful owners o f the land. The English, however, believed that their occupation was
the critical factor in establishing ownership o f the land, not to mention that they had
earlier been given permission to settle the land and continued to pledge loyalty to the
company. The council warned them “not to proceed with building, clearing, pasturing
cattle or cutting hay or whatever else may be necessary for the cultivation o f the soil upon

28 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 116.
29 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13:35.
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the aforesaid purchased and long possessed lands contrary to the agreement made at
Hartford and to remove within fifteen days” or risk persecution according to law.30 Like
the Council’s directive o f a year earlier for the residents o f Vreedlandt/Westchester to
leave the land, the English settlers also ignored this order, thereby illustrating Dutch
inability to actually control much of the land they claimed under the jurisdiction o f New
Netherland. Furthermore, WIC inability to control this particular area and the people
who occupied the land served as another example o f how different regions within New
Netherland continued to develop independently o f one another, despite governmental
efforts otherwise.
Furthermore, the Westchester residents’ resistance to the Council’s orders for
them to leave the land further illustrates how English settlers were able to form a new
cultural landscape within New Netherland. This new cultural landscape was based on
English colonial understanding o f rightful land use and ownership. Stuyvesant and the
Council continued to resist, in vain, the creation o f these new non-Dutch landscapes
within the border o f what they claimed as New Netherland.

Indian Threats
The English were able to ignore the directives o f Stuyvesant and the Council with
impunity due to the numerous threats the colony then faced. A small group o f English
farmers, no matter how strategically located, did not pose the same threat as a large
English attack, Swedish usurpation of land, or Indian attack. However, this small group
of English farmers did expose the lack of control that the WIC maintained over the land
and the people who occupied it. WIC representatives in the colony were unable to
respond to multiple threats at the same time. Furthermore, we see that the authorities in

30 Ibid., 38.
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New Amsterdam were often less concerned with events to the north o f Fort Orange than
with those to their east and south. These events were often left to the residents o f Fort
Orange and Rensselaerswyck to deal with. This was true in dealings with both the
French in Canada, including the “Canadian Indians,” and the Iroquois. This early
differentiation between the concerns and responsibilities o f the settlements would
contribute to the formation o f Fort Orange and eventually Albany as an independent
colonial center.
This separation o f responsibilities would become even more pronounced during
and after 1655. With the growing threat o f the Swedes on the Delaware River and then
the Peach W ar attacks on Manhattan Island, Stuyvesant’s attention was needed elsewhere
and the residents o f Fort Orange were left to deal with affairs in their region.
Furthermore, it is during and after 1655 that the Mohawks begin to expand their own
political activities into Fort Orange.
While Stuyvesant was concerned with Swedish activity on the Delaware River,
the Mohawks’ war with the Canadian Algonquians in the 1650s got the attention o f the
WIC Directors in Amsterdam. In April of 1652 Directors in Amsterdam expressed their
concern over the Mohawks’ war with the Canadian Indians. They were particularly
concerned by a request o f the Canadian Indians to go into the Mohawks’ country. This
would require them to pass over the North River, and they asked for permission to do so.
The directors understood that granting the Canadian Indians permission to travel over the
North River and over New Netherland territory would cause great trouble with the
Mohawks. Since the Dutch were dependent on the Indians, especially the Mohawks, to
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maintain their fur trading industry, the last thing they could afford was to allow the
Mohawks’ enemies to travel through Mohawk territory.
Although the WIC directors continued to hope to entice the northern Indians to
come down to New Netherland to trade their beaver pelts, they also understood the
necessity o f maintaining their alliance with the Mohawks. In order not to jeopardize any
future relations with the Canadian Indians, the Directors also wanted to make sure that
•> i

Stuyvesant refused the Indians’ request “politely.”

It is interesting to note that

according to the communication from the WIC officials in Amsterdam, the Canadian
Indians asked for permission to cross over the North River, not Dutch land.32 Such
emphasis on the river was not unique. It was the river more than the land that the Dutch
knew and possessed.
In the M ohawks’ invasion of French Canada when they had taken several
prisoners, Algonquians from Canada were said to be traveling down into the Hudson
River Valley to wage war on the Mohawks.34 To face this threat the Dutch continued to
propose a mutual defense against the Indians, which they initially brought up during the
concern over a war between the English and the Wappingers. By proposing this mutual
defense plan, the Dutch would benefit from the English military power that outnumbered

31 Ibid., 34; and Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 153.
32 The Gehring translation states that the Indians requested “passage to the North River.” In both Gehring’s
and Fem ow ’s translations the emphasis is placed on the River itself, and not the land.
33 See Merwick, P ossessin g Albany, 4, 107-114 where she discusses the importance o f water and
specifically the Hudson River to the Dutch in N ew Netherland. She stated on pages 107-109 that, “Water
was the sine qua non o f the trading system. The rivers and kills were essential sources o f energy and
transport. They were also sources o f imagination and self-referentiality. They were full o f power and
meaning.” They were filled with power and meaning particularly because they linked the sources o f Dutch
control, the forts, and they were one o f the few geographic regions where the Dutch were able to assert
their authority, especially over Indian populations.
34 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 28-35.
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the Dutch two to one. At the same time the Dutch would be protecting their own interests
from the same military threat by keeping their friends close and their enemies closer. The
English, seeing no advantage for themselves in such an alliance, politely declined.
Luckily for New Netherland, their failed attempt at solving these particular problems was
neutralized by the fact that the Dutch did not become immersed in hostilities between the
Mohawks and the Canadian Algonquians.
Possible threats from Indian sources were not restricted to the Iroquois’ wars with
the Canadian Indians. Although many tribes signed a treaty with the Dutch after
Governor Kieft’s war in 1645 the potential for violence continued. In George Baxter’s
1653 petition to Governor Stuyvesant, he stated that the settlers on Long Island continued
to expect another war with the Indians. Baxter predicted such an event because the
Indians committed several murders under the supposed pretext that they had not been
paid for their lands. Stuyvesant, already upset that this petition was originally written in
English by an Englishman, replied to Baxter “the assertion and allegation o f the
remonstrants that murders had been committed by the Indians, under the pretense of not
having been paid for their land, is made entirely without foundation and in bad faith.”
According to the Dutch, they had bought the land from the Indians, and therefore, it was
the Dutch under the authority of the WIC who had legal deed to the land. Baxter claimed
that he and his fellow petitioners purchased the land from the Indians.
Stuyvesant did not accept that Baxter and his associates had a legitimate claim to
protection from the WIC if they did not gain title to their land through the WIC, since all
land purchased from Indians had to be approved by the WIC. Stuyvesant made his
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feelings concerning Baxter’s claim to the land known in his somewhat hostile reply. He
stated, that
if we accept the assertion of the remonstrants that the murders were
committed under the pretext of not having been paid for the land and
compare it with their statement in the preamble that they themselves had
bought the land from the Indians, would not the lack o f payment then be
their fault as buyers, and therefore would not they themselves be the cause
"VS
o f this claim by virtue o f their default?

Whether Baxter was stealing land from the Dutch or the Indians, Stuyvesant did not
recognize Baxter’s claim to it. Stuyvesant wanted the WIC to dictate the process of
creating new communities and thereby the creation o f Dutch landscapes in New
Netherland.
Nor did Stuyvesant accept Baxter’s explanation for the growing Indian threat on
Long Island. According to Stuyvesant the reasons were much more o f a spiritual nature.
Stuyvesant admonished Baxter for not taking the time to investigate the reasons behind
the recent murders committed by the Indians. Stuyvesant explained that Indians on
Staten Island killed some settlers because they claimed that Cornelius Melyn was a
sorcerer who poisoned them and sold them bad powder. The Indians in the area swore to
kill him and all the people on Staten Island to protect themselves from the sorcery o f the
Christians.36

35 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 97.
36

Ibid., 97.
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Importance of Forts to Dutch Goals
The WIC claimed the land on the Delaware, like the land along the Hudson and
Connecticut Rivers, based on purchase o f the land from the Indians.37 As shown above,
however, the Dutch colony was constantly faced with threats from outside factions. So
while the WIC could claim land based on legal purchase from the Indians and in some
cases through settlement and use o f the land, the W IC’s practical efforts to maintain
control o f the land was through the presence o f forts on the land. Forts Orange and
Amsterdam on the Hudson allowed the Dutch to claim control o f that river, while Fort
Good Hope was the Dutch symbol of authority on the Connecticut River. On the
Delaware River the Dutch maintained at first Fort Nassau and then Fort Casimir. It was
in the presence o f these forts that the WIC placed its hope o f maintaining control over
their lands.
The Dutch had to rely on forts as a military presence in North America partly
because it could not rely on numbers as the English could, especially in New England.
While New England experienced an influx of colonists during the Great Migration, New
Netherland was never so fortunate as to attract many willing Dutch men and women to
settle in the colony. With the forts, they were able to establish an authoritative presence
and protect New Netherland’s most valuable areas, the rivers that supported the fur trade.
Furthermore, while the Iroquois had fortified towns, Europeans had little access to them,
and when Europeans did access Iroquois “castles”, as they were called, it was usually
either as captives or under highly controlled circumstances. Fort Orange, however,
played a most significant role in the history o f the region. Its use as a place of

37 See above for discussion o f Dutch shifting from land claims based on proper use to land claims based on
purchase from Indians.
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intercultural exchange, whether through trade or diplomacy, allowed it to develop as a
colonial center o f European and Indian affairs.
The importance o f the forts was apparent in a 1647 letter from the WIC Directors
to Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam that discussed the boundary disputes
with both the English and the Swedes. There was confusion as to exactly what
Stuyvesant was trying to claim as New Netherland territory. Stuyvesant had argued for
different boundaries with the separate English authorities. With some he claimed land
from the Connecticut River to the Delaware River. With others he claimed land from the
Connecticut River to Cape Henlopen, and finally at other times he claimed territory from
Cape Henlopen all the way to Cape Cod. Due to the confusion, the Amsterdam Directors
wrote:
Now your Honor says in your last letter, (that the) D irectors.. .did not
claim our ju(risdiction) farther, than from (the) Southriver in the South to
the (Freshwater) river in the North, which your honor thinks it (ought to
be beyond) question, because the (country, the) streams and rivers,
(situate) between the two, are lined (with) our forts, but that in the
protests against the English, your honor pretended a little more, namely
from Cape Malabare, (called) Cape Cot by our people, to Cape
Hinloopen: Yet your honor says if we might have the first mentioned in
peace, it would be the best to be satisfied with it.38
It seems that Stuyvesant, by making grand claims to territory, was giving himself room to
negotiate in order to maintain what he saw as New Netherland’s legal territory “beyond
question” because it was “lined with our forts.” The Dutch forts were the symbol of
Dutch authority, even though militarily they were neither well armed nor sufficiently
manned. However, the forts were erected to protect the main land use o f the colony,
trade, and were, therefore, a physical manifestation o f Dutch power and control over the

38 Gehring, C orrespondence 1647-1653, 68.
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land the forts occupied. Stuyvesant could not claim that the territory the WIC claimed
was lined by their settlements and farms, so the presence o f the forts stood as the
evidence o f Dutch power and control over a certain area, as tenuous as that control may
have been.
On the Delaware, Stuyvesant took it upon himself to replace the original Dutch
fort on that river, Fort Nassau, which was located on the east side o f the river, with Fort
Casimir, which was built on the west side o f the river. As was discussed above, the
Swedes and Dutch had rival forts on the Delaware, and the two nations traded claims to
the river by taking over one another’s forts. The populations were quite minimal. It was,
therefore, the possession and presence o f forts on the river that allowed the nations to
claim control o f the river itself and allowed a small force to control trade and access to
the interior lands. Moreover, the presence o f a garrisoned fort could force competing
powers, such as Maryland and Virginia, to pay required duties in order to sail and trade
up the Delaware River. Unfortunately, these claims of power and control were seldom
backed up with the actual ability to assert real authority over the areas surrounding them.
Fort Orange, as the W IC’s fort located furthest inland, played a unique role in
defining the borders and function o f New Netherland. Fort Orange did not control entry
to the Hudson River, but allowed the Dutch to assert some authority over the interior
lands beyond the Hudson River. Fort Orange was the one Dutch fort located closest to
lands contested by Dutch, Indian, English and French powers. After the fall o f Fort Good
Hope in the 1650s, Fort Orange defined the northern limits of New Netherland and stood
as a bulwark against encroaching English interests in the area. W ith the presence o f Fort
Orange on the upper reaches o f the Hudson and near the mouth o f the Mohawk River and
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the interior hunting grounds, New Netherland was able to exert its authority over access
to those lands.
Because o f Fort Orange’s important position, WIC authorities found it quite
necessary to protect it. In the same 1647 letter that discussed New N etherlands
boundaries as “beyond question” due to the presence o f the forts, the WIC directors
expressed concern over a desire by the Swedes to establish their own fort north of Fort
Orange. The Directors indicated that such an event would be “very injurious for us.”39
This statement was quite odd seeing that the Swedes really had no access to the lands
north of New Netherland. However, it stood as an additional perceived threat from the
north, in addition to the actually threat from France in Canada.
In response to the Mohawks’ war with the Canadian Algonquians in 1653, the
WIC suggested establishing a post eighteen to twenty miles north o f Fort Orange to allow
the Canadian Indians to trade more easily with the Dutch. However, such a move was
not to the Dutch advantage.40 By building a post outside o f the perimeter o f forts
constructed by the Dutch, the WIC risked increasing the vulnerability o f Fort Orange,
which was already isolated from other Dutch settlements. Furthermore, the Dutch could
ill afford to alienate the Mohawks with a futile attempt at enticing the Canadian Indians
south. Armed with the knowledge o f the situation on the ground, the New Netherland
Council rejected the W IC’s suggestion and moved to appease the Mohawks and to
prevent them from becoming allied to the English. The Dutch in New Netherland were
fully aware the English had more to offer the Mohawks in material aid, therefore, the

39 Ibid., 69.
40 Fem ow, D RCH N Y 13: 35; and Gehring, C orrespondence 1647-1653, 211.
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New Netherland council resolved to supply the Mohawks with a moderate amount of
powder and lead. Supplying the Mohawks with powder and lead was a practice that
would continue throughout the existence o f New Netherland.41

Furthermore, building a

new fort north of Fort Orange would place it beyond the limits o f Dutch shipping and
Dutch ability to control the river. However, the rejection of the plan and the appeasement
o f the Mohawks also allowed Fort Orange to develop its importance as a center o f
European/Indian relations in a region that had no defined political boundaries, and where
no power was capable o f imposing defined boundaries that other groups would accept.
The W IC’s forts on the Delaware River allowed them to maintain a presence
where they had few actual settlers. In the correspondence between the WIC directors in
Amsterdam and Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam, the main focus in
discussion o f Dutch territory on the Delaware River was on the forts as the Dutch worked
to retain possession o f the area. In April o f 1652 the Directors o f the WIC wrote to
Stuyvesant and the Council that they did not see much hope in arranging a boundary with
the Swedish government. The letter continued with a discussion o f Dutch forts in the
area, the possible need to build additional forts, and the necessity o f preventing “people
who have been so bold to stir up the Indians against us” from erecting strongholds on
islands around Manhattan.42 While these actions seem quite obvious and o f little
consequence in such a context, the maintenance o f forts was crucial in retaining a
presence on the land and attempting to control the people o f New Netherland and the
Hudson River Valley in particular.

41 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 35; and Gehring, Council M inutes, 1652-1654, 116.
42 Gehring, C orrespondence 1647-1653, 155.
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The importance o f forts in New Netherland was expressed not just through
correspondence between WIC officials in Amsterdam and those in New Amsterdam. The
significance o f forts on the land was also expressed through Dutch maps. One o f the
most widely used maps in works on New Netherland is the 1656 van der Donck map
(Figure 3). This map depicts Nova Belgica Neiuw Nederlandt as encompassing the area
just east o f the Fresh or Connecticut River to the area just west of the Delaware River.
The map shows fairly detailed knowledge o f the rivers, streams and coastlines o f the
colony. The Connecticut, Hudson and Delaware Rivers appear quite accurate up to the
limit of travel by European vessels. However, the map depicts the Great Esopus Kill as
connecting with the Susquehanna River and eventually emptying into the Delaware.43
Along the banks of the main rivers, the map identifies the forts o f the region. The Dutch
Forts of Orange and Amsterdam on the Hudson River, and Fort Good Hope on the
Connecticut River were identified on the map. The Delaware River forts o f Nassau,
Christina and Elsenburg (the latter was a Swedish fort) were all identified as well.
The landed areas in between the rivers were not as well documented. These areas
were filled with the names o f Indian groups whose further presence is often noted by the
use of small houses indicating their general whereabouts. Names of islands in the
Hudson River are listed mainly along the east bank o f the river and fill in an otherwise
blank area o f land. This is especially noted in the land opposite the Esopus. Other areas
that lacked European settlements were filled in with drawings o f small hills and trees.
The area o f land between the Hudson and Connecticut Rivers was left virtually empty,

43 Although it was an error, this connection actually gave greater significance to settling the Esopus region
as it would, according to the map, give the Dutch an inland water connection between the Hudson and
Delaware Rivers.
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Figure 3. Van der Donck Map. Courtesy o f the New-York Historical Society Map
Collection
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filled only by the names of a few tribes, with no corresponding houses. The “LANDT”
from the words proclaiming the region “New N ederlandf ’ also fills this area o f the map,
along with a few groupings o f trees. Actually one o f the few signs o f human occupation
o f this region between the two rivers is the designation o f “Mr Pinsers handel huys” or
the trading post of Pynchon at Springfield, which posed a relatively serious threat to
trading activities at Fort Orange.
The most significant symbol o f European occupation, and thereby European
control, o f this area was the fort. Van der Donck used both words and a four-pointed
symbol to mark the locations of Fort Orange on the Hudson River as well as Forts
Nassau, Christina and Elsenburg on the Delaware River. It is also interesting to note that
Fort Orange is identified with a different typeface than the others, thereby indicating a
certain differentiation from other New Netherland forts. The typeface is larger and less
resembles script writing thereby making it stand out. In contrast to Fort Orange, the
Rensselaerswyck settlement o f Greenbos is identified with smaller italicized type. The
community o f Greenbos, which was part of the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, was
established on the east side of the Hudson River to keep residents away from the fur
trade; it had not been a viable community for several years at this point. Most residents
of Rensselaerswyck preferred to reside on the west side o f the Hudson River, closer to
what they saw as the vast Iroquois beaver hunting grounds north and west o f Fort Orange.
New Amsterdam’s presence at the southern tip o f Manhattan Island was identified
with the same fort symbol as the smaller Dutch settlements, including that o f Fort Good
Hope. Additionally, the van der Donck map includes a straight-on view o f New
Amsterdam, as one would approach the town from the sea. In this depiction o f New
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Amsterdam, there are two dominant features. The first is a device to load and unload
ships, which is in the center foreground o f the drawing and stands as a prominent symbol
of the importance o f trade in the area, especially in New Amsterdam. The second
dominant feature is the fort, included therein was the church and the statehouse. All of
these features of the landscape o f New Amsterdam stood as the dominant symbols of the
authority o f the WIC in New Netherland. The residences o f the town are in small clusters
outside o f the fort and are also lined all along the outside o f the edifice.
This particular map also shows the locations o f two Dutch forts without actually
identifying them by name. These forts include Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River
and Fort Casimir on the Delaware River. The former had been rendered obsolete for
several years by the time the van der Donck map was published in 1656. It is still
important to note that even though by the time the English and Dutch finally came to an
agreement concerning the boundary between their respective colonies in 1650, the
English had already established themselves as the dominant European force around the
then Connecticut River. The 1650 Hartford Treaty placed the Connecticut River on the
English side o f the boundary, but allowed for the Dutch to maintain Fort Good Hope
along the river. However, it was not as if the fort posed any threat to the English
presence in the area, especially once William Pynchon established his trading house well
north o f Fort Good Hope and cut it off from any Indian trading activity.44 Although the
English then claimed the Connecticut River and Fort Good Hope was no longer a
productive Dutch outpost, it nevertheless stood as a symbol of Dutch presence in the
region. Furthermore, van der Donck’s inclusion o f the fort maintained the symbolism of

44 Pynchon w ill be discussed further in chapter five.
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Dutch presence on the land and its symbolism of the power o f New Netherland for
Europeans who would acquire knowledge o f the region solely through stories and maps.
The van der Donck map stands as evidence o f the importance o f forts for the
Dutch in laying claim to the territory they called New Netherland. Forts stood as the
most visible sign o f Dutch power in the area, not merely on maps, but on the landscape.
And as Fort Orange was uniquely depicted in van der Donck’s map, it maintained a
unique position within New Netherland. It helped to fend off threats from English
interests in the area and it aided in maintaining peaceful relations with area Indians whom
the Dutch depended on for trade. In the years after 1655, Fort Orange would play an
even more important role as Indians, particularly Mohawks, would begin to utilize the
fort to achieve their own political and military ends.

1655 as a Turning Point
In 1655, New Netherland faced a series o f calamities that threatened the stability
of the colony. New Sweden’s establishment o f Fort Christina and conquest o f the Dutch
Fort Casimir gave rise to the possibility o f New Netherland losing the southern half o f its
colony. This possibility was averted when Stuyvesant led a Dutch expedition that
removed the Swedes from the Delaware River. However, while fighting the Swedes, the
Dutch faced an Indian war known as the Peach War in the heart o f New Netherland,
which offered the potential o f ripping the colony in two.
Events o f 1655 illustrate how complicated and tenuous relations were among
Europeans and between the European and Indian powers in the mid-Atlantic region.
While Petrus Stuyvesant was busy defending the southern edges o f New Netherland from
the Swedish encroachment on WIC lands, several bands o f Indians led a raid on New
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Amsterdam. Included in this group were the Wappingers and Esopus Indians, both of
whom played significant roles in European/Dutch relations. Prior to the raid word was
circulating that Indians were going to attack the Dutch throughout Long Island, being
careful to pick them out from the English inhabitants o f the area.45
The Peach War itself offers a look at the possible importance o f the geographic
interior o f New Netherland in European/Indian relations. On the morning of September
15, 1655 several hundred Indians arrived in New Amsterdam, entered the city and began
searching through houses o f European residents o f the Island. They broke into the house
of Isaac Allerton, an English trader who was also a member o f the New Amsterdam
community, and supposedly searched Allerton’s Manhattan home because he had traded
with rival Indians, the Narragansetts 46 In the course o f the day the invading Indians
informed the New Netherland council that they were only looking for their “Northern
Indian” enemies and would soon be leaving the island. Also during this time, the Indians
exacted their revenge on Hendrick van Dyck, a local resident who had killed an Indian he
accused o f stealing peaches from his orchard. Thus the conflict received its name, the
Peach War. Eventually, the Dutch authorities who remained in Stuyvesant’s absence
took action and retaliated against the Indians. The Indians spent the next three days
destroying both farms and people and taking over 100 settlers prisoner. Staten Island and
Pavonia bore the brunt o f the attack and residents lost all o f their homes in the attack.47

43 Femow, D RCH N Y 13: 39. This initial discussion and rumors circulating about this possibility will be
discussed below.
46 Paul Andrew Otto, New N etherland Frontier, 216
47 Ibid., chapter 5. Otto’s emphasis in his work is on Dutch relations with the M unsee speaking Lenape
Indians o f the Lower Hudson River. It was the Munsee speaking Lenape Indians w ho were the main
participants in the Peach War. It was the Munsee speaking Esopus Indians who w ill be the subject o f
discussion later in this dissertation. Otto argues that the Peach War was an event that got out o f hand with
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In his study o f Indians in seventeenth-century New York, Allen Trelease notes
that another explanation for the Peach War was that the Swedes bribed the Indians to
attack New Amsterdam while the Dutch were attacking New Sweden to the south. This
explanation is supported by a report indicating that the chief sachem o f the
Susquehannocks was seen with the attackers. Trelease, however, discounts the idea that
the Susquehannocks and other Indians could have been somehow involved with the
Swedes because attacking New Amsterdam would not be as effective as a direct attack on
the Dutch at New Sweden.48
In response to the war, Stuyvesant and the Council tried to prevent further damage
by trying to control the movements o f both Dutch and Indians upon the land. Prior to the
end of hostilities, the Council in New Amsterdam released, in 1655, an order prohibiting
individuals from traveling on or even gathering near the Hudson River in Manhattan.
The New Netherland council knew that they were unable to control Indian activity on the
river and did not relish the idea o f having to ransom individuals who opted to conduct
any sort o f business with the Indians on the west bank o f the Hudson. In hopes o f
preventing further loss and another Indian attack on Dutch settlements the Burgomasters
and the Council in New Amsterdam tried to impose their will on this dangerous
landscape by restricting Indian movements within towns. These new regulations
included prohibiting Indians from coming into the city, except to specifically designated
places in order to trade. In addition, all Dutch settlers were forbidden to bring Indians

the absence o f Director Stuyvesant. He stated, “with others in charge o f the colony, one o f these tense
situations erupted into warfare” (pg. 216). A lso see Trelease, Indian Affairs in C olonial N ew York, 138147. Trelease finally concluded that, “The Peach War turned out to be no war at all in any meaningful
sense o f the term” (pg. 147). However, the war had significant consequences on Dutch policy toward the
Indians and future Indian/European relations in the region.
48 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 139.
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into their houses or shelter them overnight.49 This way, the WIC authorities could, in
theory, control the development o f the cross-cultural space o f the town, and keep
elements o f the wilderness, namely the Indians, out o f Dutch spaces. These issues will be
discussed in greater length below.
After the Peach War, the main groups o f people Stuyvesant had to deal with were
the Indian tribes o f the region. On October 18, 1655 Pennekech, chief o f the Hackensack
Indians sent fourteen Dutch men, women and children who his people had captured back
to New Amsterdam. With the release o f the captives, Pennekech also requested that the
New Netherland officials show their good faith by sending the Hackensacks powder and
lead. Stuyvesant and the Council responded to this by not only sending Pennekech the
powder and lead, but also releasing both a Wappinger and an Esopus captive from the
war. The Council found out about a week later when Pennekech requested additional
lead and powder that the remaining Dutch captives were separated among several Indian
groups who were moving into the interior.50 The interior lands were still very much
Indian dominated landscapes. Although the Indian nations in the immediate vicinity of
New Amsterdam negotiated for a peace, they still held power outside o f Dutch
settlements, and the Dutch were forced to respond to this continued Indian power where
the Dutch held no influence.

49 These same restrictions were put into place in Fort Orange and later in Esopus as w ell, and residents o f
both settlements proved unwilling and/or unable to comply with these restrictions on trade with the local
Indian populations.
50Gehring, Council M inutes 1655-1656, 102-104, 119, 132, 299. Dutch prisoners were held by
Wiequaskeckse Indians also referred to as Westchester Indians, and Highland Indians who were located
north o f Westchester on the east side o f the Hudson River. The Council continued to work for the release
o f captives, particularly children, through early 1656.
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However, the resulting peace brought a halt to hostilities between the Dutch and
Indians o f the lower Hudson River Valley. With the end o f major Indian resistance
around New Amsterdam, it is at this point that Indian relations begin to shift north.
Independent Indian power and therefore Indian control o f land lay outside the immediate
vicinity of Manhattan Island, including the lands between New Amsterdam and Fort
Orange. As New Amsterdam became more o f a Dutch landscape than an inter-cultural
one, Indian influence on the land would be felt further to the north o f Manhattan and
would eventually settle in Fort Orange. As we will see, post 1655 policy changed how
people, both Europeans and Indians moved and lived on the land as many more
regulations and actual attempts to enforce these regulation came about as a result o f the
Peach War. One o f the problems Stuyvesant wished to gain control o f was the
proliferation o f rumors throughout the colony.

Rumors
Rumors were a threat to the stability o f New Netherland under Stuyvesant right
from the beginning. As he started his negotiations with the New England colonies, and
especially the colony o f New Haven, concerning a boundary between the two, he
received a letter from Deputy Governor Goodyear from New Haven warning the Dutch
governor that, “many vaine rumours may arise whereby iealousies & discontents may be
fomented.”51 Soon after Goodyear’s warning, Stuyvesant received a letter from New
Haven’s Governor Eaton filled with jealousies and discontents. He wrote,
I heare allsoe you threaten to bume or beate downe our trading howse,
built vppon our owne purchased land, within our owne limmits,. . . and
which is yett worse, it is reported to us by several persons and from
severall places, that your secretarie hath indeauoured by a slanderous
51 Gehring, C orrespondence 1647-1653, 19.

61

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

report to incense the Long Isl: Indians, and your selfe att Aurania fort,
have attempted to trye other companies of Indians against the English.52
Stuyvesant and the New England governors discussed this particular rumor from
November 1647 through May 1648. It is interesting to note, however, that Stuyvesant
seldom discussed this rumor directly with Eaton, who originally brought it to light;
instead he dealt with Deputy Governor Goodyear or Governor John Winthrop in Boston.
Stuyvesant directly denied the veracity of the rumor that the Dutch were arming the
Indians at Fort Orange and hoped to attack and “beate downe” the English trading house
at Springfield. He referred to the said rumors as “scandalous reportes” and “soe farre
from the rules and principles of Christianitie and Charitie.”53
Stuyvesant did not necessarily speak directly to Eaton, nor did Eaton directly
speak to Stuyvesant. In response to Stuyvesant’s letter denying the rumor, Winthrop
wrote that Governor Eaton had informed Winthrop the story was “Indian intelligence and
did gaine but little Credit with him.”54 However, the issue o f “Indian intelligence” was a
crucial factor in communications in seventeenth-century New Netherland, as much of
their information came from Indian sources.55 Where Easton may have discounted

52 Ibid., 23. The trading house Eaton referred to was Springfield and “Aurania fort” was Fort Orange.
53 Ibid., 27.
54 Ibid., 29. Here Gov. Eaton equates the idea o f Indian intelligence with rumor. Eaton did not put much
credence into information derived from Indian sources, thereby equating them with the European concept
o f rumor. The Dutch, however, including Stuyvesant but particularly the residents o f Fort Orange, were
dependent on “Indian intelligence” for information concerning the further reaches o f the colony which
could often only be accessed by Indians. The Dutch, therefore, saw much value in Indian intelligence and
often treated rumors, or false intelligence, as truth for lack o f other viable sources o f information.
55 Marion A. Cail, “The Dissemination o f Rumor Among the Cherokees and Their Neighbors in the
Eighteenth Century” (Masters Thesis, C ollege o f William and Mary, 2000); and Gregory Evans Dowd,
“The Panic o f 1751: The Significance o f Rumors on the South Carolina-Cherokee Frontier,” The William
an d M ary Q uarterly 53, no. 3 (1996): 527-560. Both these works discuss the importance rumor played on
both Indian and European societies on the eighteenth century southern frontier where reliable information
was indeed scarce. With the constant rumor o f attacks coming from both sides, both Indians and Europeans
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“Indian intelligence,” Indian information continued to gain greater credence in European
relations, not only with Indians, but also with one another. Due to a lack o f safe and
reliable communication routes, the Dutch remained dependent on Indian intelligence,
which often was rumor, or at least considered a rumor. Moreover, the information
provided by Indians would drive Dutch decision making and policy towards Indians and
other Europeans.
The next significant threat o f the period came in 1650 with the rumor o f a war
between the English in New England and the Wappinger Indians. The Wappinger Indians
were located between present day Kingston to the north and Westchester to the south and
between the Hudson River to the west and the Housatonic River to the east. This position
placed them on either side o f the Hartford Treaty line o f 1650 that demarcated the
boundary between Dutch possessions to the west and English possession to the east. The
Wappingers were, from the European perspective at least, an international threat.
Depending on the outcome o f such a war, either the Dutch or the English could make
significant inroads into the other’s territory, thereby disrupting the stability o f either New
Netherland or the New England colonies.
The Wappingers were one o f several Indian bands to sign a treaty with the Dutch
in August 1645 at the conclusion o f Governor Kieft’s war. The terms of this agreement
called for both sides to refrain from war and that all grievances would be resolved
through negotiations and not through revenge. This agreement opened the way for

abandoned settlements and prepared for war. Gregory Evans Dowd, “The French King Wakes up in
Detroit: "Pontiac's War" in Rumor and History,” Ethnohistory 37, no. 3 (1990): 254-278 argues that during
Pontiac’s War, Indians used rumors in order to influence French policy to return to N ew France after their
defeat in the Seven Year’s War. This is a departure o f the idea that France influenced Indian policy at the
time, and, instead, illustrates both Indian motivations and Indian power.
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greater cooperation between the Wappingers and Dutch in the form o f formal
negotiations, which were at first centered at Fort Amsterdam. These negotiations moved
Dutch and Wappinger relations into a new realm that went beyond mere economics into
diplomacy. Furthermore, the elimination o f revenge killings would eliminate the
constant threat o f violence breaking out between Wappingers and the small, scattered
Dutch settlements along the Hudson River. Unfortunately, many individuals, both Dutch
and Wappingers, did not necessarily abide by these agreements, as we will see later,
thereby further illustrating a lack o f control by either Indians or Dutch in certain areas in
the Hudson River Valley.
From the Dutch perspective, the Wappingers, while not necessarily allies, were at
least not enemies. The same did not hold true for the English, who had no such treaty
with the Wappingers. New Netherland officials did not want to see violence break out in
the territory after five years o f relative peace, especially if that violence originated with
the English. More importantly the New Netherland officials recognized that an English
victory in such a war with the Wappingers would lead to the English trying to move into
the sparsely populated area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. The English
would claim right o f conquest, although the Dutch claimed the land. Furthermore, an
English settlement mid-way between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam would cut the
northern part o f colony in two through the crucial highway o f the Hudson River, thereby
eliminating Fort Orange’s free access to the Atlantic Ocean and would irreparably
damage Dutch participation in the Atlantic World fur trade. The directors o f the WIC in
Amsterdam were particularly concerned by this possibility.
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W ith an influx o f English settlers into the lands north o f Manhattan Island in the
1640s, the Dutch under Petrus Stuyvesant were not prepared to allow the English to
disrupt the peace and dominate the Hudson River valley.56 In response, Stuyvesant and
the Council tried, with little success, to remove some o f the more significant English
settlements in the Hudson Valley. While this threat o f war between the English and the
Wappingers remained merely a threat, it would encourage the Dutch to try to stave off
such a scenario from taking place. The Directors o f the WIC remained concerned with
the colony’s vulnerability to English incursion and recognized that an English presence
within the colony was coming from different sources, not just as a result of war.
The rumors leading up to the Peach War began as early as 1652. At this time
Reverend Wilhelmus Grasmeer, former minister in New Netherland, testified in
Amsterdam concerning one Comelis Melyn, a resident o f Staten Island. Grasmeer
claimed that he
had heard the Manhattans Indians o f New Netherland, living at Nayack, a
place on Long Island directly opposite Staten Island, frequently say, that
the said Comelis Melyn had made them believe and declared to them,
Director Petrus Stuyvesant would, as soon as he had built a wall around
Fort Amsterdam, come to kill them, namely the savages, whereupon the
said savages fled and came armed to Gravesend.57
Comelis Melyn was also the individual whom the Staten Island Indians believed to be a
sorcerer, which led them to threaten to kill Melyn and all the Dutch on Staten Island.

56 Fem ow, DRCHNY 13: 10, 14, 17, 18, 27; and Trelease, Indian Affairs, 8. Trelease identifies several
bands o f Algonquian Indians as Wappinger. These bands known individually as the Rechgawawancs or
Manhattans, the W ecquaesgeeks or Westchester Indians, the Sintsinks, the Kitchawanks, the Nochpeem s,
the Siwanoys, the Tankiteke or Pachamis, and the Wappinger proper. These groups were often referred to
collectively as the Highland Indians and occupied the lands surrounding the Hudson River south o f presentday Albany.
57 Corwin, E cclesiastical Records 1: 303. Indians on Staten Island also claim ed that Melyn was a sorcerer
who poisoned them and sold them bad powder. The Indians in the area swore to kill him and all the people
on Staten Island.
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While nothing o f consequence came out o f the rumors surrounding Comelis
Melyn, the rumors themselves caused great concern with Stuyvesant and the High
Council. In July 1654 the Council met to discuss the continued spreading of rumor of
attacks. The minutes read:
Whereas we have been reliable informed that some among our subjects
once again, as last year, have taken up and circulated false, spurious and
self-contrived rumors, dishonoring the high administration o f this province
and the Netherlandic nation; namely that some members o f the high
council together with some Dutch inhabitants were to have hired and
incited some Frenchmen and Indians to massacre and plunder the English
people residing among us; which circulated rumor, although false,
unchristian and completely without foundation, was, nevertheless,
disseminated so obstinately and impudently by some (mostly English
refugees from New England) in order to incite greater turmoil among the
good inhabitants; and in order to give more credence to their lies, they
abandoned their houses and plantations, most o f them going to the village
o f Gravesend, where some robbers, bandits and pirates have banded
together and quartered themselves for some time n o w .58
The council determined to pursue and prosecute any and all who took any part in the
rumors and deny them their rights o f citizenship and their rights to their land.
New Netherland could not afford to maintain such a dissenting population within
their borders. This was especially true when that dissenting population consisted
of untrustworthy Englishmen.
O f course, the rumors persisted. In January 1655, George Baxter was again the
subject o f discussion with the Council. This time he spread a rumor that England would
soon be moving to take over Long Island and bring it under the jurisdiction of the New
England colonies. According to the rumors, this event w as to occur by M ay o f 1655 at

the latest. The Council stated in this session that they knew the reports to be false, but

58 Gehring, C ouncil Minutes, 1652-1654, 155.
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they also took the opportunity to protest continued English movement into lands the
Dutch purchased from the Indians.59 English control of these lands could easily cut Dutch
settlements off from one another. Stuyvesant was also hindered from any further
investigation o f the rumors as they were forced to wait until the ice and snow melted to
pursue his inquiry. Due to the fact that New Netherland was held together by rivers, the
harsh winters of the Hudson River Valley made holding and defending the colony even
more difficult. The fact that Fort Orange was often cut off from New Amsterdam for
several months o f the year served as a threat to the colony’s stability. Moreover, the
isolation of Fort Orange from the rest o f the colony due to the weather assisted in the
community’s independent development from the political center o f New Amsterdam.
Because Fort Orange was often physically isolated, its residents were forced to act
politically independent at times, which aided in Albany’s eventual rise as a colonial
center o f power among Europeans and Indians.
By early September 1655 the rumors kept circulating. A letter to the Council
from the residents o f Gravesend reported that they daily heard stories that the Indians
intended to destroy the Dutch residents o f Long Island, and that the Indians had warned
the English to separate themselves from the Dutch or fear suffering the same fate. The
Dutch inhabitants o f Gravesend though it would be best to pick up and move to
Manhattan to avoid such a fate, especially since, it was “reported that the Indians o f the
north and o f the neighboring places are making great preparations to carry out their plans
quickly.”60 The council had sympathy for their situation, but concluded that there was

59 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 9.
60 Ibid., 85.
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insufficient evidence to justify a removal from Long Island. Furthermore, such an act
would only serve to leave the land firmly in the hands o f the English.
The officials remained concerned as rumors continued through October 1655.
This time the Council concluded that the cause o f these new rumors was the continual
contact between the European settlers o f Manhattan Island and the Indians as well as
contact between different Indian nations. In response, Stuyvesant and the Council
ordered, “that no one, whatever his capacity may be with boat, canoe or any other vessel,
however, it may be called, shall cross over, or in any way communicate or speak with the
Indians.” They went on to order the Indians, “in case anyone crosses over without
showing the sign and token of the honorable general or goes to the Indians that they are
to detain and subject to ransom such boat, canoe or persons.”61 The Council and
Stuyvesant went so far as to order people to stay away from boats used in official
communication between the Council and the Indians. The Dutch officials had witnessed
the “swarming and unseemly clamor” o f their fellow Dutch settlers looking for
information from the Indians concerning activities beyond the confines o f Manhattan
Island. N ot only were these crowds unseemly, but they also alarmed the Indians and
discouraged them from coming and offering what information and assistance they could
to WIC officials in new Amsterdam. Such swarming o f colonists at the river also helped
lead to increased rumors.
Indian intelligence, whether true or what many perceived as rumor, created a need
for WIC authorities in New Amsterdam to attempt to further control peoples’ movements
on the land. They were especially concerned with the movements o f the Dutch colonists
who were often starved for information on other areas o f the colony brought in by
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traveling Indians and Indian messengers sent from other settlements. However, the
continued dependence on Indian messenger and Indian information, especially for
communication between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam, caused New Netherland to
remain susceptible to reacting to bad information. Furthermore, Fort Orange’s relative
isolation within New Netherland and their dependence on the Mohawks for their fur trade
created an atmosphere where Dutch officials in Fort Orange relied heavily upon Mohawk
information. This, in turn, led to the eventual presence o f Mohawks into the Fort Orange
court as informants, witnesses and diplomats.

Ibid., 86
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CHAPTER 2

OUTSIDE OF TOWNS

With the external threats to New Netherland alleviated, at least temporarily, with
the Hartford Treaty o f 1650 and the removal of the Swedes from the Delaware River, the
internal weakness of the colony was exposed by the Peach War of 1655 and the
continued and contentious English presence within the colony. The next step for Petrus
Stuyvesant and other representatives of the WIC was to gain control o f the colony by
establishing a greater Dutch presence in the areas outside o f the few settlements. The
creation o f a settlement at Esopus could also have lessened the dependence on Indian
intelligence and Indian messengers as the New Netherland towns would be more closely
connected physically. Significant efforts were put into gaining greater control o f areas
along the Hudson River in order to connect the trade center at Fort Orange and the
Patroonship o f Rensselaerswyck to New N etherlands political center at Manhattan.
Through these efforts, such as the settling o f the Esopus region, and the results of
these efforts, namely the Esopus Wars, Fort Orange’s position as a center for not just
trade, but diplomacy among Indians and Europeans, was rapidly developing. In fact, Fort
Orange’s importance to growing diplomatic involvement between the Dutch and
surrounding Indian groups expanded to the point that it set itse lf apart from N ew

Amsterdam as the location for Dutch negotiations with Indians. Furthermore, much o f
this alteration in the role o f Fort Orange as a diplomatic center came about, not as a result

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

o f WIC policy, but as the result o f Mohawk influence both among other Indian tribes and
within the court of Fort Orange.
Fort Orange’s centrality in the fur trade remained the colony’s most significant
source of potential revenue, yet it remained quite isolated from New Amsterdam to the
south. In fact, the Dutch had little influence, and indeed, little knowledge o f lands inside
their claimed boundaries but outside o f their town walls, although they were quite
familiar with the waterways that linked them. Their forts stood as their symbol o f power,
and their power existed almost solely within those forts. Except for the waterways,
Dutch knowledge o f areas outside of their settlements was quite limited.

Dutch Experiences Outside of the Towns in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys
From the time o f Fort Orange’s establishment in 1624 until New Netherland’s
surrender to the English in 1664, there were few documented Dutch forays into the area
outside of the fort’s protection. It was through the accounts o f these infrequent journeys
that the Dutch o f New Netherland gained some o f their direct intelligence o f the area.
Otherwise, they had to rely on “Indian intelligence.” However, the Iroquois Indians
remained in control o f how and where the Dutch received their information during these
trips beyond the towns. It is also important to note that most o f the documentation of
land to the west o f the Hudson River and the Dutch settlements on it was actually written
by Frenchmen, including many Jesuits who traveled in the area. Both the French and the
Dutch were interested in the region to the west o f Fort Orange for its significance in
harvesting furs. The French, however, were also interested in the region for its potential
in harvesting souls. As a result, the French had a much greater knowledge o f the
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Mohawk River Valley, which the Dutch saw as their greatest source o f revenue in New
Netherland due to its use as hunting grounds for beaver furs.
Prior to the reports of the more extensive French travels in the area; Harmen
Meyndertsz van den Bogaert kept a diary o f his trip to the territory o f the Oneidas in the
winter o f 1634-1635. The purpose o f this trip was to inquire as to the extent o f French
incursions into hunting grounds around Oneida Lake, west of Fort Orange. As William
Stama explained, the Dutch feared that a French truce and trading agreement with the
Iroquois would divert the fur trade north to Montreal and render Fort Orange obsolete
thereby ending the Dutch colonial enterprise o f New Netherland.1 Van den Bogaert
traveled with two Dutch companions for six weeks through eastern Iroquoia, and his
account stands as the earliest known written record of Europeans in the interior lands
west o f the Hudson River.
Van den Bogaert’s account is highly valuable for its ethnographic information. It
is also useful for gaining insight into who was traveling in this highly coveted land. On
December 21, 1634 the group’s guide Sqorhea led them to a small village called Osquage
where they met the sachem, whom they referred to as Oquoho, meaning wolf.2 In this
meeting Oquoho informed the European travelers that yes indeed Indians allied with the

'Charles T. Gehring trans. and W illiam A. Stama eds., A Journey into M ohawk and O neida Country, 16341635: The Journal o f Harmen M eyndertsz van den Bogaert, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1988, xix; and in Dean Snow, Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna eds., In M ohawk Country: Early
N arratives about a N ative P eople, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996, 1. A version o f this
diary was also included in the 1909 collection entitled N arratives o f N ew Netherland, 1609-1664 edited by
J. Franklin Jameson. However, all references to the van den Bogaert diary w ill be from the Gehring and
Stama translation.
2 Gehring and Stama clarify that the c h ie fs name was most likely not Oquoho, and that the term probably
identified the c h ie fs clan affiliation. In addition to the w o lf clan, Mohawks also include members o f the
turtle and bear clans. A Journey, 7 and note 56 on page 37.
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French had been traveling in the area near the Sinnekens.3 The Iroquois chief also
informed the Dutchmen that in his own overland travels he had encountered an
Englishman coming from the land o f the Susquehannocks in order to learn their language
for the trade. It is unfortunate that he could give no other information as to the English
man’s destination or place o f origin, which could have provided insight into the source of
threats to Dutch economic interests.
»

On December 30 the men approached an Oneida village near Oneida Lake. The
Oneidas explained to the Dutch, that yes, the French had been there. The French entered
the lake and traveled down in order to trade with the Indians there. The French had easy
water access to the area by traveling up the St. Lawrence River from Montreal into Lake
Ontario, and then using the Oswego River that flows into Oneida Lake. The Dutch
traders were informed that six Frenchmen had been trading in the village in August, and
the presence o f French goods in the village appeared to confirm the statement. The
Oneidas went on to chastise the Dutch comparing their paltry payments for furs with the
generosity of the French traders.4
The following day Arenias, whom the Dutch identified as the sachem o f the
“castle” or fortified town, returned to the Oneida village from their travels among the
French Indians. While discussing the location of additional Iroquois villages over a
makeshift map consisting o f com kernels and stones, the Oneida Indians informed the

3 Sinnekens, or Senecas is a term often used by Europeans to describe Iroquois Indians who are not
members o f the Mohawk tribe. Therefore, when encountering the term “Seneca” or som e variation, one
does not necessarily know if the reference is to a member o f the Seneca tribe, or to a member o f the other
three members o f the Iroquois, the Cayugas, the Onondagas or the Oneidas. A s the Dutch became more
familiar with the Iroquois tribes there were more references to the individual tribes and less use o f the term
“Seneca” as all-inclusive for non-M ohawk Iroquois.
4 Gehring and Starna, Journey, 12-13.
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Dutchmen that in the high country near the Oneida Lake lived a people with horns. They
further explained that while there were many beaver beyond the Oneida village, they
should not travel that far because of the presence o f French Indians.5
It is not clear if the Oneidas were associating the French Indians with the “people
with horns”, or exactly what was meant by the description. It does appear that the
Oneidas were trying to discourage the Dutchmen from traveling beyond the Oneida
village. Stama and Gehring state that by telling the Dutchmen o f the people with horns,
the Oneida were trying to frighten the Dutch in order to prevent them from exploring the
region. This in fact does appear to be the reasoning behind the story o f the people with
homs. However, Stama and Gehring argue that preventing further Dutch exploration of
the region would “thereby prevent expansion of trade. Such an expansion would have
eroded a middleman position already held or anticipated by some o f the Five Nations
Iroquois.”6 However, instead o f protecting their supposed economic interest in the fur
trade, as Stama and Gehring propose, it appears that the Oneidas were trying to
discourage the Dutchmen from traveling into, and thereby protecting, the traditional seat
o f authority among the Iroquois tribes held by the Onondagas. The Iroquois maintained
the position o f Onondaga as the center o f their power and authority even when the
Mohawks were actively establishing Fort Orange as the center for Indian/European

5 Gehring and Stama, Journey, 14. A lso see Peter Hulme, C olonial Encounters: Europe an d the Native
Caribbean, 1492-1797 (New York: Methuen, 1986). Hulme discusses Native populations o f the Caribbean
informing Europeans o f the presence o f cannibals and other threatening populations who were always
located on the next island, or just beyond their present locations. Such information could serve to either
discourage further European exploration or to paint neighbors, and often enem ies, as a threat to the lives o f
both Indian and European and worthy o f fighting to destroy.
6 Gehring and Starna, Journey, 44 note 97. This econom ic interpretation o f Iroquois participation in the fur
trade continues to be challenged by historians. The most convincing argument against this interpretation is
Jose Antonio Brandao’s “ Your Fyre Shall Burn N o M ore".
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relations. The Iroquois often talked of having to return to Onondaga to decide on matters
discussed with Europeans in Albany. It appears that even in 1635 the Oneidas were
trying to protect the importance o f Onondaga from penetration by the Dutch instead of
trying to protect their interest in the fur trade.
The Onondagas’ villages would be the next encountered had van den Bogaert and
his companions continued to travel into the interior. Instead o f guiding the Dutchmen
further into the interior, the Oneidas sent word to the Onondagas to the west, and a group
of Onondagas arrived in the Oneida village on January 9. The Dutchmen met with the
Onondagas who brought gifts o f beaver pelts for the Europeans. The Onondaga named
Canastogeera then told van den Bogaert and his party to return in the summer and offered
to show them the lake and where the French came to trade. Two days after this meeting in
the Oneida village, van den Bogaert and his companions returned to Fort Orange,
•

accompanied part o f the way by the sachem Arenias.

7

•

Dutch movements in Iroquoia

were highly controlled by members of the various Iroquois tribes. While they were
guided to many Iroquois villages and met with many Iroquois sachems, the Iroquois with
whom the Dutch traders met made sure access to their communities was on their terms.
This was similar to what the Dutch were trying to do, especially after 1655, in controlling
and limiting Indian access to Dutch towns. However, due to the Dutch lack of
knowledge and power outside o f their own towns, as well as Dutch dependence on Indian
trade which forced the Dutch to allow Indians into their towns, the Iroquois were much
more successful at controlling European movements within their communities.
Furthermore, with the Iroquois able to keep the Dutch out of their centers o f power, they

7 Gehring and Stama, Journey, 18-21.
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were the driving force behind Fort Orange’s development as a new center o f power for
Indian and European relations.

French Experiences Outside of the Towns in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys
Although there are few records regarding Dutch travels into the interior lands of
the Mohawk River Valley, there was more written documentation concerning French
movements in the lands o f the Iroquois beyond Fort Orange. However, these documents
consist primarily o f captivity narratives of Jesuit missionaries written to bring attention to
the Fathers’ dangerous work among the “barbarians.” These Jesuit Relations described
the torments and tortures the Iroquois inflicted on the Jesuits as they worked to try to
baptize the American Indians and claim their souls for Christ.8 Because they were
captives, the French Jesuits’ movements in Iroquoia were highly controlled by their
captors. And while their accounts were intended for a religious purpose, they are still
able to give an idea o f both Indian and European movements on the land. All o f the
accounts described the ease o f Indian movement upon both the land and the water and in
several kinds o f weather conditions. The Relations also described Indians’ access to
European villages, especially Fort Orange.
The most famous o f the Jesuit Relations that refers to both the Dutch in New
Netherland and the Iroquois was that o f Father Isaac Jogues who was captured by
Mohawks in 1643 and eventually made his way to Fort Orange with his captors. While
in the Dutch settlement he escaped with the assistance o f several Dutch settlers. He
wrote several accounts o f his experiences as an Iroquois captive in the vicinity o f the
Dutch settlements on the Hudson River. He traveled with several o f his Iroquois captors

8 Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit R elations an d A llie d Documents; Travels a n d Explorations o f the
Jesuit M issionaries in N ew France, 1610-1791 (New York: Pageant Book Co., 1959).
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to trade with the Dutch and then to fish “seven to eight leagues below the settlement of
the Dutch.”9 Jogues’s group traveled with ease through the area and consisted of both
men and women participating in the fishing expedition. Although traveling in the
territory claimed as and labeled on maps as New Netherland, Jogues gave no account of
encountering a Dutch man or woman until his actual arrival in the Dutch settlement of
Fort Orange. Jogues arrived in Fort Orange, again accompanied by a large group of
Iroquois who were traveling through the settlement on their way back to their own
village. Jogues’s movements while in the company o f the Dutch will be dealt with in the
following chapter. However, while he was in the custody of the Dutch he made several
observations o f the area comprising New Netherland.
Jogues wrote of Fort Orange’s proximity to the Mohawks’ settlement less than
twenty leagues distant, and noted that it could be accessed by either land or water. He
did not, however, give any indication o f who traveled these routes or how often they were
utilized. In describing the area between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, he merely
stated the distance between the two at 100 or 120 miles and used the rest o f the paragraph
to give details o f the Indian populations who lived between the two European settlements.
He particularly wrote about the Mahicans, and the troubles that had recently occurred
between and among the Indians and the Europeans. His picture was not a favorable one
for the Dutch, stressing the isolation and limitations o f the Europeans in their own

9 Barthelemy V im ont “O f the Deliverance o f Father Isaac Jogues, and His Arrival in France, 1643-1644” in
In M ohawk Country: Early N arratives about a N ative People eds. Dean R. Snow, Charles T. Gehring and
William A. Stama (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 22-28. W hile Vimont is listed as the
author o f this account, the editors explain that he was responsible only for introductory and connecting
material, while the majority o f the text was taken from Jogues’s own letters.
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settlements.10 Perhaps most significantly, Jogues’s account showed the important
presence o f Indians within the colony o f New Netherland, especially between the
settlements o f Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.
Jogues was not the only Jesuit to write of New Netherland and the surrounding
lands. Jerome Lalemant was superior o f the Jesuits in New France from 1645-1650 and
again from 1659-1665. During this time he wrote Relations based on the letters and
testimony o f the Jesuit missionaries under his authority. In 1646 he wrote a report
describing the trip o f Isaac Jogues and Jean Bourdon to Mohawk territory in order to
establish a mission among the Iroquois.11 The Frenchmen left New France accompanied
by four Iroquois and two Algonquian Indians. They traveled to the Mohawks’
settlements via Lake Champlain and then into Lake George, which Jogues named the
Lake of the Blessed Sacrament. From there they traveled by land, crossing the Hudson
River above Fort Orange. The group then descended the Hudson River and encountered
no other Europeans until they arrived at Fort Orange, where they, Iroquois, Algonquian
and Frenchmen alike, were well received and stayed freely in the confines o f the town.
After several days they traveled into the Mohawk villages.12 Once they left Fort Orange,
they provided no reports o f any encounters with Dutch settlers outside o f the walls of
Fort Orange.

10 Isaac Jogues, “N ovum Belgium and an Account o f Rene Goupil, 1644” in In M ohawk Country, eds.
Snow, et al, 29-37. See also, Merwick, P ossessing Albany, chap. 1.
11 Isaac Jogues escaped his initial capture by the Mohawks in 1643 and returned to France for a short time
before returning to the Jesuit m issions in N ew France. After his trip to establish a m ission among the
Mohawks he returned to Trois Rivieres only to be reassigned to the Huron m ission. He and his Jesuit
companion Jean de la Lande were captured again by Mohawks as they traveled to Huronia. Jogues was
killed in October, 1646 in captivity.
12 Jerome Lalemant, “O f the M ission o f the Martyrs, Begun in the Country o f the Iroquois, 1646” in In
Mohawk Country, eds. Snow, et al, 56-61.
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While in the Mohawks’ land, Jogues and le Lande met with an assembly of
Mohawks that also included a contingent of Onondagas. Jogues gave the Onondagas a
gift of wampum to establish relations and open up their villages to the Jesuits as well. He
then informed the Onondagas that the French could travel into the Onondagas’ lands by
three roads. One path was through the Annierronnons or Mohawks, another was by way
of Lake Ontario and the Oswego River, or finally through the lands o f the Hurons. The
Onondaga elders were taken aback at such a proposal. The Onondagas’ response was
recorded as “ ‘It is necessary to take the road which Onontio has opened; the others are
too dangerous; one meets in them only people o f war, men with painted and figured
faces, with clubs and war hatchets, who seek only to kill’ -adding that the way which
leads into their country was excellent, entirely cleared, and very secure.”

1^

In other words, the Onondagas were telling the French Jesuits that there was one
way to enter the lands o f the Iroquois and that was through either door o f the longhouse
that represented the Five Nations. In this case the French were told to enter through the
eastern door o f the longhouse that the Mohawks guarded. The Onondagas made it clear
to the French that this path was already cleared and should be the one they used to come
to Iroquoia. Furthermore, the use o f warnings about war-like people was quite similar to
the warnings of “people with horns” the Oneidas gave van den Bogaert and his
companions a decade earlier in order to discourage them from exploring the land beyond
the Oneidas. With this warning, the Onondagas were trying to restrict both French and

13 Ibid., 59-60. The word “Onontio” was used by all Iroquois to describe the French Governors. Onontio
was a literal translation o f the first French governor who they had regular contact with, Montmagny or
“great mountain.” This use o f Onontio was similar to the use o f “Corlaer” in reference to the governors o f
N ew Netherland and N ew York.
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Dutch access to the eastern door o f the Five N ations’ longhouse, which was guarded by
the Mohawks. Furthermore, this would restrict European access to just the eastern tribes
of the Mohawks, Oneidas and Onondagas. O f course, by taking the path to the eastern
door, it also meant that the Frenchmen would travel through or near Fort Orange. As late
as 1700, a map by William Wolfgang Romer depicting the territory o f the Five Nations of
Iroquois showed a path leading from the lands north o f then New York. It started at Lake
Champlain (identified as Corlaer’s Lake) and Lake George (still identified as Lac des
Sacrament) through Albany. The path then traveled west along the Mohawk River. This
path maintained the eastern door o f the Five Nations longhouse as the primary route into
Iroquoia, thereby allowing for the Iroquois and particularly the Mohawks to control
Europeans’ movements into their lands.14
While traveling throughout northeast North American Indian territory in search of
souls ready for baptism, the French Jesuits also created maps in order to assist other
missionaries who would venture into the Indian settlements. A map depicting Jesuit
travels among the Hurons and Iroquois in the 1640s is one such document. The map is
dedicated to the location of particular villages the Jesuits visited in their travels. The only
prominent geographical features on this map are the waterways, with Lakes Champlain
and Sacrament shown much larger than they actually are. Along with these two lakes,
the Dutch settlements o f Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam are depicted. The Dutch
settlements stand on the eastern door to the Iroquois nation and, as the written documents
have shown, the settlements played an important role in the lives o f Jesuit missionaries to
the Iroquois. It is interesting to note that not a single English settlement is identified on

14 W olfgang W illiam Romer, M ap o f the Five Nations, 1700. National Map Collection o f Canada, Ottawa,
Ontario, Canada, Map #12545.
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this map, indicating that for these Frenchmen, English colonial settlements were of little
significance in comparison to the Dutch.15 Another French map from the 1640s seems to
have utilized some of the information from the Jesuits’ compilation map (Figure 4). Here
the cartographer identified the names and locations of many Indian tribes and the many
waterways throughout New France. He identified the general location o f New England,
but the only European settlements included in his work were Trois Rivieres and the
Dutch settlement of Fort Orange, just east of the “trois villages d ’Iroquois” and just south
o f Lac Sacrament.16

Fort Orange and the Surrounding Lands
The largest population center in New Netherland was N ew Amsterdam, but Fort
Orange, being the center of the fur trade, was o f vital economic importance in the 1640s.
Fort Orange was New Netherland’s most inland settlement, the center of the colony’s fur
enterprise, and was already becoming a cross-cultural center in North America.17
Furthermore, after the Hartford Treaty o f 1650 and the abandonment o f Fort Good Hope
on the Connecticut River, Fort Orange was the colony’s only inland settlement, and
closest to the Indian traders on whom the colony depended.

15 Tire des Relations de la N ouvelle France et des Hurons en 1643 et 44, 1644 et 45, 1645 et 46, 1646 et
47. National Map Collection o f Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Map #153447.
16 N ouvelle France, 1646. National Map Collection o f Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Map #44351.
17 This is especially true after the abandonment o f Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River following the
Treaty o f Hartford in 1650.
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Figure 4 Nouvelle France, 1646. Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada,
National Map Collection, Map #44351
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Regardless o f Fort Orange’s growing importance in the 1640s, prior to the
establishment of a court in Fort Orange in 1652, all legal matters for the community were
decided in New Amsterdam. Laws came from New Amsterdam, and the local schout or
sheriff was instructed with the responsibility o f enforcing all laws. O f course, with the
main function of Fort Orange being to serve the fur trade for the WIC, many of the laws
imposed on them dealt with the issue of controlling people’s participation in that trade.
The issue o f controlling trade included - indeed was built around - controlling peoples’
movements on the land. The W IC’s goal o f regulating the trade and protecting their
interests did not change once the court was established in Fort Orange in 1652. However,
both before and after 1652, the WIC had enough troubles enforcing laws that controlled
peoples’ movements and activities in town, and trying to control peoples’ movements
outside o f the town gates proved more difficult.
One o f the largest concerns that the WIC and the magistrates o f Fort Orange dealt
with was “runners in the woods.” This practice allowed individuals to leave the confines
of the town in order to meet Indians in the woods to conduct their fur trade. The practice,
however, often led to complaints o f Indians accosted by overly aggressive Dutchmen
eager to get a good deal. The Indians’ complained primarily o f physical abuse and, once
accosted in the woods, the inability to move freely about the town to trade their goods. In
June o f 1655, when the trading season was getting underway on the upper reaches of the
Hudson River, the WIC granted its permission for the Fort Orange and Beverwyck
representatives to establish and publish an ordinance concerning running into the
woods.18 The WIC stated that running in the woods should be regulated and “shall find

18 The WIC established the town o f Beverwyck in 1652 when it established courts both there and at Fort
Orange.
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most proper and necessary for the best of the community and the prevention of evil.” 19
The concern o f traders running in the woods was over more than protecting their trade.
Dutch men and women traveling in the woods also presented the colony with a spiritual
dilemma.
The idea that the woods were home to Indians, who, while providing the
livelihood for many Dutch traders, were equated with ideas o f evil, remained a concern
for many New Netherland leaders. Religious leader Domine Johannes Megapolensis
wrote A Short Account o f the Mohawk Indians in the 1640s during his time in
Rensselaerswyck. In this short description he made three references linking the
Mohawks to the devil. One reference related to the Mohawks’ appearance with face
paint, another described how the Mohawks referred to themselves “Ihy Othkon ( ‘I am the
d evil) ”, and he also stated that “They worship and present offerings to the Devil.”

90

Although Megapolensis wrote that Christians met with Indians and Indians slept in the
houses o f the Dutch, and they “think no more about it than as if we met with a Christian,”
his basic distrust of the Mohawks’ spiritual connection with the devil worried him as well
as other leaders of the WIC in New Netherland.

91

M egapolensis’ observations concerning relations between the Mohawks and the
residents o f Rensselaerswyck is illustrative o f how the area around Fort Orange

19 Femow, D RC H N Y 13:39.
20 Johannes M egapolensis, “A Short Account o f the Mohawk Indians, 1644” in In M ohawk Country, eds.
Snow et al., 38-46.
21 Ibid., 43. M egapolensis, in this account, seem s also to have a fairly low opinion o f his fellow Europeans.
He wrote, “The inhabitants o f this country are o f two kinds: first, Christians— at least so called; second,
Indians.” His and Petrus Stuyvesant’s concern over the spiritual w ell being o f the colony played a great
role in regulating peoples’ movem ents through N ew Netherland.
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developed independently from official WIC desires. Megapolensis made it clear that
according to the religious tradition he shared with Stuyvesant, the Mohawks were
considered evil denizens of the wilderness. However, his statement that Christians of the
upper reaches o f the Hudson River invited the Mohawks to sleep in their homes shows
how both Christians and Indians were creating new cultural landscapes contrary to the
traditional Dutch beliefs of civil Christian landscapes and Indians as part of the
wilderness.
M egapolensis’ connection between the Indians and ideas o f the devil was not a
new one. It came out of a tradition o f associating wilderness and those who dwelled in
the wilderness as outside the bounds o f civil existence. Roderick Nash, in his influential
book, Wilderness and the American M ind wrote o f the roots o f European Christians’
ideas on wilderness. He stated, “In early medieval Christianity, wilderness kept its
significance as the earthy realm of the powers o f evil that the Church had to overcome....
wilderness represented the Christian conception o f the situation man faced on earth. It
was a compound of his natural inclination to sin, the temptation o f the material world,
and the forces of evil themselves.”22 Truly these ideas continued to hold sway over the
population o f New Netherland.
George Baxter, who Stuyvesant saw as an English threat to the stability o f the
colony o f New Netherland, even used this idea of Christianity overcoming and taming the
wilderness in his 1653 petition to Stuyvesant. As part o f his petition he argued that he
and his neighbors, “transformed from a wilderness of woods and erected into a few small
villages.” He also claimed that “being in a wilderness” they were “unable to promote the

22 Roderick Frazier Nash, W ilderness and the Am erican Mind, 4 th edition (N ew Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2001), 17-18. A lso see John R. Stilgoe, Common Landscape o f America, 1-24.
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good o f the country.”

His argument presented the idea that transforming the wilderness

as a Christian took precedence over the fact that he was an Englishman, therefore,
Stuyvesant should assist him and his neighbors in their endeavor to continue transforming
the wilderness. Unfortunately for Baxter, Stuyvesant did not agree with his assessment
that Baxter was providing a benefit for the cause o f Christianity.
The WIC found it a challenge to balance the need to tame what they saw as the
wilderness, or a land untouched by Christian activity, and the need to control those who
ventured into the woods. A week after the original June 1655 call to regulate running in
the woods, the Council at New Amsterdam was still citing the need for “a strong
ordinance for up here [Fort Orange] concerning the going into the woods o f the Dutch.”24
Not only did the council want to prevent the Dutch settlers from heading into the woods,
but they also wanted to prevent them from sending signals to the Indians as well as to
make sure they did “not call from the houses standing at the hill where the Indians have
to pass through.”

Such activity was seen as unseemly and quite undignified.

Moreover, such actions also threatened the colony by breaking down the order the WIC
officials was trying to impose.
Curiously enough, the Council, in working diligently to prevent the Europeans
from heading into the woods, used language in their call for this ordinance that would
allow the Indian traders to “go freely where they want” upon entering the Dutch town.
Later the Council stated that incoming traders “whether they be Christians or their Indian

23 Gehring, Council M inutes 1655-56, 91.
24 Ibid., 58.
25 Ibid., 58.
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brokers, .. .to let them go where they see fit.” This attitude towards the Indians in the
Dutch settlements stands in contrast to Indians working to control European movements
within Indian lands. Although it appears that captives were actually given quite a bit o f
freedom to move about the Mohawk villages when they were not bound, Europeans did
not travel to or between Indian villages without guides, and as shown above, without
warnings.26 W ith this the Indians, particularly members o f the Iroquois nation, were
quite successful at protecting their settlements from uninvited interlopers. Captives were
given more freedom because many were to be adopted into the Indian community so
were not seen as a threat the way uninvited Europeans were. Such freedom o f movement
for Indians within Dutch town limits would soon be changed in the face o f events o f 1655
and will be discussed in the next chapter.
By the end o f July in 1655, the New Amsterdam Council was pleased to learn o f
Fort Orange’s ordinance against the Dutch traveling into the woods to intercept Indian
traders. Donna Merwick discussed this topic in detail in Possessing Albany while paying
particular attention to activities in the year 1660.

At this point, the community o f

Beverwyck that surrounded Fort Orange had its own court. It was during the trading
season o f that year that the Beverwyck court took on the question whether the fur trade
should be conducted solely within the confines o f the fort and thereby be more easily
regulated by the WIC. According to Merwick, “Townsmen were being asked what they
wished to make of the marginal, and always dangerous, area just outside the palisade.
They were being asked whether they wished to diminish the role o f the town by moving

26 Many captives w ould eventually be adopted into the Iroquois communities, so were not necessarily
considered to be or treated as captives.
27 Merwick, P ossessin g Albany, 88-99.
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vital action outside its walls.”28 But would moving vital trade activity outside o f the
walls actually diminish the town? The land outside the walls was often dangerous, but
moving further outside o f the walls would also help lead to the Europeans extending their
limited influence beyond the town walls. Moving outside the walls would extend their
Christian influence into the “wilderness.” After much debate between townsmen who
wished to maintain the tradition and the order that came with trade being restricted to the
fort and those who wished to branch into the woods and away from the prying eyes of the
WIC, Fort Orange representatives of the WIC, decided that trade would remain confined
to the town. However, a new provision allowed for individuals to beckon Indians from
“on the hill” as they approached the town with their furs. Such a compromise allowed
the Dutch traders to extend their trade practices from a safe distance.

29

However, the compromise of calling Indians from “on the hill” exemplifies WIC
officials’ unwillingness or inability to extend their authority into what they perceived as a
wilderness. They continued to perceive the woods as a place outside o f the realm of
Christian civility and law. By compromising and allowing the Indians to travel freely
where they pleased within the town, the WIC officials in Fort Orange created conditions
where the Indians who came into Fort Orange and the Dutch residents of the town could
create new cultural landscapes within the walls o f Fort Orange. Furthermore, once legal
proceedings began to prosecute Dutch traders who continued to venture into the woods, it
opened the door for Indians, and the information they could provide, to enter the Dutch
court system. From that point, a new diplomatic landscape was being forged.

28 Ibid., 89.
29 There w ill be more on this subject in chapter 3.

88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Dutch Control of Water
Whereas the Dutch had little control or even knowledge o f the land outside of
their settlements, their authority increased somewhat when the topic o f control and
knowledge turned to the water. Seventeenth-century Dutch maps depicted very little
detail of landscape features, although the van der Donck map covers a very large area.
What was emphasized, however, were the waterways and coastlines. These are shown in
great detail although the accuracy o f the watercourses decreases the further into the
interior they are located.30 In 1660, a cartographer made a copy o f a map originally
created circa 1630. This map covered an even larger area o f land than the van der Donck
map, including the St. Lawrence River south to the James River, and it emphasized the
rivers to an even greater extent than van der Donck. Particular emphasis was given to the
rivers that New Netherland then, or at one time, claimed, including the Connecticut,
Hudson, Delaware and the Susquehanna Rivers, the latter o f which was especially
highlighted. This was done possibly to fill in knowledge o f land the Dutch claimed but
neither had control o f nor knew well. Finally another 1660 copy o f a circa 1630 map
•

«

depicted nothing but the Hudson River with detailed notations o f river depth soundings.

Tt

These maps illustrated the tentative hold the Dutch maintained on the lands o f New
Netherland, while at the same time displayed Dutch knowledge and control over the
waterways connecting their forts. As long as the Dutch could control the rivers with the
use o f forts, they were able to lay claim over the surrounding lands. O f course, Fort

30 For example, the map shows the Esopus Creek connecting the Delaware and Hudson Rivers.
31 New-York Historical Society Map Collection. Other maps included illustrations o f depth soundings in
the Long Island Sound, also claim ed by N ew Netherland.
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Orange, in its unique interior position, played the key role of allowing the Dutch to lay
claim to the valuable, fur bearing lands of the Mohawk River Valley to the Great Lakes.
Knowledge o f the Hudson River was crucial because it served as the only true
connection between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, since the European settlers had
neither the knowledge nor ability to travel overland. Even Fr. Jogues had to make his
escape to a ship where he was hidden for several days from his Mohawk captors. In fact
when he left the ship, members o f the crew told him his safety would, no longer be
guaranteed when he went back to land.32 Dutch traders knew that their advantage over
Indians, especially in the contested region around Fort Orange, was greater on the water.
Jogues could not be hidden on land, even within Fort Orange, due to the Mohawks’
greater access to that area, and the Dutch authorities’ inability to control Indian
movements, even within the Dutch town. When Jogues left the ship, the crew no longer
felt a responsibility for him and left without him. For his final escape Jogues returned to
a different ship and sailed down the river to safety in New Amsterdam. Because goods,
as well as Dutch people and Dutch information all traveled via water, it was important for
the WIC to regulate peoples’ movements there as well. Early ordinances restricting
travel on water included a 1647 order that no one could leave the colony on a ship or bark
without a pass from the Director General and Council. Because that was really the only
feasible way of traveling through or out o f the colony, such a provision was designed to
control almost all European movement in New Netherland.

32 Vimont, In M ohawk Country, 26-28.
33 Charles T. Gehring ed, Law s & Writs o f Appeal, 1647-1663 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1991), 4.
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Water travel also provided the opportunity for smuggling, which Stuyvesant and
the Council worked to curb. All ships had to load, unload or be inspected in New
Amsterdam prior to continuing their journeys, whether up to Fort Orange or out to the
Atlantic.34 O f course, the continual reissue of such ordinances through the 1650s and a
1654 directive for all residents o f New Netherland to be on the look out for and report all
activities of smuggling and piracy suggests that although the Dutch traveled with more
ease and had a stronger knowledge of waterways, they still had a difficult time enforcing
their will.35
One o f the most important issues affected by water travel was communication.
Once the upper reaches o f the Hudson around Fort Orange froze over, communications
between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam were totally dependent on Indian messengers.
The Dutch found the dependability of this form of communication to be less than ideal
because once the messenger left the settlements, European official had little control of
what course or how long the messenger took to get to his destination. And although the
Dutch may have been able to chastise the Indian couriers, not much occurred beyond that.
Dutch inability to control the Indian messengers was a reflection on their
dependence on the service that the couriers provided. It was necessary for the Dutch to
communicate between their settlements and across the lands that they held little control
over. Because they had such little knowledge of the lands outside o f their settlements and
were unable to travel over those lands effectively, the Indian messengers were a crucial
communication tool within New Netherland. Dutch dependence on these Indian couriers

34 Ibid., 6 ,1 0 , 11.
35 Ibid., 39, 86, 87.

91

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

placed the couriers in control o f the flow o f information that had to go overland. In turn,
the Dutch had to make policies and decisions based on the information received via the
couriers. Because o f this, the Indians who served as messengers for the Dutch had
significant sway over what information was disseminated through the colony, and how
quickly. This relates back to the importance o f “Indian intelligence” and rumor in Dutch
decision making. Much o f the time the Dutch could not differentiate between rumor and
true intelligence. That inability to tell truth from rumor and Dutch inability to take
responsibility for their own communication o f information made it easier for rumor to be
taken as truth and forced the Dutch to compromise their positions, whether it was
abandoning land or proposing an alliance with England due to rumors o f war. In this
manner, Indian information, whether truth or not, influenced the continual creation of
new cultural landscapes. This would be particularly significant when the Mohawks and
their information and testimony made its way into the court at Fort Orange.

Post-Peach War Provisions
While the WIC tried to control the lands outside o f their settlements by
controlling peoples’ access to those lands, they also experienced what they viewed as the
evils of the wilderness invading their settlements. 1655 proved to be a pivotal year for
New Netherland and how its officials approached both Indian and European movements
on the land. As rumors o f an Indian attack on the Dutch on Long Island and Manhattan
circulated through the colony, residents, especially in outlying regions, became
concerned for their own safety. During the actual war in September 1655, many residents
living along the Hudson River but outside o f the fortified communities o f New
Amsterdam and Fort Orange abandoned their lands. The settlers o f the Esopus
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abandoned the region for fear o f attack by Indians such as the Wappingers and Esopus.
Both tribes lived in the area, and both participated in the attack on Manhattan Island.
However, abandoning the lands o f the Esopus area was not looked upon favorably by the
WIC officials since such action left yet another area vulnerable to continued English
incursion into the lands between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.
Fearing further loss and increased English expansion into the colony, Stuyvesant
ordered the removal o f leading Englishmen from Westchester to eliminate them as a
threat to the heart o f New N etherlands trade route along the Hudson River.36 At the
same time he ordered stringent restrictions on Dutch colonists’ movements outside of the
settlements to keep them from being taken captive by Indians and held for ransom that
'I'j

the Dutch could not afford to pay.
Stuyvesant came up with ideas not only on how to prevent future attacks by both
Indians and English, but also with ideas on why the Peach War came about, which again
reflected the spiritual dilemma o f a colony in the “wilderness.” The Director-General
proclaimed that it was,
evident that general sins are the cause o f general punishments. Therefore,
in my opinion, that common and public sins such as drunkeness,
profanation of the Lord’s name and Sabbath, the public and common
cursing even by children along the streets, the gatherings o f sectarians and
other disorderly groups, be countered and promptly prosecuted by the
renewal o f good regulations and laws.38
To Stuyvesant, as a committed Calvinist, it was obvious that a general lack o f piety
allowed for the evil that resided outside the town walls in the w oods to invade the

36 Femow, D RC H N Y 13: 62, 65.
37 Ibid., 69.
38 Gehring, Council Minutes 1655-1656, 134; and Fem ow, DRCHNY 13: 53.
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sanctity o f a Christian settlement. As Megapolensis cast doubt on the Christian
commitment o f the residents of Fort Orange in the 1640s, Stuyvesant saw that same lack
of commitment as the leading cause ofN ew N etherland’s struggle to survive and prosper.
To Stuyvesant, something obviously had to be done to rectify this situation. The
Christians had to be watched more closely and regulated more sufficiently. With new
regulations and establishing a public school to keep the youngsters o f the streets, it was
hoped that New Netherland could avoid such divine punishments in the future.
Changes in how people moved on the land outside of the Dutch settlements came
quickly after the Peach War hostilities ended. In October 1655, the Council became
increasingly wary “that in these dangerous times some Christians do not hesitate to go
into the country in small parties or when going out in stronger force, to separate from
each other, or are not as they ought to be, on their guard, nor do they mind their guns, but
which carelessness and negligence it has already happened, more than once, that some
TQ

Christians have been taken prisoner by the Indians and others killed.”

In response the

council forbade anyone from going into the countryside without first obtaining consent
from the Director General and Council. Once outside o f the confines o f New Amsterdam
and Fort Orange, Dutch settlers were outside o f the reach of what protection New
Netherland officials could offer. Unfortunately for the Director General and the Council,
individuals and small parties continued to travel outside the protective walls of the Dutch
settlements.

39 Gehring, C ouncil Minutes. 1655-1656, 95-98. This came after a group o f thirty Indians attacked and
captured a group o f only six Dutch settlers traveling in the woods. The Indians demanded a ransom o f
cloth, weapons and tools which the Council refused to pay because they believed it would only encourage
more captures with higher ransom demands.
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The officials remained concerned as rumors of additional Indian attacks continued
through October 1655. This time the Council concluded that the cause o f these new
i
rumors was the continual contact between the settlers and the Indians as well as contact
between different Indian nations. In response, Stuyvesant and the Council ordered, “that
no one, whatever his capacity may be with boat, canoe or any other vessel, however, it
may be called, shall cross over, or in any way communicate or speak with the Indians.”
They went on to order the Indians, that “in case anyone crosses over without showing the
sign and token o f the honorable general or goes to the Indians that they are to detain and
subject to ransom such boat, canoe or persons.”40 The Council and Stuyvesant went so
far as to order people to stay away from boats used in official communication between
the Council and the Indians. The Dutch officials had witnessed the “swarming and
unseemly clamor” o f their fellow Dutch settlers looking for information from the Indians.
Not only were these crowds unseemly, but they also alarmed the Indians and discouraged
them from coming and offering what information and assistance they could. Such
swarming and clamor also led to increased rumors. This also illustrated how the river
served as a border, beyond which the WIC held little sway.
In November 1655, the Council also promulgated their new restrictions on Dutch
settlements, especially in the outlying regions. One new tenet forbade the establishment
of separate farms or plantations, and any new settlement had to consist o f at least ten
households. Those who refused to form concentrated settlements did so at their own risk
and were to be fined an annual sum o f twenty-five guilders. The WIC remained adamant
that they control how Dutch colonists would convert what they saw as wilderness to a

40 Ibid., 101.
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productive, Dutch landscape. The Council also called for the erection o f two
blockhouses. One would be built near present-day Hackensack and the other near the
Wiequaeskeck Indians in Vreedlandt, or Westchester, “Where the best and most suitable
land lies.” The land in the vicinity of the Wiequaskeck Indians also happened to be the
home o f the English settlement that Stuyvesant was trying desperately to drive from New
Netherland. A new blockhouse would be a convenient location to watch, not only
Indians, but also untrustworthy Englishmen in the midst o f New Netherland.41

A new

blockhouse would also add to the Dutch military presence on the landscape, no matter
how poorly defended that blockhouse may have been.
At this time the council refocused its energy on removing the English presence in
the area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. The Council and Stuyvesant ordered
the Dutch military to go to Vreedlandt to forcibly evict the English settlers, as described
in the previous chapter. Their instructions included the destruction o f the houses, except
a handful to shelter the soldiers. When the soldiers arrived, most English settlers refused
to leave and twenty-three were taken as prisoners, only to be released soon after. The
settlers o f the area petitioned immediately to continue to submit themselves to the
government o f New Netherland. This petition was eventually granted because the Dutch
did not have the strength to eliminate all the English settlements within their borders.
Yet, the WIC continued to work to gain control of outlying areas in order to create
greater stability within the colony.

41 Ibid., 134, 186, 256. After his expulsion by the Dutch in January 1656, Pell tried to repurchase
Vreedlandt/Westchester from the Indians in March 1656, although, according to Dutch understanding, the
Dutch had already purchased the land from the W iequaeskeck Indians. See Documents 62, 65.
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Separation between Settlements
Although the fighting in the Peach War was limited to the southern reaches o f the
colony and in New Amsterdam, the colony of New Netherland as a whole was being
threatened. In Rensselaerswyck and Fort Orange, officials and settlers were concerned
that these settlements might also be affected by the war. However, there was also the
belief that due to the Dutch alliance with the Mohawks, the threat was minimal for the
settlements on the northern reaches o f the Hudson River. In October of 1655 Jan Baptista
van Rensselaer wrote from Beverwyck to his brother Jeremias that,
up here we have made an alliance with [the Mohawks], so that I trust that
with God's help we need not expect any trouble. If the war with the
Indians continues, I fear that we shall suffer great distress through the
destruction [of buildings] by fire and those who started this business will
deserve more blame than thanks and in the end get their deserts for
plunging the whole country into blood for some trifling cause.42
He then went on to discuss the business of the colony and the economic consequences of
the Indian wars, such as the halt put on merchant ships sailing from New Netherland
which caused several merchants, including van Rensselaer, to declare that the Council
was responsible for all lost profits. He, and other merchants, would eventually be fined
for their protests.
However, van Rensselaer’s words indicate the fragmented nature o f the Dutch
North American settlements. First it is important to note that van Rensselaer was the
head o f his own colony, or Patroonship, of Rensselaerswyck, so his interests were often
separate from that o f the WIC settlements anyway. In the matter o f Indian affairs, he did
not consider New Amsterdam’s problems with the several Algonquian groups to directly

42 Arnold J. F. Van Laer, ed. Correspondence o f Jeremias van Rensselaer, 1651-1674 (Albany: University
o f the State o f N ew York, 1932), 21.
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affect his own situation, until he was forbidden to send any ships from the colony. The
separation of settlements was more pronounced on the upper reaches of the Hudson River
for two reasons. First, the WIC settlement o f Fort Orange and Beverwyck were
physically separated from the center o f power at New Amsterdam by over 100 miles of
Indian held land connected only by river, which was sometimes frozen. This isolation,
especially in the winter, created the ever-present need o f Dutch dependence on Indian
messengers who were able to move over the land. Second the patroonship o f
Rensselaerswyck, which was comprised of land surrounding Fort Orange, was separate
from the WIC settlements o f Fort Orange and New Amsterdam and operated under its
own jurisdiction. Such conflicts surrounding the separation o f the settlements would be
present through the remaining existence of New Netherland. However, the idea that
residents o f the northern reaches o f the Hudson could remain separate from Indian issues
elsewhere in the colony would soon come to an end.
The best way for the Dutch WIC to counter this separation between settlements
was to continue to purchase land, and more importantly to occupy that land to gain
control o f the area. According to Dutch practice, the clearest ways to protect the colony
was to continue purchasing land that would give them what they perceived as legal rights
to the territory. The WIC continued to purchase land from the Indians, as did the colony
of Rensselaerswyck. These purchases allowed them to argue against English movements
into the region because the Dutch authorities would hold legal title from the original
occupants o f the land.43

43 N -Y H S Indians collection, Folder 1; N -Y H S Albany Co. Land Patents lists several land transactions
between the Dutch and Indians during the 1650s and up. It is difficult to trace or locate these purchases
with any accuracy due to obscure and moveable reference points such as trees and rocks. Often times the
transaction would be described as follows: “April 29, 1651 colony o f Rensselaerswyck purchased from
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Although the Dutch continued to purchase land and expand their legal claim and
boundaries, they also continued to try to lessen their disadvantage by populating the
colony, particularly the area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. O f course, this
is something they had been trying to accomplish for some time with little success.
However, in 1652, the Dutch established a settlement at the mouth o f what was called the
Great Esopus Kill, centered at present day Kingston. A new settlement between Forts
Orange and Amsterdam at this time would help to increase the population o f the land
between these two important centers and counter the threat the English, had recently
presented with their rumored war with the Wappingers. Furthermore, in 1652 Fort
Orange and the adjoining town o f Beverwyck were established as independent
communities with their own courts. The Esopus region was placed under the jurisdiction
of the court o f Fort Orange. With the Esopus settlements under the jurisdiction o f Fort
Orange, the Fort continued to grow in power as a political center along the upper half of
the Hudson River.
The Esopus settlement would be most significant because it was located between
the two trade centers and would thereby help ease the isolation o f Fort Orange at the
same time, as it would stave off English movement into the area. The Esopus settlements
would also prove to be a stumbling block to stability, however, as relations between the

two Indians, Naenkipquieck and Naenemari, sole owners and proprietors o f a certain parcel o f land and two
kills laying on the west shore o f the North River.” The records became a bit more detailed with greater
information throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries. These early transactions do
continue to give proof o f the W IC’s commitment to obtaining legal title to land in order to show outright
ownership. They also continue to provide evidence o f Dutch lack o f knowledge o f the land they claimed.
As Dutch and then English knowledge o f and ability to control the land they claim ed in the Hudson River
V alley increased, so did their ability to document land they purchased from Indians. For additional
information concerning Dutch land purchases from Indians see Shirley W. Dunn, The Mohicans an d Their
L and 1609-1730, Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 1994, especially chapter 8 and appendix A.
A lso see Charles T. Gehring. L an d Papers, 1630-1664. N ew York Historical Manuscript Series. Baltimore:
Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1980.
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Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians created greater tensions within New Netherland
that would finally lead to a devastating war. This war would weaken the Dutch forces in
New Netherland and help contribute to England’s speedy takeover o f New Netherland in
1664. Moreover, these tensions between the Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians
would be a key event that would help solidify Fort Orange’s (soon to be Albany) place as
the center o f Indian and European diplomacy on the eastern seaboard o f North America.
Even as the WIC continued to expand their holdings by settling the lands between Fort
Orange and New Amsterdam, more obstacles continued to present themselves. One of
the largest obstacles to a stable New Netherland, as Stuyvesant saw it, was the alcohol
trade. He was concerned with the many problems alcohol caused in the colony among
both the Dutch colonists and the Indians.
The alcohol trade that took place in the woods was o f particular concern for
Stuyvesant.44 An early case from the Fort Orange court illustrated several issues
concerning Dutch movements o f alcohol outside o f towns. In June 1653 an extraordinary
session o f the Fort Orange court was called to deal in part with Jacob Symansz Clomp
who was accused o f selling brandy to Indians in the Esopus and Catskill. Although
Europeans had settled these areas, they were still quite rural and very isolated. As
fledgling communities, they were placed under the jurisdiction o f Fort Orange. However,
their distance from their legal center made it difficult for the members o f the court to hold
much sway over their southern neighbors.

44Peter C. Mancall, D eadly M edicine: Indians and A lcohol in Early A m erica (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University, 1995). Mancall discusses the built in conflict in trying to restrict sale o f alcohol to Indians at
the same time colonial success hinged on the sale o f European com m odities, such as alcohol, to Indians.
Chapter 3 w ill discuss Stuyvesant and the WIC’s attempts to control the Indian alcohol trade within the
Dutch communities.
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Clomp was a bark skipper, and therefore had complete access to the main
thoroughfare o f the colony, the Hudson River. His ease o f access to the Hudson River
combined with the weakness of Dutch authority over the lands where he sold the alcohol,
probably led Clomp to believe the risk of being caught was minimal. But the WIC’s
desire to control illegal river trafficking and alcohol distribution to Indians led to Clomp
being brought to trial. Clomp eventually confessed to selling the alcohol after Jan
Dirrixsz van Bremen and Jacob Theunisz van Naerden each testified under oath to
Clomp’s actions. Yet Clomp’s role as a bark skipper proved too valuable for the WIC
representatives in Fort Orange to punish him to the full extent o f the law. After Willem
Fredrickson posted a significant bond for his release, Clomp was granted permission to
take his bark back to Manhattan, as long as he filled his vessel to capacity with grain.45
The lack of enthusiasm in punishing Clomp for an offense deemed critical to
maintaining the safety o f the colony was then contrasted in October 1654 when Clomp’s
sail and rudder were taken from him as punishment for selling hogs promised to Eldert
Gerbertsz to other people.46 From Clomp’s experience, we see that the priority of WIC
officials in New Amsterdam may have been in protecting against the illegal alcohol trade,
but the WIC officials in Fort Orange were more interested in protecting the livelihood of
its settlers. Clomp’s cases continued to reveal the continuing conflict o f priorities among
the WIC settlements. While Stuyvesant remained concerned over the illicit alcohol trade
with Indians and the potential threat such actions could cause, leaders in Fort Orange

45

Charles T. Gehring ed. F ort O range Court Minutes, 1652-1660 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1990), 59. Hereafter, cited as Gehring, FOCM.
46 Ibid., 157-158.
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only acted against Clomp’s illegal activity when it threatened the livelihood of a resident
o f Fort Orange.
Joannes Dijckman and members of the Fort Orange Court investigated
accusations and suspicions of alcohol sales to Indians in the lands between Fort Orange
and Fort Amsterdam, and again with tepid enthusiasm for actual prosecution. In
December 1653, the court questioned Lourens Jansz o f Beverwyck concerning
Christoffel Davits’ alleged activities in selling alcohol to the Esopus Indians in the
Esopus region. His testimony indicated not only that Davits sold the alcohol, but also did
so against the pleadings o f local sachems not to.47 In February 1654, more questioning
occurred surrounding Christoffel Davits’ participation in the alcohol trade. In the
interrogation of Marcelis Jansz van Bommel, the court received testimony that “trouble
AO

among the Christians and Indians had resulted” from Davits’ alcohol trade.
In May o f 1654, the authorities in Fort Orange opted to post notices restricting
river travel in hopes of curtailing the alcohol trade in the more remote areas of the
colony, such as Catskill and Esopus. The notices declared that no one from the
jurisdiction “Shall be allowed to sail hither from here in any rowboats, canoes or other
vessels without having the same inspected here... and without having obtained proper
consent to go thither.”49 Immediately after the new notice was read in court, Rutger
Jacobsz was fined for having sold alcohol to some Indians.50

47 Ibid., 75. There are many exam ples o f sachems from various tribes asking for the intervention o f the
Dutch authorities to stop Europeans from selling alcohol trade. In these exchanges the sachems were then
told to instruct their people not to buy the alcohol and the Europeans would stop selling it. It became quite
a Catch-22.
48 Ibid., 91. The trouble indicated had to do with the loss o f property o f Thomas Chambers in the Esopus.
Chambers h im self would create som e o f his own problems brought about by Indians and alcohol.
49 Ibid., 127.
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It was another two years until the next case surrounding selling alcohol to Indians
took place in Fort Orange. During this two years free of alcohol-related court action the
Peach War took place, which may have renewed interest in preventing hostilities between
Dutch colonists and Indians due to the alcohol trade. In 1656 Willem Hoffmeyer
confessed to “once with two half barrels in a canoe and afterwards with five half barrels
o f good small beer mixed together, sailed up the river and sold and peddled beer among
Indians (notwithstanding the strict prohibition o f the director-general and council).”51
Hoffmeyer was indeed punished for his acts, and interrogation concerning the selling of
alcohol to Indians along the river and outside o f the towns continued in the Fort Orange
court, but with little being done in the way o f punishment for such acts.

c7

While the

interest to bring a stop to the alcohol trade may have grown out o f the events o f 1655, the
ability o f the WIC officials in Fort Orange, or in New Amsterdam, to enforce their
regulations outside of their communities remained weak.
Selling alcohol to Indians was a large source of contention between the settlers in
Esopus and those in Fort Orange. The former were often accusing the latter o f providing

50 Ibid., 128.
51 Ibid., 253. N-Y H S Beekman Letter Book contains a correspondence between Beekman and Stuyvesant
that illustrates the problem o f alcohol was present throughout the colony. Beekman complained o f the
actions o f John Becker who, in 1659 and 1660, sold alcohol to both Dutch soldiers on the Delaware and
Indians. Intoxicated soldiers burned an Indian canoe and Beekman was forced to generously compensate
the Indians to prevent retaliations. When an Indian died as a result o f his drinking, his companions, “placed
the dead savage on a board, which they fastened with four crotchets and placed it opposite the door o f John
Becker, in the underwood, some o f them said because he did drink him self d ead ... he must bewail the
house where he purchased the liquor.” Beekman was wary o f punishing Becker, however, because Becker
was a very popular individual who also read the sermons on Sundays. So while Stuyvesant tried to
legislate morality, the farther from the center o f authority in N ew Amsterdam, the less leverage he had.
The case o f Hoffm eyer w ill also be discussed in chapter 3.
52 Ibid., 255, 186-187, 345-348, 387-389. Paulus Jansen was found guilty o f selling alcohol to Indians in
the summer o f 1658, and received a sentence o f six years banishment from the colony. However, he
showed up again in court records less than two years later. See FOCM, 484.
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the Esopus Indians with alcohol much to the danger of the Esopus settlers. They also
often wrote to Director-General Stuyvesant expressing their concerns in this matter.
While the Fort Orange settlers could not claim innocence in this matter, it would be the
Esopus region’s Dutch residents’ actions selling and distributing alcohol that would
precipitate a crisis with the Esopus Indians.

Esopus Settlement and the First Esopus War
When the Peach War broke out, the young settlement at the Esopus disbanded for
fear that the Indian attacks may have moved northward. After the fighting ended, a
certain sense o f normality resumed throughout the colony, and the residents o f the Esopus
moved back to continue their farming. However, the Esopus settlers did not believe it
necessary to adhere to the new policy set forth by the Council calling for concentrated
settlements. The fighting after all did not occur in the Esopus, and therefore they
continued in their practice o f establishing separate farms. Such independent and defiant
actions showed the continuation o f the fractured nature of the colony, and the limited
authority o f the WIC outside of the settlements. Furthermore, though Esopus was under
the jurisdiction o f Fort Orange, due to their physical separation from Fort Orange, the
Esopus residents could not count on their neighbors to the north for protection. Although
the Esopus settlers defied the Council and Stuyvesant by not farming in a concentrated
settlement, the Directors o f the WIC believed the area was worth defending. In
September o f 1657, the Directors informed Stuyvesant that he and the Council should
consider erecting a blockhouse on the boundaries o f the Esopus and New England. The
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Directors considered this measure “not only useful, but also necessary” although there
was not any money for the company to pay for it.

53

The Esopus region was seen as worthy o f such attention for both its agricultural
importance and its strategic location. The area was settled as an agricultural community,
not a trading post, and since so few New Netherlanders were engaged in agriculture, it
was important to protect the colony’s most promising grain producing region. In a letter
to Stuyvesant in May of 1658, Thomas Chambers, one o f the leading residents of the
area, claimed that the land o f the Esopus could feed the entire colony o f New Netherland,
and that “it would be a sin which could be avoided if we should have to leave such
splendid country.”54 Lending both credence and hope to this claim was the fact that the
harvest o f 1657 was particularly good. Records from 1658 indicate a significant amount
o f agricultural goods, such as wheat, oats and peas, traveling down the North River from
Esopus to New Amsterdam as well. The combination o f a good harvest and the hopes of
developing new agricultural lands was welcome news. Jeremias van Rensselaer
explained that there was still a great need o f opening farmland quickly in order to support
the colony. He stated, “the burgomasters o f Amsterdam have sent many people to the
South River [Delaware River] and there is as yet not much farming done, as the land is
still full o f trees, which must first be rooted up.”55 This need for food throughout the
entire colony coupled with Chambers’ claim o f the Esopus region’s ability to feed the

53 Fem ow, D RC H N Y 13: 73.
54 Ibid., Ibid., 77-78.
55 Van Laer, Correspondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 64.
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colony supported the W IC’s desire to protect the region in 1657 by erecting a
blockhouse.
Furthermore, the Dutch settlement in the Esopus, between New Amsterdam and
Fort Orange, helped to link the principal trading centers of the colony. At the same time,
the Dutch presence in the Esopus region helped to offset the ever-present threat o f a new
English settlement taking root along the North River. Most importantly in the eyes of
many New Netherland traders and merchants, and to the WIC, the Esopus settlements did
not threaten trade at Fort Orange as Schenectady would in the 1660s.56
However, there was a definite competitiveness between the people o f Fort Orange
and the settlers o f Esopus. The latter tried, with little success, to make sure that they
received proper attention and resources and were not overlooked in favor o f the more
populated and lucrative Fort Orange. Jacob Jansen Stoll, another leading burgher in the
Esopus, inquired of Stuyvesant if the residents o f Fort Orange were allowed to openly
sell alcohol to the Indians. He reported that all the Dutch residents o f the Esopus had
seen the Esopus Indians drinking daily and the latter claimed they received the alcohol
from Fort Orange. Stoll concluded his letter warning, “no good can come from it, but it
must tend to the ruin o f the whole country.”57 It was three weeks later when Thomas
Chambers wrote his letter to Stuyvesant in which he claimed that the Esopus was capable
o f feeding the entire colony o f New Netherland. In this letter he included his concern
that the whole area would be lost due to problems with the Indians caused by alcohol.

56 Thomas E. Burke, M ohawk Frontier: The Dutch Community o f Schenectady, N ew York, 1661-1710
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University ). For scientific evidence supporting Chambers claim o f the fertility o f the
land in the Esopus, see David J. D e Laubenfels, “Soil,” in G eography o f N ew York State, ed. John H.
Thompson (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1977), 104-110.
57 Femow, D RC H N Y 13: 77. Stoll’s personal experience in Fort Orange w ill be explained in the next
chapter. B y 1658 he had developed a less than favorable record with the court at Fort Orange.
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Chambers reported that intoxicated Indians fired at and killed Harmen Jacopsen and also
set fire to the house o f Jacop Andrijansen.
As residents o f the Esopus and of Fort Orange continued to accuse each other of
supplying potentially hostile Indians with alcohol, they continued to add to the fractured
nature o f the colony. Although the Esopus was under the jurisdiction o f Fort Orange, its
residents continued to appeal to New Amsterdam for assistance, while accusing residents
of Fort Orange of trying to undermine the success o f the new settlement. Also, while
Dutch colonists o f the Esopus continued to form tense to hostile relations with the
neighboring Esopus Indians, the Dutch colonists at Fort Orange, together with the
neighboring Mohawks and the Mahicans, were forming a new cultural landscape within
the walls o f Fort Orange and its court. As problems between the Dutch settlers o f the
Esopus and the Esopus Indians escalated, the Mohawks were able to take advantage of
the situation to increase their own influence on the new cultural and developing
diplomatic landscape of Fort Orange.

Problems with Indians
The importance o f the fledgling community along the Hudson River was again
made evident in the spring o f 1658 when the Esopus Indians murdered a Dutch settler
and, as van Rensselaer put it, “greatly annoy[ed] the farmers there.” On May 18, 1658
Thomas Chambers again wrote to Stuyvesant, this time to inform him o f the settlers’
precarious situation, which again involved alcohol sold to Indians. The European settlers
were unable to compel the Esopus Indians to turn over the individual who murdered
Andrijansen. Chambers explained to Stuyvesant that the Indians, “use great violence
everyday which we are not capable to relate to your honors and derisively say, that if they
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kill a Christian or more, they can pay for it in wampum and we have so far been obliged
fO

to carry out their wishes.”

He continued his plea for help by reminding Stuyvesant and

the Council that in “this fine country.. .there are 990 schepels o f seed-grain in the
ground.” Chambers’ less than subtle reminder concerning the agricultural importance of
the Esopus reinforced the idea that agricultural production would help to stabilize the
colony as a whole, at the same time the alcohol trade threatened to rip it apart.
Not only did Chambers appeal to the evident threat to the Esopus’ agricultural
production, but he also argued that the community deserved assistance on religious
grounds. He pleaded that, “between 60 and 70 Christian people live here and attend
divine service on all the proper days and that we maintain our reader at our own expense;
therefore we believe, that your honors would regret sincerely, if so many innocent souls
should be so wretchedly murdered and driven away by the cruel barbarians.”59 Chambers
pointed out that the community was not guilty o f the general sins that supposedly led to
the Peach War. Furthermore, although they had no church building they were, according
to Chambers, maintaining their piety thereby making them deserving of the protection of
both God and the WIC. Chambers and his fellow Esopus settlers were, according to his
understanding, moving out as Christians into the wilderness in order to wrest the land
from the control of the devilish Indians and into the control o f worthy Christian souls. In
Chambers’ letter for help it is evident that the Esopus Indians had the upper hand in their
relations with the sixty to seventy Dutch settlers in this important area. Director-General

58 Ibid., 78-79.
59 Ibid., 78.
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Stuyvesant agreed that this threat in the Esopus was well worth his time and attention and
quickly traveled to the settlement there accompanied by approximately seventy soldiers.
Residents north o f the Esopus also took note o f the development of events down
river. Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote home to the Netherlands on June 3, 1658 that,
As to the condition of the country it is so so, for the Indians in the Esopus
have set fire to a house and shot dead a Dutchman and they greatly annoy
the farmers there, so that the General has gone there with 70 soldiers.
How it will end time will show. If war is started there, our colony will
hardly remain exempt, for the places are but 13 or 14 Dutch miles apart.
The best reason I have for hoping that it will not happen is that it is
another nation o f Indians than those who dwell among us. Otherwise,
everything in the colony is flourishing and the good Lord grant that it may
long continue.60
His response illustrates the importance o f the Esopus region to the overall safety o f the
Dutch along the Hudson River Valley. The colony remained under constant threat of
English incursion and hostilities with Indians in places besides Esopus. Yet, Stuyvesant
believed that the location o f Esopus between Fort Orange and Manhattan Island, along
with its function as an agricultural community, was important to the survival o f the
colony. The settlement linked the two New Netherland settlments and presented the
potential to provide the colony with significant agricultural products. These two
advantages o f the community gave Stuyvesant the incentive to protect the region with the
few soldiers available to him. Van Rensselaer’s response also provides evidence that the
residents o f Rensselaerswyck believed themselves to be removed from the events in
Esopus, just as they had with the Peach War, as most o f their dealings remained with the
Mohawks and the Mahicans, who were not allied with the Esopus.61 O f course van

60 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 98-100.
61 Fem ow, D RCH N Y 13: 42. Describes a renewal o f peaceful relations and cooperation between the
M ohawks and the Dutch in 1657.
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Rensselaer’s response can be justified as Rensselaerswyck and Esopus had no official
relations. However, there remained tensions between residents o f Fort Orange and
Esopus, although the latter was under legal jurisdiction o f the former.
In the late 1650s, the Esopus Indians were in quite a unique situation compared to
most of the other smaller tribes located along the Hudson. They had participated in the
Peach War three years earlier, but were not included in the subsequent peace treaties.
Indian groups south of the Esopus and in the vicinity of more densely populated New
Amsterdam, such as the Hackensacks and Tappan Indians, along with the Long Island
tribes, agreed to peace terms with the Dutch. The areas around New Amsterdam were
never seriously threatened by major Indian attack afterwards. The Esopus Indians,
however, were located further up river and the Dutch were not able to maintain any type
o f dominance over them as Thomas Chambers’ letter, mentioned above, illustrated. The
Esopus Indians were also not under the control o f any other Indian group, thereby
allowing them to stand as an independent force in the region. Furthermore, though
southern Indians were no longer in a position to render aid to the Esopus, the Dutch kept
a watchful eye. They remained aware o f both old Indian alliances and Indian
independent power, and to counter these threats, the Dutch required the southern Indians
to declare their neutrality on several occasions during what came to be known as the
Esopus War.
Prior to the actual commencement of hostilities, Stuyvesant, as previously
mentioned, traveled to the region in hopes o f avoiding another conflict so close on the
heels o f both the Peach War and the war with New Sweden. His troops were spread
throughout the colony and the Dutch were in no position to engage in a new fight with
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the Esopus Indians. When Stuyvesant arrived in the Esopus he informed the settlers that
the only way he would help them militarily would be if they settled in a compact
settlement to avoid attack.62 O f course, this was something he had required o f them three
years earlier. Stuyvesant noted how the English had been forming such settlements and
they had been thriving. The settlers reluctantly agreed, and then Stuyvesant and the
Esopus settlers met with the Esopus Indians at the home o f Jacob Jansen Stoll whose
house was located closest to the Indian settlements. Stoll’s home held significance in the
Esopus community. Not only did he live closest to the Indian settlements, but his home
was also used for church services, thereby bringing the Dutch Calvinist tradition right to
the edge o f the forest, or as many of the Dutch would have perceived it, the edge of the
wilderness.63 Such a meeting would have definitely created a new cultural landscape as
Dutch and Esopus Indians both contributed their understanding o f the meetings’
significance and could have forged a new space for negotiations between the two
cultures.
However the meeting did not take place in a timely enough manner to please
Stuyvesant. The Esopus sachems failed to show for several days and often practiced
stalling tactics. They would return to the woods to confer about topics and not return
when they had agreed to. Often only one sachem would return and state that he could not
make decisions without the others’ consent. The Esopus utilized the woods beyond the
Dutch settlement in order to retain control o f the process o f dealing with the Dutch, and

62 Prior to actually landing, Stuyvesant utilized his boat as his point o f operations. He felt more secure o f
his position on the water than on the land, even though there were no actual hostilities at this time. When
they did leave the ships, Stuyvesant and his men stayed at the farm closest to the water.
63 Fem ow , D R C H N Y 13: 82-87.
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the Dutch were unable to alter the approach. The Esopus had access to the Dutch
settlements during negotiations, but the Dutch were unwilling to venture into the woods
in order to speak with the Esopus Indians. The Dutch position o f power remained in their
settlement, as close to the water as possible. Once they ventured into the woods,
Stuyvesant and the soldiers would become much weaker and much more vulnerable.
When the Esopus were present and Stuyvesant had his chance to speak, the
account indicates that Stuyvesant first attempted to get the Indians to turn over the
murderer o f the Dutch settler, which he failed to do because the Esopus sachems claimed
the individual had fled their jurisdiction. Even if the murderer was still within the Esopus
settlements, the Dutch were unable to travel into the woods to claim him. Stuyvesant,
out of possible frustration, then challenged the Esopus in attendance by boasting, “that if
any of the young men present had a great desire to fight, they might come forward
now.”64 No one met his challenge at the time, although it appears that there were not
many young men at the meeting as most were out hunting and did not return for some
time. However, upon the return o f the younger Esopus Indians, many were ready to meet
Stuyvesant’s challenge and the group was reported to be about 500 warriors strong.65
These young men represented what was known as the Bareback faction o f the Esopus
Indians who were opposed to acquiescing to any Dutch demand or desire. However, all
parties managed to avoid open conflict at this time.

64 Ibid., 80-86.
65 The validity o f this statement o f 500 Esopus warriors should be questioned. If they did indeed show with
500 warriors, it is m ost likely many were in fact not from the Esopus nation, but possibly disgruntled allies
from the Peach War.
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Stuyvesant continued to work to avoid a costly war, and at the same time saw for
himself the value o f the region to the future o f the Company and the colony. As settlers
reluctantly began creating a concentrated settlement, Stuyvesant him self purchased
several tracts in the Esopus region. He also recruited carpenters from Fort Orange to help
with both the settlement and his own buildings. Unfortunately, due to the distractions of
the Indian threat and trying to build a settlement, their crops were not doing well.66
Stuyvesant returned to the Esopus in October 1658 for a meeting between himself, the
Dutch settlers and the Esopus sachems Pappequaken, Preuwamackan and Nachchamat.
The meeting was to bring about a temporary agreement o f coexistence between the
settlers and the Esopus Indians.

fil

This meeting was held at the home o f Thomas Chambers instead o f that of Jacob
Jansen Stoll. Chambers’ home was located closest to the water and provided Stuyvesant
quick access to his position o f power, the river. It also brought the Indians further into
the settlement and away from the woods, which they used so adeptly in the previous
meeting to avoid making agreements with the Dutch. The location change did not seem
to work to the advantage o f the Dutch, however.

After discussing concessions to be

made by both sides, the Esopus sachems informed Stuyvesant that the other sachems
Poenap and Calcop were not present and they could do nothing without their input. They
informed Stuyvesant that they would go back to their villages and return with Poenap and
Calcop the following day. Stuyvesant wrote that he thought the move was “to be a

66 Femow, D RC H N Y 13: 91.
67 Ibid., 88-98.
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subterfuge only, to gain time either until my departure or until the arrival o f other
savages, yet to give them full measure, I allowed them this delay until tomorrow.”68
While Stuyvesant’s agreement may appear quite magnanimous, he did not really
have much ability to detain the Indians without causing more problems. He was,
however, correct and the sachems did not return as promised. Stuyvesant sent Jacob
Jansen Stoll and Marten Metselaer into the woods to the Esopus village to find out what
had happened. The men returned with the news that “the chiefs had made game o f them
and had plainly said, they had no intention of giving satisfaction as they considered what
they had done o f no consequence.”69 At this point, Stuyvesant opted to leave the region
and ordered Ensign Dirck Smith and fifty soldiers in the community with the instructions
to keep all Indians out o f the settlement, except with the permission o f Chambers or Stoll,
to attack Indians only in defense, and to protect the settlers while they commenced their
farming.
Throughout the winter and into the spring open hostilities were avoided.
Stuyvesant, who was in the Esopus early in 1659, was in communication with Jeremias
van Rensselaer in March and April of that year concerning acquiring matching horses to
use before his carriage, thus indicating at least some semblance o f normalcy in the region
as well as the WIC’s renewed commitment to the region.70 Throughout the winter, spring
and summer the residents and Stuyvesant also worked to acquire a minister for the

68 Ibid., 95.
69 Ibid., 95. However, the fact that not all the sachems were present at the meeting to conclude the
negotiations did make the meeting o f no consequence for the Esopus.
70 Van Rensselaer kept livestock, including horses and cattle, in the Esopus region, and the Director
General wished to pick up horses from him in the Esopus region. See Correspondence o f Jerem ias van
Rensselaer, 157.
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Esopus settlement, and in August of 1659 the WIC sent Domine Harmanus Bloem to the
region. The WIC Directors in Holland agreed to this to combat “the bad condition of the
public church service in the open country.”71 Although there were some signs of life as
usual in the region, there were increasing signs o f tension as well. First, there was
growing concern o f an English settlement south of the Esopus and north o f New
Amsterdam. Stuyvesant wrote to the Directors in Holland that the Dutch should resist by
sending not only more Dutch families, but also “homeless Polish, Lithuanian, Prussian,
Jutlandish or Flemish families” to counteract the English presence along the Hudson.

72

Stuyvesant and the WIC were unable to get many Dutch families to emigrate to New
Netherland because economic and living conditions in the Dutch Republic were good and
few Dutch families wished to leave thriving conditions to gamble their livelihoods on an
overseas colony. Therefore, Stuyvesant was forced to ask the WIC in Amsterdam to
recruit families from much less prosperous areas o f Europe to populate New Netherland.
Second, due to continued threats from the Esopus Indians, the settlers were unable to
bring in a crop for a second year, although reports from Rensselaerswyck state that its
wheat crop was very good for 1659.
In late summer 1659, tensions and suspicions started rising. In August the Esopus
settlers indicated that their suspicions against the Esopus Indians were raised by the fact
that they heard through their informants, a Mohawk Indian, a “southern savage,”
Wappinger Indians, and Highland Indians, that the Esopus Indians were preparing for

71 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 98.
72 Ibid., 107.
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war.73 By the end o f the month, Sergeant Andries Laurensen informed Stuyvesant that
the Esopus Indians had been quiet. However, he also said that Christoffel Davits was
continuing to sell alcohol to the Indians, and that an Esopus Indian named Poenap, who
was named earlier as a sachem, was found intoxicated near the Dutch village.74
In September Laurensen wrote that he was informed by “a certain savage” that the
Esopus Indians were preparing for war. Furthermore, the alcohol distributor Davits also
informed Laurensen that the Esopus Sachem Calcop told him, “he should move away for
the savages not only the barebacks but also the sachems had resolved to beat us.”75
While Laurensen was concerned, he questioned the veracity o f the information, mostly
due to its source, Christoffel Davits. A few days later some Esopus Indians, including
women and children as a sign o f their peaceful intentions, arrived in the Dutch village.
According to the report, two Mohawk sachems, along with “Sinnekens and southern
Indians,” accompanied the Esopus Indians and advised, “that they should reconcile
themselves again with the Christians, for which purpose they had now come.”76 The
Esopus Indians inquired o f the Dutch why they were not out plowing, and grew wary of
Dutch activities. They also indicated that the Bareback faction was still strong and also
displeased with some o f the restrictions placed on Esopus Indian movements in the area,
particularly with farmers blocking o f a path commonly used by the Esopus Indians. Even
with the presence o f allied Indians encouraging peace, the double threat o f increased

73 Ibid., 104. This also illustrates the Dutch dependence on intelligence from Indians outside o f towns,
where the Dutch had little authority and freedom o f movement, except in individual cases.
74 Ibid., 105.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 106.
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numbers o f English combined with the displeasure of the Bareback Esopus made the
Dutch nervous.
The tensions finally broke later that same month when Jacob Jansen Stoll led
some o f his neighbors into the nearby woods and fired on a group o f Indians who were
intoxicated on the alcohol they received as pay for working in Thomas Chambers’
fields.77 The Indians were, according to Stoll, disorderly and in a drunken rage. Ensign
Smith wrote to Stuyvesant informing him of the events in the Esopus and also to inform
Stuyvesant that he did not order the attack, but that Jacob Jansen Stoll led it. When Stoll
returned to the village “abusing the ensign violently” and said “I know very well what
orders [Smith] had from the Honorable General and how [Smith] sat there all in the fort
for eight days.”78 The fault for this event seems to lie with the Dutch settlers. The fact
that Thomas Chambers gave brandy to several Indians as pay after he had complained to
Stuyvesant about Fort Orange residents selling alcohol to the Esopus Indians seems to
indicate he was looking for a fight. Furthermore, Stoll’s quick actions to leave the fort
and attack the Indians against the wishes o f Stuyvesant and against the authority of
Ensign Smith also indicate that his actions were offensive.
Many other residents o f New Netherland did not support the Esopus settlers’
actions and believed that Stoll and Chambers had brought trouble upon themselves.
Jeremias van Rensselaer ignored Stuyvesant’s requests for help for the Esopus settlers,
because he believed it was the fault o f the Dutchmen there.

7Q

Although the Esopus

77 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 88-90, 119; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 171-173.
A group o f Catskill Indians corroborated the story to vice-director La Montagne at Fort Orange, and placed
the blame squarely with the Dutch.
78 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13:115.
79 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 179.
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region was under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, relations continued to remain fractured
and Fort Orange authorities would not support their neighbors in the Esopus. At this
point, it remained up to Stuyvesant to try to protect the Esopus region from New
Amsterdam, and, he hoped, protect the colony from collapse. Unfortunately for
Stuyvesant few individuals and communities throughout New Netherland were interested
in assisting the colonists in the Esopus. He did not have the authority to force residents
of New Netherland to militarily support the people o f the Esopus, and his requests for
volunteers was able to raise only a small group from Long Island. Stuyvesant even
reported that some, “even dared to say, that they were bound only to defend their own
place.”80 The fractured nature o f New Netherland remained quite evident as different
communities continued to form their own cultural landscapes independent of one another
and independent from the directives o f the WIC authorities.
By the first week o f October 1659, the Dutch village in the Esopus was “besieged
by 500 to 600” Indians, and no one could go near the village, at least ten villagers were
O I

taken captive and at least four villagers were dead, including Jacob Jansen Stoll.

Later

in the month, while some Esopus Indians taunted the Dutch soldiers and settlers that they
would come with 400 men to fight the Dutch, Highland Indians were informing Ensign
Smith that the Esopus Indians were deliberating and needed more time. With these
crossed signals, Smith found it safest to keep everyone in the village. Also, while Fort

80 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 123.
81 Ibid., 119. Lourensen sent the letter via an Indian messenger to Stuyvesant on October 3, but Stuyvesant
did not receive it until nine days later. Stuyvesant was upset at the length o f time the m essage took to reach
him, but besides expressing anger, there was not much else he could do because o f Dutch dependence on
Indians for communication. The numbers o f Indians remains questionable, unless they were joined by
members o f other tribes, which Stuyvesant suspected.
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Orange and Rensselaerswyck did not send any aid themselves, they did recruit the
assistance o f two Mohawk sachems and a Mahican sachem to travel to the Esopus to help
bring about an armistice.82 The Mohawks, Mahicans, and some Catskill Indians were
able to negotiate an armistice between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch by the end of
October.83
The Dutch were powerless to end the outbreak o f hostilities, which could only be
brought about by the intervention of the still powerful tribes o f the Mohawks and
Mahicans. These tribes had been establishing relations with Fort Orange for many years
at this point. As they took the lead in the diplomatic relations between the Dutch and the
Esopus Indians, they, especially the Mohawks, were able to insert themselves further into
areas o f Dutch diplomacy with the Indians. At the same time, as will be discussed later,
the Mohawks were gaining greater access to Dutch courts in Fort Orange. Through
growing Mohawk influence in both areas, they were able to greatly influence the rise of
Fort Orange as the new colonial center of Indian and European affairs, even though Fort
Orange officials were trying to remain independent from the tensions between the Esopus
settlers and the Esopus Indians.
The Esopus settlers and Dutch leaders in New Amsterdam, however much they
may have wanted to retaliate and eliminate the Esopus Indians, were still not in a position
to fight a truly offensive war and Stuyvesant continued to delay such an event until the
Dutch were strong enough to fight. In November o f 1659 Stuyvesant wrote to Jeremias
van Rensselaer and remarked that any peace with the Esopus could hardly be lasting

82 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 123.
83 Ibid., 126; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 186.
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unless they were to leave the land and join another tribe altogether, a fate that the Esopus,
especially the Bareback faction, would rather avoid.84 O f course such action would
allow the spread o f Dutch Christianity, give the Dutch productive farmland and increase
the Dutch influence between the settlements at Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.
Furthermore, the distractions from the fighting would help bring about a bread shortage
in the colony, which also threatened the colony.85
For the remainder o f 1659, Stuyvesant urged extreme caution in dealings with the
Indians and gave instructions for limited contact between the Esopus Indians and the
Esopus settlers.86 It was not until February o f 1660 that Stuyvesant offered the Directors
in Amsterdam a moral reasoning for military action. He stated that,
in consideration o f the suffered injuries and the restoration o f the almost
ruined Batavian reputation (as one savage considers him self now as good
as two Dutchmen) and on account o f the fertility o f the lands (directly
ready for the plough without ridding o f trees or brushes and settled with
two or three villages each o f 20-24 families, which according to the
convenience o f the place are able and capable each to produce every year
as much grain as all the Dutch and English villages o f New Netherland
together are as yet able to produce) that it is necessary to make war on the
Esopus Indians.87
Throughout 1659, Stuyvesant remained focused on the Esopus region although he still
recognized that the Dutch were not strong enough to fight a full-scale war with the
Esopus Indians without leaving the southern settlements open to attack from Maryland
and their northern settlements vulnerable to New England. He also knew that at that

84 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 106; and Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 186.
85 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 187-189.
86 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 128.
87 Ibid., 136.
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point, both the bad winter weather and the lack o f bread kept the Dutch from waging war,
while they were sure the Esopus Indians were preparing for war themselves.

88

Stuyvesant knew that without stabilizing the interior of the colony, New
Netherland could be split in two. The Dutch could not afford to ignore such a fate and
needed to establish an agricultural presence and to prevent the total isolation of Fort
Orange. Stuyvesant and the Council, recalling the Peach War, decided that a new war
was necessary, but opted to wait until the fall o f 1660 to carry out their offensive war in
the Esopus, the protection of which was deemed necessary for the survival of the
colony.89 In the meantime, Stuyvesant proclaimed March 24, 1660 as a day of fasting
and prayer to prepare for the military action. He explained that,
with rumors o f war and its immediate consequences, murder and arson by
the savage barbarous natives committed here as well as principally on our
friends, countrymen and fellow-inhabitants of the Esopus, which though
the righteous but not less merciful God has mitigated and so directed that
it did not happen, against our expectation, in the worst manner and
according to the evil intentions o f the barbarians and has made it cease for
the present desiring doubtless our penitence and turning away from our
crying and God irritating sins, as the abominable desecration o f His
Sabbath and his name.90
As Stuyvesant saw it, while the residents apparently forgot the lessons taught to them
through their sufferings in the Peach War, God was giving them a reprieve to turn away

88 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 130, 132. A ll sharing o f information during the winter o f 1659-1660 was based
on both Indian sources and Indian messengers, primarily Mohawks although Catskills were also mentioned,
as well. The use o f Mohawk information and messengers illustrated further the Dutch dependence on the
Indians for their correspondence in the winter especially. Furthermore, the Dutch trusted, although
possibly not fully, Mohawk messengers not to give false information or provide the Esopus with
information against the Dutch. In January 1660, Ensign Smith was unable to get any information out o f the
Esopus because no Indian would agree to carry the m essage due to the weather.
89 Ibid., 135, 137-138, 142; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 179-180. With
such a small population, Stuyvesant was faced with the problem o f raising enough troops to fight such a
war. In response he requested that several slaves be sent from Curacao to assist in the fight against the
Esopus.
90 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 145.
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from their continued evil and God irritating ways. In this light, the Esopus War was seen
as a continuation o f the Peach War, brought about by the sins o f the community.
Not only did Stuyvesant call for a day o f prayer to avoid God’s punishment for
the sins o f the colony, as they had been punished in 1655, Stuyvesant also worked to
maintain the peace made with Indians after the Peach War. In his negotiations with the
Indians who signed a peace with the Dutch in 1655, Stuyvesant was making sure that
they did not try to assist their former allies, the Esopus Indians, who fought with them
during the Peach War, but who never participated in the peace negotiations. On March 6,
1660, Stuyvesant and sachems from the Hackensack, Nyack, Tappan and Long Island
tribes met at Fort Amsterdam to renew their peace from the Peach War. One of their first
orders o f business was for the southern Indians to pledge to have nothing to do with the
Esopus Indians.91
Another concern the Dutch voiced to the Indians was their desire to end wars for
the purpose o f avenging murders and to cooperate in bringing murderers to justice. This,
as mentioned above, was one of the events that led to hostilities between the Esopus
Indians and the settlers and threatened other areas in New Netherland as well. A week
after this meeting, the non-Bareback faction o f Esopus Indians requested a meeting with
Stuyvesant at Fort Amsterdam through Coetheas, chief o f the Wappinger Indians, to
discuss a permanent peace.

The Bareback faction o f the Esopus were the young

warriors who were always willing to meet a challenge from the Dutch. However, the
non-Barebacks, at this point, did not see an advantage to continuing the hostilities and

Ibid., 147.
: Ibid., 150.
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wished it to come to an end. Since the Wappingers already had a treaty with the Dutch,
the Esopus were able to utilize the Wappingers as mediators between themselves and the
Dutch in New Amsterdam.
Unfortunately, before a peace could be brought about, hostilities once again broke
out in the Esopus and the armistice was broken. Furthermore, Stuyvesant did not want to
establish a peace with the Esopus Indians unless it included both the Bareback and nonBareback factions of the tribe. Otherwise, he would not trust that a peace could be
maintained and that the Esopus would vacate the lands that Stuyvesant wished to acquire.
In March 1660, Ensign Smith went out into the countryside on an expedition to locate the
Esopus Indians, and about three miles inland from the river came across a camp with
about sixty Indians who fled upon seeing the Ensign and his men. The Dutch force killed
at least three Indians and captured twelve, the rest were able to flee to the security o f the
woods.93 W ith this event Stuyvesant and the Council declared war “after having suffered
many massacres, affronts and unbearable injuries from time to time by the Esopus
Indians.”94 Apparently God could not stay his wrath any longer, and the colony was
again placed under alert.
In an attempt to bring about an end to the fighting, it was once again the
Mohawks and Mahicans from the Fort Orange area who traveled to the Esopus and dealt
directly with the Indians there. However, this was the extent o f Fort Orange’s

93 Ibid., 151, 152. Furthermore, the river was opened enough at this point to allow Smith to utilize Dutch
water travel to inform Stuyvesant, instead o f having to depend on an Indian messenger.
94 Ibid., 152. The Dutch actually experienced much difficulty trying to execute the war due to bad spring
weather and due to their lack o f know ledge o f the inland area. They had to cut o f f pursuit o f Esopus
Indians because they were unable to cross streams and travel through the woods. They did, however,
manage to keep the Esopus Indians from being able to remain in one spot very long. Femow, DRCHNY 13:
170.
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involvement in the war and peace proceedings. Although the Esopus was actually under
the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, all negotiations occurred either in the Esopus itself or in
Fort Amsterdam. As stated above, in many ways Stuyvesant saw this conflict as an
extension of the Peach War. The Esopus Indians had fought in that war, but never
participated in the negotiations to end it. Stuyvesant also feared that old alliances would
be rekindled and those tribes who had agreed to terms with the Dutch would join the
Esopus. Therefore, Stuyvesant took charge o f the negotiations and it was Fort
Amsterdam that served as the location o f the negotiations. Stuyvesant would not travel to
the Esopus to treat with the Esopus Indians, especially after his earlier experiences there.
In May 1660, several Sachems o f tribes who had surrendered to the Dutch at the
end of the Peach War appeared at Fort Amsterdam and declared that the Wappingers,
who had also not participated in the Peach War negotiations, would “not injure the Dutch
to the extent o f a straw.”95 With this meeting and others at Fort Amsterdam, the tribes of
the southern Hudson River Valley pledged to either maintain their neutrality or try to
bring about a peace with the Esopus.

Later in May, three Mahican leaders came to Fort

Amsterdam on behalf o f the Esopus sachems who wished for peace. The Mahicans were
told that if the Esopus Indians wanted peace, they would have to come to Fort
Amsterdam, or at least Fort Orange to do so. It was clear that while Stuyvesant would
accept the use of Fort Orange to conclude a peace, any negotiations would have to be in
Dutch territory. He would not accept anything less than an actual appearance by the
Esopus sachems in a Dutch fort. Authorities in Fort Orange, however, showed little

95 Ibid., 166, 171, 172.
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inclination to become too involved in the Esopus troubles, and the negotiations continued
to occur at Fort Amsterdam.96
In July 1660 a peace was negotiated between the Esopus and the Dutch in Fort
Amsterdam. Present at the proceedings were representatives o f the Mohawks, Mahicans,
Catskills, Susquehannocks, Wappingers, and Hackensacks. The Esopus sachems Calcop,
Seewackemamo, Neskahewan and Paniyruways agreed to end all hostilities, give up their
land and move away never to return, not to kill livestock, and “whereas the last war was
caused by Drunken people, no savage shall be allowed to drink brandy or strong liquor in
or near the Dutch plantation houses or settlements, but he must go with it to his land or to
some distant place in the woods.”

07

The Esopus Indians were also forbidden to enter

Dutch houses armed, and lastly, eleven Esopus warriors were sent to Curacao to work as
slaves as an example to others. While the Dutch won this particular war and were able to
dictate the terms within the confines o f their own fort, the Mohawk sachems
Onderishoghque and Adoghwatque admonished the Dutch for starting the war at the
same time they warned the Esopus to avoid war with the Dutch.
The next chapter will further explore how the Mohawks were able to use the
Dutch base o f power in the forts to advance their own authority among both the
Europeans and other Indians. After the peace negotiations in Fort Amsterdam, the
Mohawks would concentrate their efforts at Fort Orange, thus increasing the significance
o f that fort in relations between Indians and Europeans. Stuyvesant and the Mohawks
utilized Fort Amsterdam in this instance because o f Fort Orange’s lack o f interest in

96 See Gehring, Correspondence, 1654-1658, 205, 227. This will be explored more in chapter 4.
97 Fem ow, D RCH N Y 13: 179-181.
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events in the Esopus, again illustrating the lack o f cohesion among the WIC settlements
along the Hudson River. Soon after this event, however, Fort Orange would be unable to
avoid dealing with Esopus affairs, and furthermore, the continued admonishments o f the
Mohawks would leave Fort Orange authorities with little choice but to get involved in the
Esopus.
The Mohawk admonishment aside, the Dutch were able to secure, at least for the
moment, the strategic Esopus region and shorten the gap between Fort Orange and Fort
Amsterdam. The Dutch settlers returned to the land and farming recommenced, much to
the pleasure o f Stuyvesant, the Council and the Amsterdam Directors. The community’s
importance grew and they would also be granted their own court in 1661, thus releasing it
from the jurisdiction o f Fort Orange. However, they would soon learn that their troubles
were far from over.
When war would break out again in the Esopus, the region would actually serve
to further separate the Dutch settlements at Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. This
separation and Fort Orange’s continued isolation would increase Fort Orange’s reliance
on Indian intelligence and Indian couriers. This would, in turn, provide a significant
opportunity for the Mohawks, who provided the majority of the intelligence, to establish
their presence in the Fort Orange court.
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CHAPTER 3

S T R U G G L E S IN SID E T O W N S

In 1653, Dutch settlers Volkert Jansen, Willem Brouwer and Jan van Aken were
brought into court at Beverwyck for violating New Netherland laws that forbade Dutch
settlers from entering Indian lands to conduct trade and from inviting Indians into private
homes and taverns for trade. Each man was accused both of entering Indian space and of
allowing Indians into private Dutch space. They were all convicted and forced to pay a
fine for violating regulations on access to particular spaces that the Dutch WIC had
deemed off limits for trade. The actions o f these men caused Dutch officials to declare
that, “God the Lord would punish such a place.” Such a declaration reflected their
Calvinist sensibilities that dictated that God would not stand for the continual violations
o f regulations on access to particular spaces by Christians and non-Christians alike.
However, the convictions and declarations o f the New Netherland court did not deter
others from violating regulations against entering certain spaces.
As seen in the preceding chapter, European movements outside o f their
established communities was highly restricted. Their limited ability to move on the lands
outside o f their towns was the result o f their lack of knowledge o f these lands. This was
in direct opposition to the Indians who controlled knowledge and access to the lands

outside of European settlements. Furthermore, as a result of events outside o f Dutch
control, such as the tensions in the Esopus region and Mohawk wars with Algonquian
tribes in New England, the Mohawks would also manage to gain more knowledge and
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access to the spaces within Fort Orange. The most significant space that the Mohawks
would penetrate was the use o f the fort, but not just for trade purposes. Through the
1650s and 1660s, the Mohawks were able to gain greater access to the fort and its use by
the Dutch court. In this way, the actions of the Mohawks increased the significance of
Fort Orange as a new political center for both Dutch and Indians.

Focus on the Fort
Stuyvesant’s arrival in New Netherland in 1647 was followed by the arrival of
Brant van Slichtenhorst the following year. Whereas Stuyvesant was the DirectorGeneral o f all o f New Netherland, and was the primary representative o f the WIC in
North America, Slichtenhorst came as the director o f the patroonship of
Rensselaerswyck. Soon after Slichtenhorst took up his post in Rensselaerswyck, he
quickly found himself in conflict with Stuyvesant and the WIC as he began issuing
building lots just north of Fort Orange to the residents o f the patroonship. Slichtenhorst’s
instructions as director of the patroonship no longer exist. However, his actions trying to
bring order to construction along the river as well as his attempts at consolidation o f the
dwellings o f non-farmers near the fort, was an extension of overall Dutch policy o f trying
to form compact and less vulnerable settlements. Stuyvesant vigorously pursued such a
policy throughout the colony to increase the safety o f the settlements and, in turn,
increase the stability o f the colony as a whole. In Slichtenhorst’s case, he already had the
advantage o f a fort in the midst o f his patroonship, and it made sense to utilize that
advantage and consolidate his settlers under his direction in the shadow o f the fort.1

1 Much o f this information can be found in Charles Gehring’s introduction to his edited volume, Fort
Orange Court Minutes 1652-1660.
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However, the fort stood as the symbol o f the WIC’s authority in the land, and
while Stuyvesant would encourage other communities to settle close together and to build
fortification for their protection, he did not view Slichtenhorst’s activities as beneficial to
the WIC. In fact, Stuyvesant saw Slichtenhorst as an interloper trespassing on WIC land
and authority. As Charles T. Gehring observed, this event touched off a controversy
lasting thirty-five years.2 It also illustrated the ever-present competition and separation
between Dutch settlements. In this case, the tensions were between the WIC settlement
at Fort Orange and Beverwyck and the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck. The
competition between the two Dutch colonies would end in favor o f the WIC and would
continue to strengthen Fort Orange’s power in the region. In response to Slichtenhorst’s
restructuring Rensselaerswyck’s settlements, Stuyvesant ordered that no structures could
be built within a cannon shot o f the fort, or about 3000 feet. This provision, if enforced,
would allow for the growth o f Fort Orange’s influence beyond its walls.
To make matters worse, Slichtenhorst further polarized Fort Orange and
Rensselaerswyck by refusing to assist in repairs to the fort by forbidding WIC laborers to
freely quarry stone and cut wood on patroonship land. In the ensuing years as
Stuyvesant’s attention was drawn to the threats coming from outside the colony,
particularly from New England, Slichtenhorst continued consolidating his own hold on
the land around the fort. He granted new building lots within cannon shot o f the fort and
actually guaranteed settlers against their losses if the WIC were to tear down their
property.

2 Gehring, FO CM , xxi.
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Also during the time o f Slichtenhorst’s tenure as director o f Rensselaerswyck,
there was no separate court in Fort Orange representing the rule o f the WIC and all
direction had to come from Fort Amsterdam. This continued to put Slichtenhorst and
Stuyvesant in direct conflict with one another. Furthermore, since weather closed down
river access to Fort Orange in the winter and lack o f authority outside o f towns and lack
of ability to move effectively over land greatly limited land access between the two
settlements, the colonists o f Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck were left to their own
devices a good part o f the time. When the WIC and Stuyvesant attempted to assert their
authority over the land, Slichtenhorst openly resisted. He refused to allow the company
to post their ordinances within Rensselaerswyck jurisdiction. He also threatened
retribution against patroonship farmers who assisted in the repairs to the fort by helping
to haul logs or stone.
By the time Stuyvesant had negotiated the Treaty o f Hartford in 1650, thereby
securing the colony’s eastern boundary, he had also received permission from the
directors in Amsterdam to exert his authority over the entire colony, including the area
around Fort Orange.

Even so, Slichtenhorst continued to grant lots in the disputed area

and continued to refuse the WIC the right to post ordinances in the patroonship. The
rivalry turned violent when on New Years Eve 1651, soldiers from the fort fired burning
fuses onto Slichtenhorst’s home, which was located within cannon shot and north o f the
fort. The house was set on fire, but the family escaped without injury. Slichtenhorst’s
son Gerritt was not so lucky the next day when he ventured a bit too close to the fort and

3 Charles Gehring also explained that Slichtenhorst had little support from the owners o f the patroonship o f
Rensselaerswyck back in the Netherlands. They were w ell aware that the survival o f the patroonship
depended on good relations with the colony, and such heavy-handed tactics by Slichtenhorst did not help
their cause, or their bottom line.
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was beaten by the same soldiers who fired on his family’s home. This beating was
witnessed by Fort Orange commissary Johannes Dijckman, who was soon to become the
first president o f the Fort Orange court. Dijckman refused to interfere and actually
threatened swift action with his sword against anyone who tried to intervene.
The last straw in this power struggle, which was threatening to descend into utter
chaos, came in the spring with the breaking of the ice in the river, which then opened the
line of communication between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam. Stuyvesant sent
orders up river proclaiming the W IC’s authority over the land surrounding the fort and
gave instructions to erect boundary markers displaying the company’s territory.
Slichtenhorst refused to post the ordinance and went further by tearing down the
boundary markers. In response, Dijckman arrived at Slichtenhorst’s home accompanied
by eight armed soldiers. The group took down the patroons’s flag, announced the
authority of the newly formed Fort Orange Court, arrested Slichtenhorst and sent him to
Fort Amsterdam where he served out the remainder o f his directorship under arrest.
Those people who were granted lots within 3000 feet o f the fort were then required to
swear allegiance to the WIC thereby renouncing their allegiance and obligations to the
patroonship. Moreover, this move once again established authority o f the WIC along the
northern reaches o f the Hudson and established Fort Orange as the foremost symbol of
that authority.
Once the court’s authority was established in 1652, its members quickly began
working to try to impose the authority o f the WIC on the settlement and its inhabitants.
The opening meeting o f the court on April 15, 1652, immediately took into consideration
issues surrounding the land around the fort. Abraham Pietersz Vosburgh had begun

131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

erecting a house within the 3000-foot radius of the fort and requested permission to
continue to do so. The court granted their approval because they deemed the house’s
location behind the once targeted home of Brant van Slichtenhorst to be far enough so it
did “not greatly crowd or obstruct the fort.”4 The court also did not want to contribute to
the financial ruin of Vosburgh by forcing him to relocate a house he had already begun to
build. The court then appointed Dirrick Jansz and Vosburgh to make a survey o f other
lots where people had requested permission to build. It must have given Dijckman much
pleasure to allow continuation of home construction begun under Slichtenhorst, then
under the authority of the W IC.5
The WIC continued to assert its authority over the land once dominated by
Slichtenhorst. In April 1653 the court held an extraordinary session to announce that the
appointed surveyors would lay out an additional eight lots o f forty Rhineland feet wide
on Beverwyck land, “for the accommodation o f the good inhabitants here.” The court
strengthened the influence o f the WIC on this land by giving the first lot to Commissary
Dijckman, the second to the Domine Gideon Schaets, and the third to Abraham Staets,
Captain o f the burgher guard, all WIC officials.6
Along with taking charge o f the land that Slichtenhorst tried to consolidate under
the authority o f the patroonship o f Rensselaerswyck, the WIC also commenced with
repairs to the fort, another past point o f contention between Slichtenhorst and the WIC.

4 Gehring, FOCM , 3.
5 The controversy over who controlled the land, the WIC or the Patroonship o f Rensselaerswyck would
continue for years, and the van Rensselaer’s authority over their land would not be reinstated until after the
English took over N ew Netherland and formed N ew York. W hile the van Rensselaers would not have the
authority o f their own colony, they were deemed rightful owners o f the land.
6 Gehring, FOCM , 49.
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Repairs to the fort would strengthen both the community’s defenses and the W IC’s
physical presence on the land. The Company then had access to Rensselaerswyck’s
quarries, woodlands and livestock to assist in the repairs. The WIC made the community
responsible for the finances o f the repairs by instituting a tax on homeowners, renters and
landowners.7

Regulations on Morals and Movements
Part o f the WIC asserting control of the lands and the people on it included laws
and ordinances regulating movements of individuals and their access to particular places
and spaces. Furthermore, it is important to note that even after the establishment o f the
court at Fort Orange and Beverwyck in 1652, laws that came from the Council in
Manhattan were applicable throughout the colony unless specifically designed for
particular communities. However, because of Fort Orange’s distance from New
Amsterdam and the presence o f an independent court, all laws were not enforced the
same way in Fort Orange as they may have been in New Amsterdam.
With Stuyvesant’s arrival in 1647, he worked very hard to centralize the WIC’s
authority over the people o f New Netherland. In doing so, Stuyvesant and the Council
established laws and ordinances that regulated business and trade, which o f course was
the central activity o f the colony. However, they also issued laws and ordinances
regulating social morality, religious observances, as well as the physical movements of,
both Europeans and Indians.
According to Petrus Stuyvesant’s Dutch Reformed perspective, social morality
and religious observance were intricately intertwined. As was illustrated in chapter two

7 Ibid., 96.
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how well a community adhered to the prescribed social morality and/or the religious
observances was seen as directly related to events, either good or bad, that took place in
the colony. Therefore, one o f the first ordinances issued by Stuyvesant upon his arrival
n

in the colony was one against “tapping and brawling during divine service.”
He opened the ordinance by preaching against the colonists’ general habit to
“indulge in excessive drinking, quarreling, fighting and brawling even on the Lord’s day
o f rest... to the disparagement, indeed contempt of God’s divine laws and ordinances,
which command us to sanctify this His Sabbath and day o f rest.”9 While indulging in
excessive drinking and fighting was bad enough, the issue was that these events were
occurring contrary to God’s own laws and ordinances concerning the Sabbath, and
thereby brought a greater chance o f incurring God’s wrath. In order “to prevent the curse
instead o f the blessing o f God from falling” on the colony, the ordinance forbade the
tapping and serving of alcohol o f any kind before two o ’clock on Sundays with no
sermon and four o ’clock on Sundays that included a sermon on the word o f God.
Furthermore, all tapping and serving was to cease every day o f the week at the ringing of
the bell, which took place around nine o’clock at night.10 It was hoped that controlling
alcohol consumption would lead to an increase in the community’s morals, which of
course would lead to God’s blessing and prosperity, instead o f G od’s curse and suffering.
The fact that the Council at Fort Amsterdam renewed these ordinances at least two more

8 Gehring, Laws & Writs o f Appeal, 6-7.
9 Ibid., 7.
10 Ibid., 8.
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times, in 1656 and 1657, illustrated that not everyone in the colony was necessarily
concerned about such divine consequences.
In fact, it was not even a year later when Stuyvesant and the Council promulgated
another ordinance concerning Sabbath observation. Again, it stated that, “in order to
avert, as much as possible, from themselves and their subjects, God’s wrath and
punishment, which is to be feared from these and other misdeeds, do hereby renew and
amplify their previous proclamations and ordinances.” 11 As part o f the renewal and
amplification, the ordinance called for, but did not explicitly require, attendance at both
morning and afternoon prayers on Sundays. The restrictions on alcohol remained and
other restrictions were added on such activities as “fishing, hunting and other avocations,
crafts and trades, whether it be in houses, cellars, shops, ships, yachts or on the streets
and in markets.” 12 It appears that people made some interesting excuses as to why they
failed to observe the Sabbath to Stuyvesant’s standards.
Problems arising from Sabbath day drunkards were not restricted to the southern
reaches o f the Hudson River. The ordinance was binding for the entire colony, and Fort
Orange had its share o f problems. In January 1653, Pieter Adriaensen was brought into
the Fort Orange Court for having tapped after the nine o’clock bell. And while this
incident did not lead to violence in the way the ordinance related the two, Adriaensen was
further cited for using abusive language when he was fined. Such was another sign of
moral decline related to breaking alcohol regulations.13

“ Ibid., 18.
12 Ibid.
13 Gehring, FOCM, 39. See Peter C. Mancall, D eadly M edicine: Indians an d A lcoh ol in Early America. In
chapter one he discusses the pervasiveness o f alcohol in the early m odem period, including colonial North
America. Although he concentrates on the eighteenth century, he also displayed a seventeenth century map
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Violence and alcohol continued to be a problem in Fort Orange. In February of
1654 an inquiry was begun regarding the actions of Jacob Jansen Stoll from the previous
summer. Stoll had apparently approached the town guards when “drunk, intoxicated, or
at least quite befuddled,” he drew his sword and threatened the members o f the guard,
especially Adriaen Jansen van Ilpendam, who was singled out. On another drunken or
befuddled occasion, Stoll also apparently approached the guardhouse with a loaded gun,
which he discharged.14

Religion in New Netherland
The presence o f the officially sanctioned Dutch Reformed Church and other
religions in the daily life o f New Netherland, including Fort Orange, was not limited to
ordinances enforcing Christian morality. Four years prior to Stuyvesant’s arrival in 1647,
Father Isaac Jogues spent time in New Netherland after having escaped his Mohawk
captors. He wrote down his experiences in the colony in 1646 while awaiting to depart
for a winter mission among the Hurons. He also wrote a description of his captivity and
escape soon after his safe delivery in 1643.
Jogues’ original account of his time in Fort Orange gives very little information
on the settlement. He noted that prior to his escape he met with the Dutch Governor in
the colony who instructed the crew o f a ship to carry the missionary to Europe once he
made his escape from the Mohawks. Jogues went on to tell that once he made his escape

from Maryland that depicts the town tavern next to the courthouse. See also William J. Rorabaugh, The
Alcoholic Republic: An Am erican Tradition (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1979) and Mark Lender
and James K. Martin, D rinking in America: A H istory (New York: Collier Macmillian, 1987).
14 Gehring, FOCM , 88-96. Stoll was also involved in altercations when apparently sober. He fought with
Lourens Jansz at the house o f Hendrick Jochems. In February 1656 he was brought to court and confessed
to beating and drawing blood from his w ife Geertryt Andriessen, although, in this case, because it occurred
in a domestic and not a public situation, the court found it could not punish Stoll.
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he spent two days concealed in the hold of the ship. After those two days he traveled by
night to the Governor’s home where he continued to hide from his Mohawk captors who
continued to look for him. With his limited movements in town, and in addition to the
fact that his movements actually took place at night, it is interesting that he was able to
give a description o f the town at all.
However, the description he gave seems to reflect his overall experience in the
community. Jogues found two features in the community of Rensselaerswyck worth
noting. “First is a wretched little fort, named Fort Orange which the Company of the
West Indies has reserved for itself, and which it maintains.” 15 In 1643, at least in the case
o f Jogues, the appearance o f forts on maps was much more impressive than the
appearance o f the forts on the land. The second feature Jogues found worth mentioning
consisted o f the homes themselves. He described, “24 or 30 houses built along the River,
as each has found convenient.” 16 He pointed out that the houses lacked masonry, except
the chimneys, and were made of no more than boards and thatch. His impressions of the
town do seem to reflect his limited and less than pleasant stay in the settlement. He also
seems to confirm the disorganized situation that Slichtenhorst would try to change in
1648, when he would try to bring order to the patroonship and develop a concentrated
settlement. Another part o f Jogues’ account noted that while “there is no exercise of
Religion except the Calvinist and orders declare that none but Calvinists be admitted;

15 Gehring, et al., In M ohawk Country, 31.
16 Ibid., 32.
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nevertheless, that point is not observed, for besides the Calvinists, there are in this
•

•

settlement Catholics, English Puritans, Lutherans, Anabaptists, etc.”

17

This was the same diverse population that Father Joseph Poncet found during his
own stay in Fort Orange as a captive o f the Mohawks in 1653. Poncet’s experience
greatly differed from Jogues’ because Poncet was actually being escorted back to Three
Rivers when he arrived in Fort Orange. Elis Mohawk escort took him there so he could
get clothing for his return trip to New France. Because his situation was not that of an
escaped captive, but of a man who had actually been adopted by the Mohawks and was
being returned to a French settlement, he had much more freedom o f movement in the
town than Jogues had.
While Poncet did not receive much hospitality from Dijckman, he did receive
much kindness from a variety o f other residents. Dijckman, as the official representative
o f the WIC court in Fort Orange may have been threatened by Poncet's presence because
he was both French and Catholic and taking away resources from the Dutch colony. He
was treated so poorly by the Dutch representative that Poncet’s Mohawk escort removed
him from Dijckman’s home to another where the French priest received much better
treatment. Poncet also encountered a young Frenchman who served as an Indian
interpreter in the colony. The young man sought Poncet out to hear his confession.
Poncet also received welcome from a Scots woman “who has shown herself on all
occasions very charitable toward the French,” and a “Brussels Merchant, a good
Catholic.” 18 The Dutch Reformed WIC officials in New Netherland frowned upon what

17 Ibid., 31.
18 Ibid., 99-100: E cclesiastical Records 1:315.
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they saw as Catholic behavior. For example, Abraham Stevensen was fined by the court
for having walked the streets of Beverwyck on Shrove Tuesday, the day before the
beginning o f Lent, in women’s clothes. He escaped harsher punishment because it was
the first time he did it and he did not believe he was doing anything wrong.19 The
practice was a holdover of pre-Lenten revelry in Europe and seen as yet another
challenge to the Dutch Reformed authority o f the town.
Except for the occasional pre-Lenten celebration, the Catholic presence in Fort
Orange tended to remain fairly quiet and out o f conflict with the Calvinist WIC officials.
Lutherans, however, were a source of much more contention in the town, and the colony
as a whole. Until 1653, there was very little discussion o f Lutherans in the colony. Their
presence was known, but like the Catholics, they generally kept their religious matters to
themselves. This way they were able to blend into and contribute to the evolving crosscultural landscape o f Fort Orange. The Lutherans’ standing in the community was
challenged in the years after Stuyvesant’s arrival.
In October 1653, Lutherans in New Netherland presented Stuyvesant with a
request to allow them to send for a Lutheran minister and “to organize separately and
publicly a congregation and church.”

0 (\

At this time the Lutheran community claimed 150

families in the colony and wanted the church to flourish in New Netherland as they said it
did in the Netherlands. The m iters o f the petition also pledged their loyalty to the

19 Gehring, FOCM, 101; Merwick, P ossessing Albany, 74. See Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Reason o f
Misrule: Youth Groups and Charivaris in Sixteenth-Century France,” P ast an d Present 50, no. February
(1971): 41-75. Davis discusses the accepted practice o f otherwise deviant behavior on certain occasions
usually surrounding Catholic rituals and holidays.
20 Corwin, E cclesiastical Records 1:317.
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WIC.21 The Dutch Reformed ministers Drisius and Megapolensis saw the haughty
behavior o f the Lutherans as leading to “the injury o f our church, the diminution of
hearers o f the Word o f God, and the increase o f dissension, o f which we have had
sufficiency for years past. It would also pave the way for other sects, so that in time our
place would become a receptacle for all sorts o f heretics and fanatics.”22 The colony was
already home for other sects, whether heretical or not. It was truly the idea of a public
congregation that was much more scandalous in the eyes of the ministers and Stuyvesant,
than merely the idea o f a separate congregation that already existed. In other words, this
was yet another battle o f who would control the development o f the cultural identity of
the colony. In this instance, although the Lutherans were Dutch, they still remained
outside WIC norms to the extent that Stuyvesant tried to exclude them from the public
life of the community.
When the Dutch Lutherans finally succeeded in bringing a minister to New
Netherland, one Johannes Emestus Goetwasser in 1657, he arrived without a certificate
of approval from the WIC Directors and was therefore denied permission to preach. At
this point the matter was a highly public religious conflict that Domine Drisius, Domine
Megapolensis and Stuyvesant wanted to avoid. Even if Goetwasser preached in a private
setting, it was not going to be tolerated. Therefore, the Lutherans in New Amsterdam
spirited him out o f Manhattan to a settlement “six or eight miles away, under the
jurisdiction o f the English.”23 Truly this was seen as a double offence to not only run

21 Arnold J. H. Van Laer, trans, The Lutheran Church in N ew York, 1649-1772: Records in the Lutheran
Church A rchives in Amsterdam, Holland, N ew York: N ew York Public Library, 1946, 14.
22 Corwin, E cclesiastical R ecords 1:317.
23 Ibid., 343-344; and Van Laer, Records o f the Lutheran Church, 32.
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from the authority o f the WIC, but to run to the protection of the English who were a
threat in and of themselves. Goetwasser finally departed the colony in 1659 and through
this time period the Lutheran Consistory o f Amsterdam continued to advocate “that if the
friends would keep quiet and be moderate, the exercise o f their religion would no doubt
by connivance be allowed.”24 Although the Consistory continued to point out that it was
the same quietness and moderation that allowed them to continue to practice their
religion in the Netherlands, the New Netherland Lutherans would have none of it.
Fort Orange apparently had a larger Lutheran population than New Amsterdam,
but the majority o f the drama occurred in the area around Manhattan. Fort Orange’s legal
actions proceeded much differently. On February 1, 1656 Tierck Claesen was brought
before the court for fighting with Willem Teller on a Sunday, a definite violation o f the
ordinance against brawling on Sundays. Teller had been brought in the week earlier for
the same offence. Yet, after Claesen was fined for fighting on the Sabbath, he was
charged with, confessed to and was fined for, “having been found last Sunday in the
company o f Lutherans performing divine service, contrary to the ordinance issued against
it.”25 In connection with this same unlawful assembly o f Lutherans, Aelbert Andriesssen,
also known as Aelbert de Noorman, was fined for attending the same separate Lutheran
service that Tierck Claesen was fined for attending.
Although there were supposedly seventy to eighty Lutheran families living in Fort
Orange Claesen and Andriessen were the only two who were brought in front of the court

24 Van Laer, R ecords o f the Lutheran Church, 36
25 Gehring, FOCM, 2 1 4 ,2 1 6 .
26 Ibid., 220.
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for partaking in illegal Lutheran liturgies. Furthermore, it seems that the only reason
either man was fined was because he was brought into court for other violations, Claesen
for fighting and Andriessen for a real estate case. It did not appear to be worth the effort
of bringing the other Lutherans into court. From this limited action against the Fort
Orange Lutherans, it appears that distance from the more vehemently anti-Lutheran
voices in Manhattan helped prevent the drama and dissension that Manhattan experienced
over this issue. Fort Orange continued to develop separately from New Amsterdam.
Whereas the latter worked to suppress Lutherans from participating in the community’s
growth, the former maintained few barriers to Lutherans in the community.
Even the Dutch Reformed ministers were known to rock the boat and challenge
the authority o f the WIC. The Dutch Reformed Minister Gideon Schaets was appointed
minister for the Patroonship o f Rensselaerswyck in May o f 1652. At this same time
Johan van Rensselaer issued instruction for the Patroonship concerning religious
activities. They generally fell in line with those o f the WIC, calling for attendance of
divine services and preventing labor on the Sabbath. He was also particularly concerned
with preventing scandal when “Christians should mingle themselves unlawfully with the
wives and daughters o f Heathens” and established an ordinance against such unseemly
behavior. Furthermore, van Rensselaer wanted his minister Schaets to “use all Christian
zeal there to bring up both Heathen and their children in the Christian Religion.”

97

However, there is no evidence illustrating Schaets’ Christian zeal with Indians or against
Dutch who mingled unlawfully with Indian women.

27 Corwin, Ecclesiastical R ecords 1: 309-310.
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Schaets did however insert himself into the controversy between Dijckman and
Slichtenhorst, at least after the arrest o f Slichtenhorst in 1652. This intervention served
as yet another example o f the tension between the different settlements in New
Netherland. On January 25, 1654 Domine Gideon Schaets announced from the pulpit to
his Rensselaerswyck congregation that if anyone had any charges to bring against Brant
van Slichtenhorst before he was returned to the Netherlands, he or she should come
forward to the court o f Rensselaerswyck or forever keep his or her silence.28
No one actually came forward to the court o f Rensselaerswyck, much to the relief
of the van Rensselaers. However, the action created such a stir with Joannes Dijckman
that he called an extraordinary session o f the Fort Orange court on that same day, which
was, in fact a Sunday. He apparently believed Schaet’s affront was serious enough to call
court on the Sabbath. Furthermore, the court actually convened in the church itself in
order to draw up a protest against Domine Schaets’ announcements. Although Schaets
viewed this announcement as an inner matter o f the Patroonship, as both he and
Slichtenhorst were in the employ o f the van Rensselaers, Dijckman saw this as an
example o f usurpation o f WIC authority to say who could bring a complaint against
Slichtenhorst and placing a time limit on such actions. Not only did Schaets challenge
WIC authority, but according to Dijckman, “such means also tend to make the good
inhabitants disobedient and rebellious to their lawful superiors.”29 Dijckman used this
event to build up the authority o f the Fort Orange court, while further reducing the

28 Gehring, F O C M ,84; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 19.
29 Gehring, FOCM, 86.
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authority o f Rensselaerswyck.

30

The tensions between Schaets and the WIC officials in

Fort Orange were short-lived however. In 1657, Schaets became the minister for Fort
Orange, leaving the patroonship without a spiritual leader.

11

This event is yet another

example of the fractured nature o f the Dutch settlements in North America. It also serves
as an example of how Fort Orange continued to develop its own significance as a center
o f power within New Netherland.

Indians Inside Towns
Along with trying to control how other Europeans moved through and lived in
towns, Dutch authorities also worked to try to control how Europeans and Indians dealt
with one another, and to control Indian access to towns. While the ultimate goal in
regulating the relations between Indians and Europeans was to control the Indian
populations, it was often the Europeans who faced the consequences o f breaking those
regulations, thereby further illustrating the relative power and freedom o f Indians within
the Dutch communities. As discussed in chapter two, the alcohol trade with Indians
proved particularly difficult to keep track of outside o f towns. It was no less o f a problem
within towns. Excessive alcohol consumption among Europeans was feared as a moral
problem. Drunkenness led to unacceptable behavior, which, according to Stuyvesant and
the Council, led to God’s wrath and punishment for the offenders. Alcohol consumption
among Indians was viewed as dangerous, but instead o f being the cause o f God’s wrath it

30 Gehring,F O C M , 106-107.
31 While letters between members o f the van Rensselaer family indicate their commitment to upholding the
Dutch Reformed Church in their Patroonship, they also illustrate that the matriarch o f the family was not
heartbroken with Schaets m oving from their jurisdiction to that o f Fort Orange. She was actually quite
pleased at the money the Patroonship would save with his absence.
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could instead be viewed as an instrument of it. Therefore, curtailing the alcohol trade
with Indians was of vital importance to the safety of the colony.
Prohibitions on the sale o f alcohol to Indians were issued as early as 1643 then
again in 1645. Stuyvesant reissued an ordinance against the selling o f alcohol to Indians
in July 1647. The wording o f the 1647 ordinance illustrated that this regulation was not
one of morality, but one o f safety. It noted that alcohol was sold daily to Indians, thereby
causing “serious difficulties” within the colony. Furthermore, those found guilty of
selling alcohol to Indians would be fined and were “to be responsible for the calamities
that might arise therefrom.”

However, Stuyvesant was forced, less than a year later, to

reissue the ordinance with the additional deterrent o f “arbitrary corporal punishment,
because it is better that such ill-willed people be punished than that a whole country and
community should suffer through their deeds.” He also warned that from the alcohol
trade, “new misfortunes and wars are to be feared.”
By 1654 the problem persisted to the point that the WIC took new steps. In order
to catch the individuals selling alcohol to the Indians, officers o f the court would arrest
intoxicated Indians and keep them confined until, in a sober state, they could inform
authorities of their supplier’s identity. The ordinance stated further that “such
confessions and declarations o f theirs shall... be accepted and believed on that point, and
the violators here o f shall, on the declaration o f the Indians, be punished according to the
ordinance.” O f course, in order to prevent a supposedly respected member o f the
community from being punished in case he or she was named, the ordinance also made it

32 Gehring, Laws & Writs o f Appeal, 3, 9.
33 Ibid., 18-19.
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clear that the accusations would be accepted, “according to the circumstances o f the case
and the person.”34 Nevertheless, Indian voices were given significant legal weight in this
instance in matters involving Europeans as their words would be taken as a sworn legal
statement. However, at the same time, their movements were greatly curtailed, given that
they could be arrested for being drunk, although it was not illegal for Indians to consume
alcohol. Moreover, New Netherland officials actually did not have much ability to stop
Indians from drinking. The illicit alcohol trade outside o f town walls was difficult to
stop, especially when there were so many buyers and sellers willing to make deals.
Fort Orange did have its own problems with Indians and alcohol, and as noted
earlier, all ordinances passed in Manhattan were applicable throughout the colony.
However, Fort Orange did not appear to go so far as to try to arrest intoxicated Indians in
order to learn the identity o f European alcohol peddlers. The Fort Orange community
was dependent on the trade o f Indians who would come into town, and the act of
arresting a visiting Mohawk, no matter how intoxicated, would have had repercussions
with Dutch and Indian relations that outweighed the urgency o f apprehending alcohol
peddlers. The first time the Fort Orange court dealt with the matter o f intoxicated Indians
inside the town was in May 1654. This court hearing also happened to coincide with a
visit to the community from Director-General Stuyvesant. The evening before
Stuyvesant was scheduled to arrive, a group o f intoxicated Indians was in the home of Jan
van Hoesem after obtaining beer from the house of Willem Bout.35

34

Ibid., 48.

35 Gehring, FOCM, 122-123.
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A month after the court action concerning van Hoesem and Bout, which
apparently brought with it no legal action, Jochem Becker was brought before the court to
testify against Elmerheysen Kleyn and Gerritt van Slichtenhorst concerning the latter two
selling brandy to Indians in their house. Becker testified that not only did he see
intoxicated Indians emerge from the house, but that he witnessed Kleyn and Slichtenhorst
giving “a sound thrashing” to a Mahican named Pimp, who had been drinking brandy
sold by the two Dutchmen.

Like with Bout and van Hoesem, there was no record of

action taken against Kleyn and Slichtenhorst, but one cannot help but wonder if
Commissary Dijckman’s actions were personal and an extension o f allowing Gerritt van
•57

Slichtenhorst to be beaten by WIC solders on New Years Day 1652.
The next court action against anyone for selling alcohol to Indians in Fort Orange
came over two years later in October 1656. Again, this legal action coincided with a visit
by Director-General Stuyvesant, who was present at the session, and had the memories of
the Peach War from the preceding year still with him. In this court proceeding Willem
Hofmeyer was caught selling alcohol to Indians and admitting intoxicated Indians into his
residence. In this case as in the two noted above, although the court was trying to restrict
the presence o f intoxicated Indians in town, it was not the Indians who were prosecuted,
but the Europeans who provided them with alcohol or with shelter. Furthermore, in the
first 1654 case, the violation occurred the day before a visit from Stuyvesant, but he was
not present for the interrogation. The fact that there appeared to be no punishment for the
accused seems to indicate a lack o f dedication in dealing with this issue by the Fort

36 Ibid., 141.
37 Ibid., 144.
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Orange magistrates. However, when Stuyvesant was present at the court hearing, the
transgressor was not only found guilty, and charged a fine, but was declared banished
•5 0

from the country for three years.
On the same day Hofmeyer was brought into court, Dirckie Hermense and
Egbertjen Egberts, female innkeepers in Beverwyck, both admitted to selling Indians beer
in their establishments. In both instances the women avoided banishment and corporal
punishment. Each was fined, less than Hofmeyer was, and placed under civil detention.
The women were established members of the Beverwyck community and may have
received less punishment than Hofmeyer for that reason. Furthermore, Hofmeyer had
been in front o f the court before for selling alcohol out of his boat, making him a more
significant threat, especially since he, unlike the tavern keepers, traveled outside o f the
borders of the towns, and therefore, outside o f WIC authority.
Throughout the rest o f the 1650s, Dutch authorities in Fort Orange continued to
bring legal action against Europeans for violating laws concerning the prohibition of
alcohol for Indians, but with limited zeal. The lack o f enthusiasm in prosecuting alcohol
peddlers continued to illustrate the separation between the WIC settlements o f Fort
Orange and New Amsterdam. The laws and ordinances came from the High Council in
New Amsterdam, who were motivated to prevent another attack such as the Peach War
and believed that halting the flow o f alcohol to the Indians was one way o f doing that.
However, authorities in Fort Orange, who had not experienced such Indian troubles, were
less concerned with stopping a lucrative trade.

38 Gehring, FOCM, 253.
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In January 1658, Jan Teunissen, Jan Anderiessen and Pieter Jacobsen Bosboom
were all charged at Fort Orange with selling alcohol to Indians; all denied the charges and
demanded proof against them.

39

Proof was provided four days later and presented in an

extraordinary session of court. The proof came in the form o f “three irreproachable” but
unnamed witnesses. Three days later the three men were found guilty, ordered to pay a
fine and declared banished for three years.40 Furthermore, in the 1658 cases, there was
the inclusion o f Indian testimony against a Dutchman, although there was no indication
that this Indian was ever arrested and held for his testimony. It was a 1654 ordinance,
mentioned earlier, that allowed the use of Indian testimony against sellers of alcohol, but
this was the first time it occurred in Fort Orange. In the case against Gijsbert van
Loenen, an unnamed Mohawk Indian “declared in the presence o f three credible
witnesses” that he had bought brandy from the defendant, “which declaration, according
to the ordinance, must be accepted as complete evidence.”41
Although there was no indication that alcohol played any part in initiating the
Peach War, the war itself served as a significant turning point in the issue o f Indians in
towns. Prior to the Peach War, the most significant regulation on Indians in towns
revolved around the issue o f alcohol, as discussed above. Even that regulation was o f
greater concern outside of the main settlements where the Dutch had significantly less
control over any population, Indian or European. In fact, prior to 1655 in Fort Orange,

39 At this point, there was more concern and accusation about intoxicated Indians in the Esopus region.
With greater fear o f tragedy occurring as a result, more interest was taken as to the source o f alcohol for
Indians. O f course, later in 1658, Jacob Jansen Stoll and his companions would attack a group o f
intoxicated Esopus Indians, thereby sparking the first Esopus War.
40 Gehring, FOCM, 345-348, 349-351.
41 Ibid., 347-348.
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the only discussion surrounding Indians in towns actually stressed the idea o f freedom o f
movement for trade purposes. Fort Orange’s goals continued to develop separately from
that of the rest of New Netherland, and they would not enforce laws that would be
detrimental to their fur trade enterprise. Moreover, it was this freedom o f movement for
trade purposes that would allow the Mohawks to eventually move into the Dutch legal
system and begin to utilize the Dutch, and then English, court systems for their own
diplomatic purposes.
Only three months prior to the Peach War, the Council in New Amsterdam sent
directions to officials in Fort Orange for the opening o f that year’s trading season. The
Council was very supportive of restricting settlers’ movements in the woods or outside of
town, even o f not allowing Dutch traders to stand on the hill and call to the approaching
Indians. Authorities seemed to believe that as long as activities occurred in the town,
then they had a certain amount o f control over events. However, once activities passed
beyond that border, almost all control was lost. So while the Council agreed to restrict
the Dutch movements out of town, Indians were actually able to “go freely where they
want.”42 Accommodating trading Indians and keeping them happy took precedence over
issues such as concern for safety.
After the Peach War, instead o f permitting Indians to go freely where they
wished, Stuyvesant recommended that Indians be forbidden entirely from the island of
Manhattan, but in particular, “the city and especially the fort and all inhabitants must be
interdicted to give them lodging and, by penalty o f the gallows, to sell or give them
brandy, but that a trading place should be appointed for them, the Indians outside or in

42 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 58.
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the outskirts of the city, where it may be considered more suitable.”43 While Stuyvesant
would back off from banishing Indians from the entire island and from demanding the
gallows for those who sold Indians brandy, it was with the Peach War that he became
much more concerned about the construction o f homes. At that point he then ordered that
houses not be covered with straw or reed in order to prevent the easy burning by nature or
an Indian torch.44 Again, he shifted responsibility for control o f Indians in towns to the
European settlers, not the Indians.
After he retreated from his call for the gallows for those who sold alcohol to
Indians, Stuyvesant and the Council established their new regulations on Indian relations
in tow n.' They deemed it “advisable and necessary, that no Indians shall be allowed to
come to any bouwery or plantation, except three or four sachems without arms and that
nobody shall give them lodgings for the night, nor carry on any trade, neither directly nor
indirectly, with them except upon certain specified places.”45
These restrictions were greeted with varying degrees o f enthusiasm throughout
New Netherland. Residents of New Amsterdam supported a stricter enforcement of laws
prohibiting Indians from coming into the city, except to a designated place or unless they
were chiefs.46 After the “suffering by murder and mayhem” the residents o f New
Amsterdam were willing to suffer, “a loss of ordinary freedom,” if “our nation shall live
in more security; provided always good watch be kept, especially on Sunday during

43 Fem ow, D RC H N Y 13:54.
44 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 186.
45 Fem ow, D RC H N Y 13: 59.
46 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 256.
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divine service.”47 It appears that New Amsterdam residents did agree with Stuyvesant
that “general sins are the cause o f general punishments” and that not following the laws
led to God’s wrath in the form of the Peach War. Immediately after the new restrictions
were agreed to Sander Toursen and his wife were banished from the colony to return to
Europe for selling alcohol to some Indians.48
The new restrictions were not greeted with uniform enthusiasm. At Fort Orange,
which was not immediately affected by the “murder and mayhem” o f the Peach War,
colonists did not appear to be willing to suffer a loss o f ordinary freedoms as their New
Amsterdam counterparts vowed. Officials at Fort Orange continued to accommodate
Indians and tolerate otherwise questionable behavior to maintain their trade. This
accommodation in trade would then lead to greater Indian influence in other areas of Fort
Orange life, particularly the court.

Indians’ Use of the Fort and Court
The first real example o f Indians having access to the Dutch court in Fort Orange
was in an extraordinary session held on December 24, 1653, a year after the court was
established as a separate jurisdiction. After disposing o f a financial dispute, the court
turned to a Mohawk proposition requesting Dutch assistance in their relations with
French Canada. Although this appears to be the M ohawks’ first actual foray into Fort
Orange’s judicial process, the propositions were made by one Stig Stiggery, “and others
in the name and on the part of the Maquas.”49 The M ohawks’ propositions did not call

47 Ibid., 256.
48 Ibid.
49 Gehring, FOCM , 77.
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for any new negotiations concerning themselves or any other party. The Mohawks and
the French had previously concluded a peace between themselves so no new negotiations
were necessary. What the Mohawks were requesting was Dutch acknowledgment of this
peace and, in so doing, Dutch expression of support o f the M ohawks’ position with the
French. The Mohawks proposed that the Fort Orange court write to the French governor
declaring Dutch approval of the peace between the French and Mohawks. The Mohawks
also requested that the Dutch court at Fort Orange write to the French governor asking
that the French remain neutral in any future hostilities between the Mohawks and “the
French Indians.”
Joannes Dijckman and the court wrote letters to both the French governor Jean de
Lausen and Pierre Boucher, commander of the fort at Three Rivers. The letters stated
what the Mohawks requested even if the language did not emphasize Dutch support of
the Mohawks. Dijckman referred to the Mohawks as “cruel savages” while still
connecting the Dutch to the French under the banner o f Christianity. However, in taking
on the role o f intermediary on behalf of the Mohawks, the court o f Fort Orange set the
precedent o f being the Dutch authority in dealings with the Mohawks. The Fort Orange
court heard the Mohawks’ propositions and acted on them without the consent of
Stuyvesant in Fort Amsterdam. In fact, Dijckman told both the M ohawks’ representative
and the French governor that he would inform the Director General o f these proceedings
after they were concluded. This was truly a new form o f interaction taking place within
Fort Orange. By the Mohawks asking the Dutch to intervene on their behalf with the
French, the Mohawks introduced a new diplomatic dimension in their dealings with
Europeans, even though they were speaking through a mediator.
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The next time Indians appeared in the Fort Orange court records they were not so
much participants as the subject o f discussion. On July 17, 1654 the commissaries of the
court called an extraordinary session to discuss what the court perceived as the necessary
disbursement o f gifts to the Mohawks. While the Mohawks were not actually present
during these proceedings, the court declared that in order to maintain the Mohawks’
friendship, to compensate for the high price of scarce Dutch goods and to prevent the
Mohawks from killing Dutch cattle, it was necessary to make a gift to the Mohawks. As
a result, eleven o f “the most favorable disposed citizens” donated a total of four kettles,
eleven axes, nine pounds o f powder and forty-four fathoms o f sewant, or wampum, to
present to the Mohawks.50
A month later, on August 11, 1654, a group of Mohawks and “Sinneken” made a
present to the court.51 In return the members o f the court thought it proper and prudent to
give the Indians twenty-five pounds o f powder, among other things, from the WIC’s
powder supply. Again, while the Mohawks and other Iroquois did not have full access to
the Dutch court at Fort Orange, they were gaining access and a certain amount of
acceptance in the Dutch legal process. Moreover, the Mohawks, in particular, would
continue to cultivate and expand this access to serve their owns ends and work to their
advantage. And by focusing their efforts in the judicial system in Fort Orange, the
Mohawks truly began to establish Fort Orange as the center o f European/Indian relations.
According to Fort Orange court minutes, Indians did not appear in the court
during or immediately following the Peach War o f 1655. It was not until June 16,1657

50 Ibid., 146-147.
51 In this instance, it appears that the term “Sinneken” does not apply to the Seneca tribe but to one o f the
other non-Mohawk members o f the Iroquois.
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that Indians, and again it was the Mohawks, were present in the court at Fort Orange. At
this time the sachems of the three Mohawk villages sent a chief named Sasiadego to vice
director La Montagne to request a meeting. The latter convened the court, where three
Mohawk sachems representing the three villages came to make some propositions to the
Dutch. Now the Mohawks were not speaking through a third party, but were directly
representing themselves within the judicial system o f Fort Orange.
At this meeting, the Mohawks were asking for more direct intervention and
assistance from the Dutch in possible hostilities between themselves and the “Sinnekens”,
in this case the western tribe of the Five Nations, the Senecas, with whom they were at
war. The Mohawks were becoming more adept at their use o f the Dutch court at Fort
Orange. They sent a messenger ahead to request a meeting prior to the sachems’ arrival
in the court. Their influence within the community o f Fort Orange was reflected in the
fact that this request was honored immediately, and the meeting was arranged. In this
meeting they asked directly for aid from the Dutch in the form o f horses to haul logs to
repair the M ohawks’ fortresses, and a cannon for each village to be used as a warning
signal between the villages. They also requested that the Dutch “should protect their
wives and children here in the village in case they should be involved in a war with the
Sinnekes.”

This appears to be the first instance o f the Mohawks doing two things in the

Dutch court. First, they were requesting protection for Mohawk women and children in
Fort Orange, and second they were setting themselves up against another member of the
Five Nations. However, while both instances represented a first, neither would be the
last.

52 Gehring, FOCM , 304.
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Unfortunately, no record seems to have survived describing the Dutch response to
these requests, although it would be safe to assume that the Mohawks did not receive any
cannons. But in the period after the Peach War, the Mohawks were working diligently to
increase their power among both Indians and Europeans in the Hudson and Mohawk
Valleys, and they were beginning to adeptly utilize the Dutch judicial system at Fort
Orange to achieve those ends.
The Mohawks did not return to the Fort Orange court in an official or proactive
capacity for over a year. On August 13, 1658 the Fort Orange court held an extraordinary
session for the arrival of fifteen Mohawk sachems.53 This meeting between the Mohawk
sachems and the court was similar to the first in 1653 in the respect that the Mohawks
were requesting Dutch assistance in their dealings with the French. However, instead of
having the Dutch show support o f a peace between the French and Mohawks, the
Mohawks now requested that the Dutch help in a prisoner exchange between the French
and Mohawks by sending a resident of Fort Orange who could speak French with the
Mohawks to Montreal. The Mohawks were told that there might not be any Dutchman in
the region willing to take such a journey. The Mohawks’ response was to remind the
Dutch that since the Mohawks had traveled to Fort Amsterdam to help end the Peach
War, it was now New Netherland’s responsibility to help the Mohawks bring peace to
their nation.
Here we see how the Mohawks were able to create the shift from Fort Amsterdam
as the center o f Indian and Dutch relations during the Peach War to using Fort Orange for
such purposes. The Indian tribes around Manhattan no longer serving a threat, New

53 Ibid., 400-402; Fem ow, DRCHNY 13: 88.
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Amsterdam was no longer a site for Indian and Dutch negotiation, beyond the occasional
renewal o f the peace made after the Peach War. Furthermore, since New Amsterdam was
not dependent on the direct trade with the Indians, they were able to maintain more
restrictions on Indian access to Manhattan Island. Fort Orange p a resented a very
different situation. The Mohawks retained their independence and, in fact, the Dutch at
Fort Orange were dependent on the Mohawks for the fur trade. This allowed the
Mohawks to have much more influence over the workings of Fort Orange, including the
judicial system.
Moreover, the Mohawks were utilizing the Dutch courts in order to force the
Dutch to assist them in an issue that the Dutch had no significant interest in. The
Mohawks were able to wield enough authority, and had the ability to back up their
authoritative statements, to get the Dutch to respond to the Mohawks’ request. Since
their problem was with the French in Montreal, it made much more sense to deal with the
Dutch in Fort Orange instead of going down river to Fort Amsterdam, where the fighting
during the Peach War took place. Although the Dutch in and around Fort Orange did not
necessarily see the Peach War as their problem, the Mohawks recognized the Dutch as a
single entity, although, the different Dutch communities worked to achieve their own best
ends, similar to the Mohawks working against the “Sinnekens.” The Mohawks also
stated that they promised, “in the future to do their best between us and other Indians.”54
With this statement, “the court immediately summoned the public crier and had him

54 Gehring, FO CM , 400. Jeremias van Rensselaer, in particular, expressed that the people o f Fort Orange
and Rensselaerswyck were not a part o f this war because they had no relations with the Indians o f the lower
Hudson River Valley. Residents o f the upper reaches o f the river also gave no aid to those affected by the
war on Manhattan or Staten Island. Their good relations with the Mohawks allowed the Dutch in Fort
Orange to consider themselves as being separate from the Indian troubles to their south.
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announce that if anyone cared to undertake such a journey, he would receive one hundred
guilders for his trouble.”55
It was another full year before the Mohawks once again came to Fort Orange for a
meeting with the court. On September 6, 1659 some Mohawks arrived at Fort Orange for
a meeting, and upon their entrance into the town, they were led to the fort. The members
of the courts of both Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck were likewise summoned to the
fort.55 In this meeting the Mohawks came to make very specific demands of the Dutch,
who, the Mohawks pointed out, called the Mohawks brothers, “but that lasts only as long
as we have beavers. After that we are no longer thought of.”57 There was a definite shift
in the way the Mohawks approached the Dutch officials in the Fort Orange court with
this particular meeting. Prior to this session, the Mohawks had been somewhat pleading
in their requests o f the Dutch. At this point, they became much more demanding o f the
Dutch. It is difficult to ascertain if this shift was due to a change in Mohawks’ attitudes
or if it was due to a change in Dutch perceptions and translations. With the inclusion of
officials from both Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck it appears that as the Mohawks’
approach to the Dutch had changed, so too did the Dutch approach to the Mohawks.
For example, during the June 1657 meeting between three Mohawk sachems and
the court at Fort Orange the Mohawks are recorded as saying “as old friends that we [the
Dutch] should accommodate them with some horses to haul logs out of the woods.”58
However, in the 1659 meeting that language changed from declaring the Dutch “old

55 Ibid.
56 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 217.
57 Gehring, FOCM , 453.
58 Ibid., 304.
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friends” to accusing the Dutch o f abandoning that friendship when the Mohawks no
longer meet the needs of the Dutch. Also in the 1659 meeting the Mohawks’ request for
men and horses changed from asking for accommodation as old friends to stating, “Look
at the French and see what they do for their Indians when they need them. Do the same
for us and help us repair our castles.”59 The conciliatory tone o f 1657 was abandoned by
summer o f 1659. With the Mohawks’ active involvement in mediating an end to the
Dutch hostilities with the Esopus, they were arguing from a new position o f power.
Furthermore, the Mohawks were no longer looking for Dutch assistance in their dealings
with the French, but were using the French to strengthen their position with the Dutch by
showing the Dutch what accommodating friends the French were.
In the record o f the 1659 meeting the Mohawks also made demands that the
Dutch smiths repair the Mohawks’ guns regardless of whether or not the Mohawks were
able to pay for the repairs. The Mohawks also made the argument that guns were
worthless without powder, so the Dutch should also provide the Mohawks with powder
as well. Another example that illustrates shifting Dutch perceptions of Mohawks’
motives was the record o f the Mohawks’ request for men and horses to haul wood to help
them repair their fortifications, “for they are too lazy to work.”60 It is hard to believe that
the Mohawks used such an argument to persuade the Dutch to render assistance, but it is
less of a stretch to see how the Dutch could interpret the M ohawks’ growing demands as
a sign that they wished too much from the Dutch. However, the Mohawk demands

59

Ibid., 454.

' Ibid.
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served as a sign o f the Mohawks’ understanding o f their own position o f power among
the Dutch o f Fort Orange.
With the Mohawks making so many material demands o f the Dutch in this 1659
meeting, the Dutch answered that they continued in their feelings of brotherly union with
the Mohawks. However, they also informed the Mohawks that any specific answer to
their demands would have to wait for the arrival o f Petrus Stuyvesant. But Stuyvesant
was not able to come to Fort Orange, and on September 24 seventeen representatives
from Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck traveled to the Mohawks’ easternmost settlement
called Kaghnuwage to answer their propositions. The actual answers the Dutch gave
stressed the ideas o f brotherhood and friendship between the two peoples, but they also
emphasized Dutch inability to grant the Mohawks their material demands such as free
gunsmith services and use o f Dutch livestock. They did, however, bring gifts of axes,
powder and lead for the Mohawks.61
More significant than the gifts the Dutch brought to the Mohawks was the fact
that the Dutch went to the Mohawks at all in order to conduct official business. The trip
appears to have been for the purpose o f a good will gesture. In a letter written a year
later, Jeremias van Rensselaer told his brother that the Mohawks asked the Dutchmen to
come to their country to make their response to previous Mohawk proposals. He wrote
that they “unanimously resolved to make a little trip, with the help of God, we did.”62
The Dutch officials, including Jeremias van Rensselaer, informed the Mohawks that they

61 Gehring, FOCM , 456-458; and Fem ow, DRCHNY 13: 112.
62 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 217.
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came, “only to renew our old friendship and brotherhood.”

S'}

From the description o f

the proceedings at Kaghnuwage, the Dutch representatives were uncomfortable in their
surroundings. While they did bring gifts, they also informed the Mohawks that they
brought no cloth for them, “for we could not get men to carry it.”64 Additionally, the
Dutch representatives expressed their discomfort in the area outside o f their own
settlement by telling the Mohawks that “we cannot come here every day, as the roads are
so bad to travel over.” In response to the Mohawks’ request for horses and men to help
them repair their fortifications, the Dutch declared, “that is not feasible for horses
because the hills are so high and steep, and the Dutch cannot carry it out as they become
sick merely from marching to this place, as you may see by looking at our people; how
then could they in addition carry palisades?”65
While probably not the best way to earn the respect o f the Mohawks, the Dutch
statements clearly pointed out their discomfort in the woods. Therefore, instead of
offering horses and men, they gave the Mohawks fifteen axes. They also helped solidify
the use o f Fort Orange court as the official setting o f meetings and negotiations between
the Dutch and Mohawks by making it clear that they did not like to go to the Mohawks’
villages to conduct business. The Dutch court members would not again venture into the
woods for a meeting with the Mohawks. The woods were definitely a wilderness or
foreign landscape for the Dutch representatives. However, at the same time, the
Mohawks were becoming much more adept at utilizing Fort Orange and its court to their

63 Gehring, FO CM , 456.
64 Gehring, FOCM , 457.
65 Ibid., 458.
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advantage. In this manner, the Mohawks were protecting the inner relations o f the Five
Nations, except when revealing such matters worked to their advantage. They were also
actively constructing a new diplomatic landscape centered at Fort Orange.
In September 1659 war broke out in the Esopus region. This war was the reason
for the Mohawks’ next visit to the Fort Orange court, and the court called an
extraordinary session to hear the Mohawks speak. In this meeting, a mere month after
the meeting at Kaghnuwage, two Mohawk Sachems spoke for not only the Mohawks, but
also for the Mahicans and Catskill Indians. They spoke out against the Esopus Indians,
but said the Dutch should live as brothers with the Mohawks, Mahicans and Catskills.
The Mohawks also expressed impatience and dismay with the Dutch and actually
reprimanded the Dutch in their own court. The Mohawks deferred to the Dutch on
whether they should go to war with the Esopus Indians and gave a string o f sewant.
However, in their next point the record states “ ‘You say you are not at war and that you
do not wish to go to war against any Indians.’ About which the Indians were very angry
and [asked] why we said that, [saying], ‘For you and the Manhatans are one. Suppose the
Esopus Indians came now or in the spring to kill the country people, what would you do
then? You make no sense.’ ”66 At that point the Mohawks demanded the return o f the
sewant that they gave as negotiation gifts, and dispatched a Mahican sachem to the
Esopus to attain the release o f Dutch prisoners.
With this meeting the Mohawks illustrated several points. First, they had become
much more emboldened and comfortable with the Dutch in the court at Fort Orange, by

66 Ibid., 463.
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openly criticizing the position o f the Dutch at Fort Orange.

ft

7

Secondly, they exposed the

general lack o f unity o f the separate Dutch settlements. The Mohawks believed that since
the Dutch were o f one nation, they would come to each other’s aide. The idea of mutual
aide was one that the Mohawks espoused when, in 1657, they requested cannons in order
to warn the different Mohawk villages in case of an attack. Their request stated, “as all
three castles belong to the same nation and they are bound to help each other in time o f
need.”68 Fort Orange’s lack of assistance to the Dutch in Esopus truly made no sense to
the Mohawks, and at the same time it also revealed the fractured nature of the Hudson
River settlements. The third point illustrated in this meeting was the growing authority of
the Mohawks over other Indians. The Mohawk sachems spoke for all the Mohawk
villages as well as the Catskill Indians and the Mahicans.
Although the Mohawks were quite active in mediating an end to the fighting
between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians, they did not return to the Fort Orange court
until June 26, 1660. This meeting, however, did not deal with Indian wars or issues with
the French. The Mohawks approached the court at this time to request that the Dutch
officials gain greater control over the Dutch traders during the trading season.69 The
Mohawks requested the members o f the court “to forbid the Dutch to molest the Indians
as heretofore by kicking, beating, and assaulting them, in order that we may not break the
old friendship, which we have enjoyed for more than thirty years, and if it is not

67 O f course, the Dutch probably did not help their own position by referring to them selves as too weak to
assist the Mohawks in m oving palisades or by their complaint o f the harshness o f their travels to the
Mohawk villages.
68 Gehring FOCM , 304.
69 See in particular Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany, chapter 2 where she discusses the importance o f
the trading season in Fort Orange. She deals with the 1660 trading season specifically in pages 88-99.
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prevented they will go away and not be seen by us anymore.”

70

In reply, the Dutch court

officials promised the Mohawks that they would forbid Dutch traders from entering the
woods to seek out Indians who traveled to Fort Orange to trade their beaver skins.71
The Mohawks’ complaint in court set off a summer of the Dutch authorities
bringing before the court traders who traveled into the woods or were accused o f so
doing. Moreover, the M ohawks’ course o f action was again a first and quite unique. One
may ask why did not the Mohawks merely retaliate against offending Dutchmen while
the alleged abuse was occurring? It has been established that the Indians were in firm
control o f activities outside of European settlements, and it would seem hard to believe
that the Mohawks merely stood helplessly by while Dutchmen “beat them severely with
fists and drive them out o f the woods.”

79

It would be unlikely that the Dutch would be

able to retrieve and bring to justice an Indian who retaliated against an abusive Dutch
trader and then retreated into the woods. Yet, the Mohawks also understood that any
retaliation against the Dutch, no matter how justified, could lead to greater violence in the
region. However, the Mohawks did make another statement in this meeting before the
court, “that it might develop into the same trouble as between the Dutch and the Indians
in the Esopus.”

79

Not a particularly veiled threat, but an effective one.

70 Gehring, FOCM , 503.
71 O f course this activity was already forbidden and eleven days prior to the Mohawks appearance in the
court, Jan Harmsen, Volkert Jansen, W illem Brouwer, Jan van Aken, Daniel Jansen, Jurriaen Jansen, Jan
Thomassen, and Jacob Thijsen were all brought before the court to face chargers o f going themselves or
sending others into the w oods to conduct trade for them. A ll but Harmsen “purged them selves under oath.”
Harmsen was fined three hundred guilders and his trading rights were suspended for two months.
72 Gehring, FOCM , 503.
73 Ibid.
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With this meeting, the Mohawks were now able to utilize the Dutch courts in
order to try to gain greater control over Dutch traders. The residents o f Fort Orange
could ill afford either the loss of Mohawk trade or large scale Mohawk retaliation against
the Dutch due to a few offending traders. As a result of this single court appearance by
the Mohawks, all members o f the court advised to forbid the Dutch from going into the
woods in search o f Mohawk traders. On July 15, 1660, an extraordinary session was held
in Fort Orange to deal with individuals who violated the law by entering the woods.
Poulis Jansen admitted to entering the woods, but claimed he did so to collect blueberries,
while Cornells Fijnhoudt claimed to be in the woods to look for hogs. Rutger Jacobsen
was accused o f sending his servant into the woods to attract Indians; he denied the
charge. Philip Pietersen was also accused o f sending his servant into the woods to trade
with the Indians, but he denied to the court that “he sent his servant into the woods for
such a purpose, but [says that he sent him] only to see what sort o f Dutchmen were in the
woods and what they did there.”74 All together there were ten men who were either
accused o f traveling into the woods or sending a servant into the woods to trade with the
arriving Mohawks.
In response to these denials, creative or otherwise, the court issued the following
statement. “The honorable director general o f New Netherland and the magistrates,
having heard and examined the complaints respecting going into the woods and outrages
resulting there from, have been as yet unable to discover any better expedient than to
renew and maintain the ordinances heretofore enacted on that subject.”75 The court

74 Ibid., 513.
75 Ibid., 514.
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minutes give no indication if the defendants were in any way punished. Nor is there any
indication o f any Mohawk traders bringing specific accusations against individual Dutch
traders. It also is not known if the Mohawks who brought these issues to the attention of
the court were satisfied with the proceedings against the Dutchmen or if they were even
present for or aware o f them. However, the court’s response did at least show the
influence the Mohawks had in the court system as the Fort Orange authorities attempted
to respond to the Dutch actions against the Mohawks. This incident also exposed the
continued weakness o f WIC authority outside o f the walls of the community. Once
people entered the woods, even if their activities were expressly forbidden, they
continued to remain outside the control o f the WIC. As the Mohawks retained their
authority outside o f the walls of Fort Orange, their authority within the town and the
court system continued to increase. With this, the importance o f Fort Orange, not just as
an economic center, but as the center o f Indian and Dutch legal and diplomatic relations,
also grew.
While the controversy surrounding Dutch traders in the woods was being played
out in the countryside and in the court, the next group of Indians to speak in front of the
court, were the Sinnekens.76 On July 25, 1660 the Sinnekens presented several
propositions covering their displeasure with their treatment in matters o f trade and
diplomacy with both the Dutch and other Indian groups. Some o f their propositions
included pleas to keep the Dutch from beating the Indians, and also keeping the Dutch

76 In this particular meeting it appears that the term Sinnekens does indeed refer to the Senecas, who were at
this time at war with the Susquehannocks. This war complicated events in N ew Netherland because while
both the Senecas and Mohawks were members o f the Five Nations, the Mohawks were actually
sympathetic with and assisting the Susquehannocks. This war would also have greater consequences in the
1670s when the Susquehannocks fall under the influence o f the Mohawks.
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brokers out o f the woods, much like the Mohawks’ propositions from a month earlier.
The Sinnekens opened their statements by reminding the Dutch officials who were
present, which included Petrus Stuyvesant, that several years earlier they had traveled to
Manhattan to conduct trade and to establish their own trading house closer to Fort
Amsterdam, thereby circumventing Fort Orange as the main trading post. This
proposition was ultimately rejected by the WIC. This move established Fort Orange as
the center o f the fur trade for New Netherland, thereby requiring Indians who wished to
participate in trade with the Dutch to travel to Fort Orange as well.77
More significantly in this meeting was the Dutch response to the Sinnekens ’
propositions in matters o f diplomacy between the Sinnekens and other Indian groups.
The Sinnekens requested powder and lead for “their difficult war.” Although the
Sinnekens did not state whom exactly they were at war with, the reference was most
likely of their war with the Susquehannocks and possibly their war with the French
Indians.78 They also expressed their pleasure in the end o f the Esopus War and requested
a return o f the captured Esopus Indians to their people.79 Finally, they warned that, “The
French Indians will visit the Mahikanders at the Cahous [Cohoes Falls, north o f Fort
Orange on the Mohawk River], They greatly bewail this. And as you are bound to them
on

with a chain, you ought to be sad also.”

77 Gehring, FO CM , 515-518.
78 See Charles Gehring’s note on pg. 516, FOCM.
79 As a form o f deterrence for future aggressive acts, Stuyvesant sent eleven Esopus Indian captives to work
on the Dutch plantations in Curacao. Two o f the Indians would eventually be returned as a sign o f good
will.
80 Gehring, FOCM , 517.
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In answer to these propositions the Dutch responded that since they made peace
with the Esopus, “we now, in turn, request them to make and keep peace with the
Maquas.”81 They then gave the Sinnekens a keg o f powder, but admonished them that
“they must not use it against our brothers, the Maquaes, but against their enemies, who
dwell far away, where they must fetch their beavers.”82 The western Iroquois tribes were
not at war with the Mohawks, but the Mohawks did support the Susquehannocks in their
war with the Sinnekens. The Dutch statements made it very clear that their favor was
with the Mohawks, and they again expressed this in an official setting within the fort.
The lack o f an official Dutch statement concerning the Sinnekens ’ warning o f a meeting
between the French Indians and the Mahicans at the Cohoes Falls also speaks of their
favor of the Mahicans to the point that they would not discuss such matters with the
visiting Sinnekens. The Mohawks may have been able to get away with chastising the
Dutch within the confines of the Dutch court, but the other Iroquois tribes could not.
By the end o f a fairly tumultuous trading season, matters between the Indians and
Dutch at Fort Orange turned again to diplomatic matters. In early November 1660,
Stuyvesant met with some Mohawk sachems in Fort Orange, in an attempt to dissuade
them from traveling to New England in an expedition against the Kennebec Indians.
Stuyvesant held this meeting with the Mohawks at the request o f the English Governor in
Boston. The Mohawks were again in Fort Orange in January 1661 informing the Dutch

Ibid., 518.
Ibid.
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courts that they would be traveling to the Delaware River in order to bring about a peace
between the Sinnekens and the Susquehannocks.
While the Mohawks continued to develop their utilization o f Fort Orange for
purposes o f negotiations between themselves and the Dutch and English, they very much
continued to avoid the fort for their direct negotiations with other Indian groups. In July
1662, Governor Endicott o f Massachusetts and Governor Bredon o f Nova Scotia both
wrote to Dutch authorities protesting a Mohawk attack on an English trading house in
May o f that year. In the attack several Indians who were allied with the English were
killed. According to the English governors this attack was “contrary to the treaty of
peace made between the maquas and the Northern savages at Fort Orange last year.”

84

Yet according to the Mohawks, they did not make a peace with the Northern Indians at
Fort Orange in 1661 as the English claimed. The Mohawks asserted that they made a
peace only with the English.

85

This controversy carried over into the next year, when, in the summer o f 1663,
English officers in Nova Scotia wrote to Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam
to request their intervention to stop Mohawk attacks on “Northern savages.” They
requested that New Netherland authorities bring about a “permanent peace” between the
Mohawks and the Northern Algonquians. The Dutch council in New Amsterdam then
contacted the court in Fort Orange and stated, “should your honors see any hopes to bring
about a desirable result, then we leave it to your Honors’ own deliberation.”86 Dutch

83 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 189, 191.
84 Ibid., 224; and Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jeremias van Rensselaer, 297.
85 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 225.
86 Ibid.
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officials recognized the role o f Fort Orange in dealings with the Mohawks, but they did
not recognize that the Mohawks did not utilize Fort Orange in their relations with other
Indian groups.
A week later, the letter was read to the Mohawks at Fort Orange. The Mohawk
representative in the court replied for “Col. Temple to leave him and his people alone and
not trouble him self about the war between them and the Northern Indians.”87 The
Mohawks continued to make it clear that while they would remain at peace with the
English, their dealings with the so-called “English Indians” remained their own business.
Actually, the Mohawks worked to keep their direct dealings with other Indians groups
outside o f the realm o f the European courts almost all the way to the end o f the colony of
New Netherland. With this statement, the Mohawks appear to be protecting their
negotiation with other tribes from European influence. In this light the Mohawks
avoidance o f Fort Orange and insistence of New England to stay out o f these matters can
be seen as a continuation o f the Mohawks protecting their inner workings as was
discussed in chapter two with the Iroquois trying to keep both Dutch and French from
traveling to Onondaga, the center o f the Five Nations, without proper authorization.
In their relations with the “English Indians” in New England, the Mohawks were
particularly incensed by the English request, because the Mohawks saw themselves as
victims o f attacks by New England tribes. In fact, a month after the meeting where the
Mohawks expressed their desire for the English to stay out of their business, a message
from several Connecticut River tribes was read at Fort Orange. The tribes who sent the
message denied that they continued hostilities toward the Mohawks and singled out the

87 Ibid., 298.
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Sowaquackicks as the aggressors that the Mohawks had mentioned to the Dutch. The
message read that, “The Sowquackicks live at the head o f the river o f Canticot and they
are the ones, who fell upon the maquaas and the Indians beyond them to the North and
Northeast, but the Southern Indians o f Pacomuck and Agawam and farther South assure,
that they will remain friends with the maquaas and hope, that they will live in peace with
them.”88
The Connecticut River Indians were not actually present at this meeting but spoke
through a Mohawk interpreter. Adogodquo answered for the Mohawks and was pleased
with the Agawam and Pacomtuck Indians. The 1663 meetings was really one of the first
instances o f Fort Orange being used as a site to negotiate between different Indian
groups. However, the Connecticut Algonquians were not in attendance and no settlement
was actually made. Yet the Mohawks were still able to use the meeting at Fort Orange to
advance their own ends. With this action, the Mohawks’ use o f Fort Orange evolved
from economic purposes, to diplomacy between the Dutch and other Indians, to
diplomacy between the Mohawks and the French, and then to diplomacy between Indian
groups and mediated by the Mohawks. The Dutch really had little say in how the
Mohawks utilized the court in Fort Orange once the Mohawks began to assert their
authority over both the surrounding lands and the town itself.
At the same time that the Mohawks were dealing with the New England Indians,
the Second Esopus War had begun. At this point, the village o f Wiltwyck in the Esopus
was no longer under the jurisdiction o f the Fort Orange court. Therefore, there was little
activity in Fort Orange concerning the Esopus War. Since at this point, the Mohawks

88 Ibid., 308.
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continued to utilize the Fort Orange court primarily for their relations with Europeans and
not necessarily for other Indians, there was little activity recorded as having taken place
in Fort Orange. Furthermore, since the residents o f Fort Orange did not want to be
involved in the first Esopus war, there was no reason to believe that they wanted to be
involved in the second, even if the Mohawks continued to chastise them. The town
received word on activities in the war, but most o f the official proceedings occurred in
the Esopus or at Fort Amsterdam.
A couple o f weeks after the outbreak o f the second war with the Esopus Indians,
vice-director La Montagne wrote a letter to Stuyvesant concerning a meeting he had with
several Mohawks and Mahicans. The courts of Beverwyck and Rensselaerswyck were
meeting to figure out a way to procure the release o f several Dutch prisoners from the
Esopus, when “there appeared suddenly Smits Jan, a chief of the said Maquas, with three
•

others o f his people and two Mahicans.”

89

While this meeting did not appear planned, it

was timely. The Mohawks and Mahicans were dispatched to recover the prisoners. The
letter also informed Stuyvesant that the Mohawks kept an Esopus captive in a
Dutchman’s house in Beverwyck and that they had cut off two o f his fingers.90
After this initial event concerning the Esopus War, the remainder o f Mohawk
activity in Fort Orange dealt primarily with their relations with the Kennebec and
Connecticut River Indians as described above. Since the Mohawks were not directly
involved in the Esopus War, their attention was devoted to their own conflicts, and they

89 Ibid., 264.
90 The fact that the Mohawks moved the very ritualistic event o f torture o f a captive outside o f their village
and into a Dutch m an’s private home is quite interesting. Descriptions o f Mohawk torture o f captives
usually stresses the communal nature o f the event, whereas this incident seem s to have occurred for the
benefit o f the Dutch, instead o f as a part o f ritualistic torture.
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concentrated their use o f Fort Orange for their immediate needs. The next time there was
discussion o f the Esopus War in the Fort Orange court records was in October 1663, less
than two weeks after the Connecticut River Indians’ message was read to the Mohawks in
the same court. This meeting was called in response to a rumor that within two or three
days the Esopus were going to attack the people in the area surrounding Fort Orange.
The members of the court asked some Mahicans about the rumor, again showing Dutch
reliance on Indian intelligence. Their reply was that they thought the Dutch had known
the information. They then informed the Dutch that more than two weeks earlier, some
Esopus had been among the Catskill Indians and wanted to attack Fort Orange, but “had
been prevented at this time.”91 The Dutch officials then sent some Indians to bring some
Catskill leaders to Fort Orange to give additional information.
The minutes do not specify if the Mahicans who gave the initial information were
actually in the presence of the court, or if their message was relayed. However, we see
that the Mahicans who gave the information, whether true or a false rumor, were still
very much in control o f the spread of information. Furthermore, the Dutch requested
three specific Catskill Indians, Macsachnimanau, Safpagood and Keesien Wey to come to
Fort Orange to give additional information unavailable to the Dutch in hopes of clarifying
the situation.
A month later on November 22, 1663 the court at Fort Orange held an
extraordinary session. At this session the Catskill Indians Macsachnimanau, Sacsamoes,
Keesien Wey and Sechano, and the Mahican Aepje were present. Eldert Gerbertsen
Cruuf said that he had sent word several times requesting that the Catskills come to Fort

91 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 309.
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Orange to appear in court. However, the Catskills countered that they “excused
themselves” from appearing because they had to go out hunting. The court obviously
held little power over the movements of the Catskills. Commissary Jan Thomassen then
asked the leader Keesien Wey about the Esopus Indians. He replied, “that he has
prevented the Esopus five times, who wanted to do harm at Katskil and further up to the
bouweries dissuading them every time and making them presents o f wampum.” Kessien
Wey also protested that “when he comes here, the Dutch pull him by the ears and call
him an Esopus rascal.”

92

With the Catskills in control of the dissemination of information in this particular
court meeting, Keesien Wey and his companions took full advantage o f the situation.
When the rumor first surfaced in October that the Esopus would attack to the north at
Fort Orange, the Dutch were told that the Catskills had prevented it “this time” with the
implication o f a solitary event. Yet in the November meeting, in the presence of both
courts Keesien Wey made it known that he had prevented such an attack on five separate
occasions. Whether true or not such information in such a setting should at least have
illustrated to the court that preventing the Dutch from verbally and physically abusing the
Catskills was the least the Dutch could do in appreciation of preventing an Esopus attack
on them.
In the next extraordinary session held a few days later, the members of the
combined court replied to Keesien Wey, in the presence o f two chiefs o f the Mohawks
and Mahicans that the Catskills should call the Dutch “brothers.” Keesien Wey appeared
quite satisfied with the Dutch response and expressed his gladness that the Catskills could

Ibid.
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come to Fort Orange without fear. He then turned to the Mohawks and Mahicans who
were present and gave ten strings of wampum to representatives o f each tribe in
testimony o f the proceedings. There was no report of an exchange of gifts between the
Catskills and Dutch however. The Mohawk representative Adogodquo then answered, “I
shall bring this present to the Maquas, my brothers, and inform them o f what has been
concluded and confirmed here by handshaking.”93 So while the meeting took place in the
Dutch court, the Catskills, Mohawks and Mahicans also utilized the court proceedings for
their own negotiations and exchange o f gifts. In this particular instance, the Dutch were
not even actors, but passive observers. The Indian groups had taken over Fort Orange’s
court strictly for their own purposes. Furthermore, the fact that only the Mohawk
sachem, Adogodquo spoke in the meetings while the Mahican who were present
remained silent, or at least their words were not recorded, continues to illustrate the
growing power o f the Mohawks within the setting o f the Dutch court.
Although the Mohawks actually utilized the Dutch court meeting to strengthen
their relationship with the Catskills, their main focus remained on their war with the
Kennebecs. In a letter from La Montagne to Stuyvesant in January 1664, the former
described the news from an Iroquois war party returning from raids on the Kennebecs.
They reported that the Kennebecs and Mohawks had attempted to make a separate peace
without the knowledge or consent of the other Iroquois involved, the Onondagas and
Sinnekens. Although the Onondagas and Sinnekens persuaded the Mohawks to rejoin
them in their fight with the Kennebecs, this even provided yet another example of the

93 Ibid., 310.
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Mohawks acting independently from the other Iroquois tribes, an independence that
would only continue to grow.94
By May of 1664 as the Esopus War continued the Mohawks again exhibited their
desire to end their war with the Northern Indians. In yet another extraordinary court
session at Fort Orange, the Mohawks for the first time asked for direct Dutch assistance
in bringing about a peace between them and another Indian tribe.95 O f course, the Dutch
had been hoping for peace between the Iroquois and Northern Indians, who were allied
with the New England colonies, in order to retain peace with the New Englanders. The
Mohawks warned the English, who tried to intervene on behalf o f their allied Indians, to
basically stay out o f it. But at this point, the Mohawks declared, “war is now
inconvenient to them and they prefer to live in peace.”96 In response the Dutch court
dispatched Jacob Leckermans and interpreter Jan Dareth as mediators between the
Indians, although the negotiations did not occur in Fort Orange. Regardless o f the
location o f the negotiations, this event does illustrate the Mohawks’ ever increasing
influence over the Dutch at Fort Orange. Furthermore, because an end to the hostilities
between the Northern Indians and the Mohawks worked to Dutch advantage, they were
willing to bring about its end by whatever means possible.
The last extraordinary meeting between the Dutch and Mohawks in Fort Orange
occurred on July 12, 1664. The information that came out of this meeting provided quite

94 Ibid., 355. Furthermore, the Iroquois war party reported that they lost twenty warriors in their attack on
the Kennebecs. However, Stuyvesant replied to the report, in a letter from January 26, 1664, that he had
heard a rumor that the Iroquois had actually lost two or three hundred. He advised that La Montagne find
out the truth. Either way, this stands as another example o f how the American Indians were able to control
information passed on to Europeans.
95 While there are records o f this session, much o f the information is missing.
96 Fem ow, D RC H N Y 13: 378.
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a taste o f things to come. The Pocumtuck Indians were recorded as having said that the
English had ordered them to carry on their war with the Mohawks and told them to fight
and kill the Dutch as well. They also warned that the English had informed them that,
“forty ships shall come across the sea to make war here and ask for the surrender of this
country.”97
By 1664 the Mohawks had firmly established their authority within the court at
Fort Orange. They were able to do this through their previously important role in the
town’s fur trade, and also because o f the fractured nature o f New Netherland that allowed
Fort Orange to develop independently o f the center of power at New Amsterdam. These
factors created an atmosphere that allowed for the creation of new cultural landscapes as
many groups, Indians, French, Catholics, and Lutherans as well as supporters of the
Dutch WIC were able to negotiate their influence and presence in the community.
Furthermore, after the Peach War o f 1655, Indian influence along the lower reaches of
the Hudson River had come to an end. The Mohawks, however, retained their
independence with the Dutch and began to speak for many more Indian nations in the
region. With the continued troubles in the Esopus region, the Mohawks were able to
increase their authority among the Dutch and other Indian groups, and continued to
utilize Fort Orange’s legal system to assert their power among their neighbors.

97

Ibid., 389.
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CHAPTER 4

THE ESOPUS REGION IN BETWEEN THE CENTERS

While the Mohawks would continue to establish their authority in Fort Orange, it
was the Esopus region that proved to be the continual battleground over the creation of
new cultural landscapes. The Esopus Indians conceded the land for the town of
Wiltwyck in the Esopus region. However, as the Dutch continued to expand their
influence out of Wiltwyck and into the surrounding “wilderness,” the Esopus Indians
fought to bring this to an end. The ensuing violence would negate the role o f the Esopus
settlement as a way to connect the political and economic centers o f Fort Orange and
New Amsterdam and thereby strengthen the colony as a whole. Instead the violence
drove a deeper wedge between the Dutch centers on either end o f the Hudson River.
Furthermore, the violence in the Esopus region provided an opening for other Indian
tribes, such as the Catskills, to assert their own influence in the court at Fort Orange.
This was possible because the Catskills were under the protection o f the Mohawks, and
instead of the Mohawks speaking for the Catskills in court, the Mohawks had to deal with
their own wars with Indians in New England. With the addition o f other Indian groups to
the Fort Orange legal system during the time of the Second Esopus War, Indian groups
were able to assert more influence within the Fort Orange court. A s a result o f this Indian

influence, the court’s role as a new diplomatic center in America Indian and European
relations continued to grow.
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As with the end o f the Peach War, after the peace was negotiated at the end of the
First Esopus War in 1660, a sense o f normality quickly descended on the Esopus region.
As more people returned to or moved into the area, the more they helped strengthen the
colony as a whole. Now the Dutch were able to lay claim to a larger area o f land, thereby
extending their authority further out from the river alone. O f course, the Dutch had
claimed this land for decades prior to the 1660 treaty. However, now they believed they
held claim by right o f conquest and by a growing proper use o f the land.
In the spring o f 1661 more and more people were moving into the newly named
town o f Wiltwyck. In response, Stuyvesant traveled to Wiltwyck in April and May in
order to distribute parcels o f land in the enlarged settlement. The lots were distributed
under the agreement that all land would be surveyed and marked within six months.
Furthermore, to protect against the possibility o f future Indian attack, the expanded
settlement had to be pallisaded.1 Also due to the increased population, Stuyvesant
established a court in Wiltwyck in May o f 1661. Prior to this time the community fell
under the jurisdiction o f Fort Orange. The new court was mandated to administer justice
in civil suits dealing with less than fifty guilders. Criminal cases, however, were to be
referred to Stuyvesant and the Council. Court was to be held in Wiltwyck every two
weeks, except during harvest time.

The presence o f a court at Wiltwyck was a truly

significant event in extending control o f the WIC. In November 1661 several ordinances
were passed in Wiltwyck further expanding the WIC’s authority over daily life including
a new land tax to defray the cost o f constructing the minister’s house, and an ordinance

1 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 195.
2 Ibid., 196. This exception illustrates the agricultural importance o f the Esopus region.
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•

for observing the Sabbath.

3

•

In this way, the WIC under the authority o f Stuyvesant

continued to assert its influence over the much-coveted land o f the Esopus.
Growth in the area continued. However, in the summer o f 1661 Stuyvesant
lamented to the Directors in Holland that, “your Honors’ colonies in New Netherland are
only gradually and slowly peopled by the scrapings of all sorts o f nationalities (few
excepted) who consequently have the least interest in the welfare and maintenance of the
commonwealth.”4 He was especially concerned with the colony’s reliance on its
inhabitants for military support, particularly in light of the lack o f assistance offered to
the Esopus community during the first war. Even with Stuyvesant’s concern o f the pace
and make-up o f the growth of New Netherland, it was indeed growing, especially in the
Esopus region.5
At this point, the Esopus region could have taken after Fort Orange in its
development as a new cross-cultural landscape o f Indian and European diplomacy.
However, Dutch desire that the Esopus serve as an agricultural center instead o f a trading
center, like Fort Orange, would prevent a stable new landscape from being formed.
Whereas Fort Orange residents depended on trade and therefore Indians, they had to be
more open to allowing Indians into Dutch space. However, the Dutch at Esopus needed
land and wished to spread further into the woods, thereby creating a predominantly Dutch
agricultural landscape. The Dutch authorities at Fort Orange wished to remain in town

3 Ibid., 211.
4 Ibid., 205.
5 While the community was growing and many considered this region to be potentially profitable, expenses
continued to outpace income, see Fem ow, D RC H N Y 13: 229.
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and out o f the woods. This created the need for the presence o f Indians in Fort Orange,
followed by the creation of a new cultural landscape.
In April 1662, five residents o f Beverwyck submitted a petition to Stuyvesant and
the Council to establish a new village in the Esopus. They argued that, “it was evident
that the prosperity o f this province o f New Netherland rests principally on agriculture and
commerce” and that many people wished to establish farms on the uncultivated lands of
the “Great Esopus.”6 The petition was granted and the WIC was quick to begin the
establishment o f the new town. Likewise in 1662, thirty-one new lots were laid out to
add to the original sixteen. One of the new lots was to be reserved for the new church,
which would be another addition of the physical representation of the authority of the
WIC on the land. The presence o f the church along with the presence o f Harmanus
Blom, who arrived in September 1660 as the permanent pastor o f the local Dutch
Reformed congregation, were not only symbols o f the authority o f the WIC, but symbols
of the presence o f Christianity on what was considered a wild landscape. With these
changes, the Esopus Dutch were attempting to build a new Dutch landscape out of the
Esopus Indians’ “wilderness.”
Even with the growing presence o f Dutch authority on the land with the
establishment of the court, the plans for a new church and a new minister, the new
settlement was not without its problems. Where Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck
clashed over authority as discussed in the preceding chapter, Wiltwyck’s court, although
established by the WIC, was also challenged. In the winter o f 1662-1663 a small conflict
developed between the court magistrates under Everet Pels and the militia under Thomas

6 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 219.
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Chambers. Chambers wrote to Stuyvesant to complain that the court magistrates tore
down an ordinance posted by the militia. The ordinance was a plan o f action devised in
response to repeated gatherings o f Indians in the area. Even after a meeting between the
court magistrates and the militia officers, the former refused to post the ordinance.
Whereas the court believed that its authority was threatened by the m ilitia’s act,
Chambers believed the court’s action weakened the security o f Wiltwyck.7 The incident
was relatively small in light o f the events the region recently experienced, but it still
represented an illustration of the increasing power o f the court, as a representative of the
WIC, over the landscape along the Hudson. It also shows the continued tensions between
the WIC authority and the Dutch colonists who lived and worked the land.

Indian Relations
For almost a year after the peace was settled with the Esopus Indians at Fort
Amsterdam, relations between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch in the area remained
relatively quiet. Although the Esopus Indians agreed to the terms o f the treaty to remove
far from the settlements and cede their land to the Dutch, they remained close by and the
Dutch were powerless to really do anything about it. While the Dutch expanded their
authority over some territory, that area was still limited to lands adjacent to the Hudson
River. In April 1661, to show his pleasure with the peaceful situation in the Esopus,
Stuyvesant honored a request from the Esopus Indians. With the support of other area
tribes, the Esopus requested a return of their eleven tribesmen who were sent to Curacao
as punishment for their hostility against New Netherland. Stuyvesant sent to Curacao for
the return o f two Esopus Indians who had been exiled into slavery on the island.

7 Ibid., 235, 237. Chambers became a court magistrate in April o f 1663 thereby consolidating his influence
in both the court and militia.
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Stuyvesant hoped that this gesture would show the Esopus Indians and the Indians who
supported them, that good behavior could win the release of other Esopus Indians from
the island. If all worked out, it would also prevent any future hostilities between the
Esopus and the Dutch.

o

By June of that year, Dutch officials were becoming more anxious concerning
Esopus behavior. Claes Jansen Ruyter reported to Stuyvesant that although he had been
sent to the Esopus village to ascertain how they were living and their behavior, he was
denied access to the Esopus village. Instead of allowing him to enter their community,
some left the village in order to meet with him in the open.9 The Esopus Indians were not
overtly aggressive in this meeting, and they informed the Dutch that they wanted their
freed compatriots to be delivered to the Hackensack chief Oratam upon their arrival from
Curacao. Although this was not an aggressive act on the part o f the Esopus, refusing
Ruyter access to the town continued to show Indians’ desire and ability to restrict Dutch
movements in Indian territory. It was also consistent with Iroquois’ actions that restricted
the movements o f Europeans within their towns, and which forbade Dutch and French
entry into the center o f Five Nations’ authority at Onondaga.
In the summer o f 1661 Stuyvesant’s anxiety concerning the safety o f the colony
had continued to grow. He was fully aware o f New N etherlands weak military position.
In an attempt to get more support from the WIC Directors and States-General he warned
them that, “although the aforesaid Esopus, as well as the Raritan and Nevesink savages
have since that time kept quiet, we are nevertheless not without fear and anxiety, that

Ibid., 194.
’ Ibid., 202.
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when they see an opportunity they will take advantage o f it to strike a blow and revenge
themselves.” 10 Even more telling of Stuyvesant’s desire for military help from Holland
was his plea that “the gracious God may grant, that the maquas will not begin with us
after they have destroyed and finished with the French.” 11 By painting a picture of
France’s imminent defeat by the Mohawks due to the formers’ military weakness,
Stuyvesant was able to lay the future of the colony in the hands o f both a gracious God
and the Company Directors who could provide the colony with more military assistance.
Being an ocean away also allowed Stuyvesant to make this point, although there was
never any indication that the Mohawks intended to attack the Dutch settlements.
By the end o f the summer of 1661, more information was reaching Dutch
authorities in New Netherland to cause concern. The Mohawks continued to be the
greatest source of information for the Dutch. A Mohawk companion apparently traveled
with Claes Jansen Ruyter to the Esopus on at least one occasion. This Mohawk
individual then traveled to the Esopus village on his own in order to gather additional
information. It was during this solitary trip that he reported having heard o f aggressive
•

words and action from a Catskill Indian who referred to the Dutch as dogs.

1

2

*

Nothing

specific came o f this issue except the continued wariness of the Dutch, and the continued
influence o f the Mohawks. However, this example provides additional evidence of the
importance o f the Mohawks to retrieve and report information valuable to the Dutch.

10 Ibid, 204.
11 Ib id, 205.
12 Ibid, 207. This information implied a relationship between the Catskills and Esopus. The Catskill man
was married to an Esopus woman. W hile the Dutch suspected the Catskills o f aggression toward them, or
at least sympathy for the Esopus, the Mohawks always worked to protect the Catskills. After this incident,
the Catskill leaders would work to show how they held the Esopus back from attacking the Dutch.
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Continued evidence o f Dutch lack of control outside o f their expanding area of
influence, particularly with the continued trade in alcohol, exposed concerns in relations
between the Dutch and the Indians. In the spring o f 1662, the Dutch council gave
Oratam, sachem o f the Hackensack Indians, permission to seize alcohol brought into his
land. He was also given permission to arrest those who were selling the alcohol and
bring them to Fort Amsterdam for punishment.

11

The Dutch gave Oratam greater powers

over certain Europeans in his own lands, but the Dutch still claimed the authority to
punish them in Fort Amsterdam within a Dutch court.14 The situation in the Esopus was
a bit more tenuous. The community schout, or sheriff, Roloff Swartout wrote to
Stuyvesant in September 1662 that, “the situation here is such that if no precautions are
taken we are in great danger o f drawing upon us a new war. The cause will be the selling
o f liquor to the savages, which, God better it! begins to increase.” 15 Apparently the main
culprits were the soldiers stationed to protect the village. One particular individual, Jonas
Ranstou, traveled to the newly formed Esopus Indian village accompanied by an Indian
and was admitted to the village. However, this event did not end with a transaction over
alcohol but o f accusations o f spying and inflamed tensions.16 The Esopus Indians refused
to tolerate European interlopers in their village.

13 Ibid., 218.
14 The Hackensacks under Oratam were weakened and held under Dutch influence after the Peach War o f
1655. However, Oratam continued to play an influential role in relations between the Dutch and other
Indian groups, including the Esopus. He was a respected leader in the eyes o f both the Dutch and the
Indians o f the lower Hudson River.
15 Femow, D RCH N Y 13: 228.
16 The Indians allow ed Ranstou into their village merely to interrogate him as to his purpose there and to
accuse him o f spying. He was then expelled from the Esopus village.
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The Esopus, expecting an attack from the Dutch, strengthened their own town
walls and sent out messengers to the Highland Indians, the Minisinck Indians and the
Catskills supposedly to inform them that “they had put more reliance into the
negotiations, which the savages had had with the Director-General at the house of Dom.
Blom, when the peace was renewed and a present promised to them to be given next
year.” 17 The last meeting that took place between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch
outside o f Fort Amsterdam was at the home o f Jacob Jansen Stoll, as discussed in chapter
two. The fact that he was one o f the leaders o f the Esopus community also meant that his
home was probably quite large in comparison to his neighbors, thereby giving it a more
impressive presence on the landscape.
The 1661 meeting to renew the peace was then moved further into the village,
away from the edge o f the woods and into the seat of Dutch civility, the pastor’s home.
Regardless o f the growing presence o f Dutch authority on the land o f the Esopus, they
were unable to control the flow o f information among the Indian tribes o f the Hudson
River valley. Indeed, they remained at the mercy o f Indian messengers to both retrieve
and deliver information between Dutch settlements. Moreover, the Dutch blamed the fact
that bad information was spreading at all on the “contraband traders who swallow up this
i n

place and sell a pint o f brandy for a schepel o f wheat.”

With this declaration, Dutch

authorities revealed the double threat of smugglers. The first threat was the illicit alcohol
trade, and the second was their role in the spreading o f rumors.

Femow, D RCH N Y 13: 229.
18 Ibid.
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The magistrates o f Wiltwyck continued to observe a deterioration o f their
situation due to the sale o f alcohol to the Indians. While in September 1662 the
complaint dealt with soldiers from Wiltwyck traveling into the woods to the Indian
villages to sell their alcohol, by January o f 1663 the problem was identified as residents
of the newly created town in the Esopus region. They particularly mentioned Louis
Dubois, a Walloon, who possessed alcohol that he had not reported to the Wiltwyck
authorities.19
The new village quickly became the source of more problems for the Wiltwyck
magistrates and the WIC. Stuyvesant and other Europeans truly wanted to continue to
expand their authority on the land and bring what they perceived as order and prosperity
to a “wilderness.” Furthermore, they believed that their peace negotiations at Fort
Amsterdam, and their subsequent renewal at the home o f Domine Blom at Wiltwyck,
which produced a surrender o f the Esopus land, gave the Dutch the legal right to build
upon the land. The Esopus Indians, however, saw it otherwise. In the spring of 1663, as
building in the new Esopus settlement continued, the Esopus Indians spoke out against
aspects o f the Dutch activity. They informed the Dutch that they could erect buildings on
the land, but that they could not build a fortification, “which, if it should be done, would
show that [the Dutch] had evil intentions.”20 The Esopus Indians further told the
Wiltwyck residents that a second piece o f land the Dutch claimed near the new town was
not a part o f the 1660 Fort Amsterdam treaty and that the Dutch should not plough it or
use it for cattle. The Esopus Indians were threatened by what they saw as not only the

19 Ibid., 237.
20 Ibid., 242.
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expansion of Dutch ways o f life into their territory, but also the expansion o f Dutch
families into their territory. Moreover, the Esopus Indians saw as the real threat the key
symbols o f Dutch control o f the landscape: a fort and agriculture.
In order to placate the Esopus Indians, Stuyvesant and the Council decided to
offer them the gifts they were owed a year earlier.

1

These gifts were to include cloth,

muskets and lead. According to a report of the magistrates at Wiltwyck, Thomas
Chambers traveled to the Esopus village on June 5th to tell the Esopus Indians that
Stuyvesant would soon be arriving in Wiltwyck to give gifts and renew the peace. The
Esopus Indians replied to this that, if the Director-General wished to renew the peace, he
“should with some unarmed persons, sit with them in the open field without the gate, as it
was their own custom to meet unarmed when renewing peace or in other negotiations.”22
Apparently there was much distrust on both sides. Stuyvesant had no intention of having
any negotiations outside o f the Dutch community. The last renewal of the peace was at
Domine Blom ’s house and allowed the Dutch to negotiate, not only as victors, but
surrounded by the symbols o f their power, as limited as it was. The Esopus Indians did
not want to allow the Dutch into their village, but wanted to make sure that the site was at
the least away from the very symbols o f Dutch power that Stuyvesant worked within. In
the meantime, authorities in Fort Orange did not want to jeopardize their own peaceful
situations and continued to try to stay out o f the fray.
However, the gifts and the peace were not the issue, and apparently the gifts were
not exchanged before trouble began. On June 7,1663 the Esopus Indians attacked the

21 Ibid., 243.
22 Ibid., 256.
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Dutch villages o f the Esopus region. The attack began in the new village. The Esopus
Indians were particularly upset about Dutch activities in this area and it was the new
village where the Esopus Indians had warned the Dutch against building any
fortifications. When the Indians attacked Wiltwyck later in the morning, the Indians first
entered the town under the claim that they were selling food. Soon after the Esoups
Indians arrival in Wiltwyck, the alarm was issued about the attack on the new village, and
the attack on the older town began. Most o f the damages were inflicted in the new
village and most o f the captives were also taken from the new village, which was situated
on contested land between Dutch and Esopus Indian territory. The new village had
become such a point o f contention because while it expanded Dutch authority over a
larger expanse o f land, it directly challenged Esopus authority over land that they still
claimed as their own. The Second Esopus War broke out because o f the tension created
as both groups tried to assert their authority over this particular landscape.

Fighting the War in the Country
The Dutch were immediately faced with difficulties in pursuing the Esopus
because o f their lack of knowledge of the area. They did not know where the Esopus had
fled or what to expect if they were to find the Indians. The Dutch authorities received
their first break through information from Rachel La Montagne, the wife o f Gysbert van
Imborgh o f Esopus, and daughter o f WIC vice-director La Montagne at Fort Orange.
Rachel La Montagne had been taken captive and was released with the intervention of
Mohawks. W ith her release from captivity she informed the Dutch military officials that
the Esopus Indians had retreated to a place about eight hours march south o f Wiltwyck on
a footpath. The Dutch believed they could reach the Esopus village by wagon in one or
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two hours, although there were “one or two bad hills” and “three or four little creeks”
along the road. Through the information of La Montagne, the Dutch also learned that the
Esopus village was palisaded and defended by about thirty men. The Esopus women and
children did not remain in the village but continued to utilize the relative safety o f the
surrounding woods, where they stayed with the Dutch prisoners.23
In fact, Stuyvesant learned “by good authority” that the Esopus were living near
and among the Catskill Indians, which continued to complicate matters for the Dutch.
The Mohawks and the Catskills continued to assert that the Catskills were friends of the
Dutch. However, Stuyvesant saw the Catskills “if not our declared enemies, at least as
protectors o f our enemies.”24 Captain Creiger, who was in charge o f the military forces
in Wiltwyck, understood that the fight against the Esopus was centered in the woods. He
knew that taking the Esopus village would accomplish nothing since the Indians would
escape to the woods upon first sight of the Dutch soldiers. He recommended allowing the
Mohawks to intervene for the release of the forty captives held by the Esopus. In the
meantime, he vowed to take his fight into the Esopus territory o f the woods to inflict as
much injury as he could.
The Esopus Indians continued to stand by their assertion that the reason for the
attack was the additional land they claimed the Dutch confiscated without treaty or
payment. The Mohawks informed the Dutch that the Esopus Indians did not care so
much about securing the release o f the captured Indians as they did about the large tract

23 Ibid., 271, 275.
24 Ibid, 275.
25 Ib id, 273.
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o f land o f the new village. According to the Mohawks, Dutch payment for this land
would bring about the “release o f the prisoners in a sensible manner.” In response to the
Mohawk proposition, Thomas Chambers, member of the court o f Wiltwyck, “engaged
himself, to refute promptly all the propositions which the Esopus have made to the
Maquaes and Mahicanders, if it should be required by any court.”

Instead o f working

out a payment for the land claimed by both the Dutch and the Esopus, Stuyvesant also
vowed to pursue the Esopus in the woods, although in late July 1663, the Dutch still did
not know the location o f the Esopus Indians or if the Esopus fort was still occupied.
When the Dutch were able to get to the Esopus village to mount an attack, in the
words of Captain Crieger, it “has not had the result, which we wished and hoped for, but
it was God’s pleasure, that it should be so.”

97

In this expedition against the Esopus, the

Dutch also tried to enlist the assistance o f the Marsepingh Indians, with little success.
The problem supposedly arose due to the Indians’ lack o f cooperation and wanting “to
have everything their own way” despite the reported Dutch efforts to have “humored
them.” The Dutch were also hampered by the landscape itself, which came as a surprise
to them because the conditions contradicted earlier intelligence. They were slowed by
rocky land and hills. They were forced to spend long amounts o f time trying to figure out
ways to get through swamps and over creeks that were thought to be dry. They
encountered some hills so steep that they had to haul the wagons and cannons up and
down them with ropes. Within a mile of the Esopus village the way was so impassable
that the cannons had to be abandoned. This was supposed to be a one to two hour trip by

26 Ibid., 275.
27 Ibid., 286.
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wagon.

98

However, by having to rely on information from other sources, in this case

Rachel La Montagne, the soldiers were unable to have the proper information to plan
adequately. While this may have been an easier trip by foot, the same did not apply for
men with wagons and cannons.
In the meantime, the Esopus continued to scatter among the various Indian tribes
of the Hudson River Valley. With the Esopus increasingly moving into the territory and
protection o f other tribes, the efforts against them became more difficult for the Dutch,
who did not want to attack other tribes and bring more nations into the war against them.
Although the Dutch were particularly concerned with the role o f the Catskills in
protecting the Esopus Indians, the Mohawks continued to speak for the Catskills as their
friends and that they should do no harm to the Dutch and the Dutch should do no harm to
them.

90

This action by the Mohawks tied the hands o f the Dutch who recognized the

power o f the Mohawks and their reliance on the Mohawks to try to win the release of the
captives.
In response to this dilemma, the “council o f war” at Wiltwyck decided to dispatch
several men into the woods in order to attain any information that may be useful in their
fight against the Esopus. However, since most of the soldiers did not have any
knowledge o f the surrounding lands in which they would be searching for information,
the council decided to send for Christoffel Davits to serve as a guide in the territory.
Davits was known to have been “well acquainted with the localities o f the Esopus
savages.” O f course he gained most of this knowledge o f the territory o f the Esopus in

28 Ibid., 328.
29 Ibid., 287.
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his illegal alcohol trade with the Indians. Nevertheless, the military knew that “without
him little or nothing could be accomplished.” 30
The need for action against the Esopus Indians was becoming more imperative as
the harvest approached.31 By the end of August, Stuyvesant gave thanks, honor and
praise to the Lord God when he received a report o f the Dutch troops’ surprise attack on a
newly constructed village o f the Esopus Indians. In the attack they were able to free
twenty-two European captives, while taking nineteen Indians captive and killing another
twenty-seven. Yet the Dutch were still desperate for information. Stuyvesant sent out
instructions for the military to go to the Wappinger and Highland Indians to “make every
effort to get information” from Indians there. At the same time he was using his
influence with the Indians in the lower Hudson Valley to acquire information regarding
the Esopus Indians from them as well. Stuyvesant also established a patrol o f the river to
prevent Indians from descending the river as well as to question any Indians they
•

encounter about the Esopus Indians.

T9

The Dutch really only had some control over the

river and decided to utilize that control to gain the information they lacked.
Yet the Dutch, who continued to actively pursue information, also continued to
fall prey to rumors and false information. In November 1663 Stuyvesant wrote to
Captain Creiger to give him the latest intelligence. Stuyvesant had been informed that Lt.
Pieter Wophertsen van Couwenhoven was captured, with his yacht, when traveling to the

30 ibid.
31 Ibid., 287; and Van Laer, Correspondence ofJerem ias Van Rensselaer, 329, 336.
32 Fem ow, D RC H N Y 13:301. The Indians o f the lower Hudson River Valley who had negotiated a peace
with the Dutch after the Peach War generally stayed out o f the conflict. In order to maintain good relations
with some o f these Indians, the Dutch gave out cards with the seal o f the WIC to show to the Dutch as
proof that they were not Esopus Indians. These cards were given to Indians specifically who were moving
and working on the water near N ew Haerlem.
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Wappingers for a prearranged prisoner exchange, which was scheduled a week after the
Wappingers and the Dutch had renewed their peace. According to the report, the
Wappingers surprised the Dutch party, captured and burned the yacht, murdered the six
or eight men with Couwenhoven who was held prisoner in the W appingers’ village.
The Dutch were then hoping for “a chance in consequence o f good information, to gain
an advantage over the said Wappings.”

This event was seen as a true blow to the

strength o f the Dutch military forces, which held an advantage on the water. In the next
days and weeks the only “good information” regarding the incident with the Wappingers
was that it was completely false. Stuyvesant had to quickly inform Creiger before the
latter attacked the Wappingers and escalated the war by directly involving other Indian
tribes.
By the spring o f 1664 both the Dutch and the Esopus were experiencing losses in
their war with one another. The winter brought a very heavy snowfall that created heavy
spring flooding. Since water in creeks impaired Dutch movements in July, the flooding
caused by spring run-off proved to be an insurmountable obstacle in pursuing the Indians
in the woods. Small groups o f soldiers went out into the woods in pursuit o f the Esopus
Indians or for information to lead them to the Esopus, with no success. During this time
as well, the Esopus Indians were apparently making overtures for peace through the
Mohawks and the Mahicans, although the Dutch tended to discount them. The war was
also costing the colony in revenues from the beaver trade. Even more damaging was the
growing conflict between the Iroquois and the Canadian Algonquians. The fur traders
were upset because the Iroquois were off fighting instead o f hunting, but diplomatically,

33 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 302.
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with the Mohawks becoming more involved in issues to the north, they had less time and
resources to deal with issues to their south, such as the Esopus War. In response to all
these events, Harmanus Blom called for June 7th o f every year to be set aside and
observed as a day o f prayer and remembrance.34 This time, however, the day of prayer
was not to be one of repentance, as Stuyvesant established nine years earlier with the
Peach War. Instead this call for a day o f prayer and remembrance was to serve as a day
o f thanksgiving to praise God for leading the survivors through the death and suffering.

Shifting Geography in Dutch-Indian Relations
As with the first Esopus War, most o f the diplomatic and military efforts to end
the war came out o f Fort Amsterdam, even though, during the first war, the Esopus was
considered part o f Fort Orange’s jurisdiction. As the reports o f the Esopus’ attack on
Wiltwyck and the new town became known, it was once again Fort Amsterdam that took
the initial steps. While Fort Orange would benefit in the long run from a stable Esopus
region dominated by the Dutch, its officials still considered themselves outside of the
fight. Mostly they feared the immediate destabilization of their trade and relations with
the Mohawks.
The High Council sent out warnings to other towns around New Amsterdam of
the attack and also tried to assure those settlers that the neighboring Indians had nothing
to do with the attacks. These were the same Indians who negotiated a peace settlement
after the Peach War and who either maintained their neutrality or worked as mediators
during the first Esopus War. Also similar to the first war, Stuyvesant traveled to
Wiltwyck to deal with the issue first hand. However, whereas during the earlier crisis,

34 Ibid., 373.
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Stuyvesant came ashore with a show o f force, met with the Esopus Indians on the edge of
the woods and challenged them to a fight on the spot, during this trip, Stuyvesant did not
leave the safety of his boat. When he arrived in Wiltwyck, the boat that was to precede
him to the town was not there, so he took refuge on the river until he could assess the
situation. Also unlike the first war, Stuyvesant immediately called on Fort Orange for
i f

action and assistance.

Along with turning to Fort Orange, the Dutch turned

immediately to the Mohawks for their assistance. Stuyvesant’s goal was to eliminate the
Esopus Indians and he knew this could not be accomplished without greater cooperation
throughout the colony. Furthermore, he knew the Dutch would need the assistance of
people who had knowledge o f the woods and could travel efficiently within the woods.
Days after the attack o f the Esopus Indians on Wiltwyck the New Netherland
authorities decided on a plan to attain the release of the captives that would be run out of
Fort Orange. The main focus o f that plan was to induce the Iroquois, and particularly the
Mohawks, to travel into the woods and liberate the Dutch captives. The Dutch, at this
point, were not interested in establishing a new peace with the Esopus. They clearly
stated that they did not want the Mohawks to mediate a peace, but either to get the release
o f the Dutch captives, or at least take a few Esopus as captives to make a prisoner
exchange. The Dutch were again relying on the Iroquois, and again they turned to the
Mohawks to acquire information on the Esopus Indians’ strength, location, and condition
of the prisoners. Moreover, the Council also wanted, but failed to persuade, twelve
Mohawks to enter into the service o f the WIC for up to three months to participate in

35 Ibid., 250, 251. O f course the fact that Vice-Director LaMontagne’s daughter was taken captive during
this war gave the authorities at Fort Orange greater incentive to get involved.

196

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

expeditions against the Esopus Indians.35 By June 26,1663 a few Mohawks and a
Mahican traveled to the Esopus Indians with Jan Dirck to see about getting the prisoners
back. Another Mohawk Indian was sent to the Mohawk villages to call the sachems to
Fort Orange to enlist their help.
While the Dutch called on the assistance of the Mohawks and Mahicans in Fort
Orange, the Hackensacks, led by the sachem Oratam, and Staten Island Indians were
called to Fort Amsterdam. However, instead o f immediately asking for assistance from
these tribes, the Dutch authorities asked if they wished to maintain the peace with the
Dutch and if so to stay away from the Esopus Indians and to forbid any Esopus Indian
from seeking refuge with them. At the end o f these talks at Fort Amsterdam, the Dutch
finally asked for some assistance in releasing the captives from the Esopus.38 However,
the main goal o f this meeting was to get assurances o f the non-interference o f the tribes
who had settled a peace with New Netherland after the Peach War. Approximately two
weeks after this meeting, Oratam summoned other sachems from neighboring tribes to
appear at Fort Amsterdam to agree to neither aid nor shelter the Esopus Indians. The
Indians present agreed, but were not able to give any significant information or further
1

•

assistance at that time.

39

The Dutch would have to continually turn to their Mohawk allies for information.
Although the tribes o f the southern Hudson valley had been subdued, they were not able
to provide the same type o f significant assistance as the independent Mohawks to the

36 Ibid., 254-255.
37 Ibid., 2 6 1.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 275, 280.
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north, who were not beholden to the Dutch for any reason. This is especially true since
Stuyvesant was not interested in negotiating a peace as much as he wanted the military
defeat o f the Esopus in order to force them from their land. While the southern tribes
could help with the former, the independent strength of the Mohawks could, in the eyes
o f Stuyvesant, help bring about the latter.
Oratam continued to be the spokesman for the tribes south of the Esopus,
although during the time o f the war the southern tribes did not lend much aid. In late July
1663, Oratam returned to Fort Amsterdam and informed the Council that the Esopus
Indians had been unsuccessful in bringing other tribes into the fight against the Dutch. In
August he appeared again in Fort Amsterdam and spoke for the Menissinck Indians who
continued to claim that they had no connection with the Esopus Indians and wished to
live in peace with the Dutch. The Dutch were pleased with this news, and what they
really wanted next from the Indians was information. Oratam told the Council that the
Menissincks were not in possession o f any prisoners. In fact, the Menissincks would not
give any information to the Dutch as to the whereabouts of the Esopus and the prisoners,
but said that they would first try to ransom the captives with kindness or gifts. If they
were not successful, they would then give the Dutch information as to the whereabouts of
the Esopus.40 The Menissincks did not appear in the records again until March 1664.
However, Oratam remained active by appearing at Fort Amsterdam. He served as
a trusted source of information, and was really the only Indian leader south o f the Esopus
who was treated in such a manner. He sent messengers out from his own tribe, and other
tribes for whom he spoke, to gain information and bring it back to the authorities at Fort

40 Ibid., 289.
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Amsterdam. He also sent representatives out to relay messages for the Dutch. In
December 1663, he sent messengers out to the Esopus Indians to discuss terms o f an
armistice between the Dutch and the Esopus. Later that month he spoke for the Esopus
sachem Seweckenamo who had gone to speak to Oratam. According to Oratam’s report,
Seweckenamo did not want to appear in Fort Amsterdam because he was unable to bring
any Dutch prisoners to the meeting because they were scattered among hunting parties.
Oratam then requested an extension o f an armistice in order to allow Seweckenamo to
bring in some o f the Dutch prisoners. The Dutch authorities respected Oratam’s efforts,
but informed him that if Seweckenamo wished for peace, he would have to come to Fort
Amsterdam in person.41 His efforts continued throughout the winter o f 1663-1664 and
right up until the peace negotiations in May 1664.
While Oratam served as a negotiator and the main intermediary for all the Indians
in the lower Hudson River Valley, separate negotiations were occurring in Fort Orange
involving the Esopus Indians and the Mohawks. The Mohawks, like Oratam, sent
delegates into the woods to talk with the Esopus Indians to try to gain the release o f the
prisoners, although Stuyvesant continued to insist that no peace be made in those first
few months after the June attack. The Mohawk delegates who first traveled to the Esopus
in July 1663 reported that the Esopus “were willing to keep at peace with the people of
Catskill, o f Fort Orange and the Mahicanders and Maquas, but not by any means with the
Esopus people.”42 The Esopus Indians told the Mohawks that if the Dutch did not

Ibid., 314, 320, 3 2 1 ,3 6 1 .
: Ibid., 273.
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abandon the new town they would spread out over the land with the captives, thereby
using their natural advantage of living in small groups in the woods.
At this point the Mohawk known as Smits Jan proposed taking forty-four
Mohawks into the Esopus and having each take one of the then forty-four prisoners by
the hand and bring them back to Fort Orange. Stuyvesant was excited about this idea, but
soon expressed his displeasure on the Mohawks’ delay in the plan. Vice-Director
LaMontagne in Fort Orange finally informed Stuyvesant that the plan to send Smits Jan
to the Esopus with the forty-four Mohawks was abandoned because they saw it as too
dangerous. First, Smits Jan was “tipsy” at the time he made the proposition, and second,
he made the proposition without the knowledge o f the older Mohawk sachems with
whom they usually dealt.43 Indian relations in Fort Orange had developed so
independently from New Amsterdam that Stuyvesant had little knowledge o f their inner
workings.
As discussed in the last chapter, after these initial meetings, the Mohawks
primarily were concerned with their dealings with their enemies to the north and did not
want to spend so much time on the Esopus. Nonetheless, with the second Esopus War
there was much more involvement on the part o f Fort Orange as a whole, both from the
Dutch and the Mohawk and Mahican residents o f the area, than occurred in the first
Esopus War. In August 1663 there was even discussion that the Esopus would be willing
to make a peace with representatives from Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck, including
Vice-Director LaMontagne, Arent van Curler and Jeremias van Rensselaer 44 However,

43 Ibid., 278, 283.
44 Van Laer, Correspondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 326-328.
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Stuyvesant was adamant that no one, Indian and Dutch alike, pursue a peace with the
Esopus.
With the final surrender o f the Esopus Indians at Fort Amsterdam in May 1664,
came the last major diplomatic event between Indians and Europeans on Manhattan. The
final negotiation happened at Fort Amsterdam in May of 1664. After Stuyvesant’s
frustrating experience o f trying to negotiate with the Esopus in their own territory, he
wanted to assure his own dominance in the final negotiation. The Esopus could no longer
use the woods to their advantage. Although the Mahicans and Mohawks played
important roles in keeping other nations out o f the war and containing the war in general,
representatives of neither group were present during the final negotiations at Fort
Amsterdam. Their attentions were turned to what they perceived were the real threats to
their power, northern Indians who were allied with the English. With the Mohawks’
focus beyond Esopus, they held little interest in the peace talks. Furthermore, since
Stuyvesant had been so adamant about eliminating the Esopus Indians, he wanted
negotiations in his center o f power at New Amsterdam to be able to fully direct the terms
of peace.
Representatives o f tribes defeated in the Peach War, Oratam o f the Hackensack
and Tappan Indians, and Matteno chief of the Nayacks were present. The Mohawks did
not travel to Fort Amsterdam for treaty negotiations, but later the same month, they
requested that the authorities at Fort Orange help them arrange a peace with the
Pacamtekocks who lived on the Connecticut River. Such moves on the part o f the
Mohawks continued to illustrate the importance o f Fort Orange as the site o f legitimate
negotiations for their people. Furthermore, after the treaty was negotiated in Fort

201

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Amsterdam, whenever the peace was renewed, the Esopus representative returned to Fort
Orange to do so.
Only a few months after the peace between the Esopus and the Dutch was
negotiated, the Dutch surrendered the colony of New Netherland to the English.
However, during the Esopus War there was much discussion o f intrigues outside the
colony especially with the English and non-allied Indians. Jeremias van Rensselaer gave
voice to the confusion in the colony in an August 1663 letter to his brother. He wrote
that,
everything looks so bad here that I see little chance of getting together as
much as I owe you, for the trade ceases so suddenly that one hardly sees a
single Indian and this because the path is not safe for Indians, for one says
that the French Indians are coming and another that the English are
coming with the Indians so that the Maquas are quite in a pinch. The
Sinnekes are hard at war with the Minquas, so that they do not come
except in troops, like one troop which has been here, which was so large
that we had to keep watch night and day... as many as eighteen families
had fled to my house.45

The threat coming from New England and the English dominated communities within
New Netherland was actually the deciding factor in Stuyvesant agreeing to an armistice
with the Esopus Indians in late 1663 and the eventual peace in 1664. He was particularly
concerned with the English forming alliances with the Esopus and other non-allied Indian
groups. By the beginning o f 1664, the English, both in New England and within New
Netherland, were growing bolder in their advances to gain control o f Dutch lands,
particularly along the Hudson River.

In July 1664, the pressure from the English grew even more intense. The
Mahicans came to Fort Orange and announced that the English on the Connecticut River

45 Ibid., 324-326.
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had requested to buy some Mahcian land on the Hudson River. The Mahicans first
offered to sell the land to the Dutch if they wanted it, before they dealt with the English.
At this point, the WIC Council in New Amsterdam approved this purchase o f land along
with several other purchases in order to claim proper right to the land and keep the
English away from New Netherland, and the Hudson River in particular.46 Later that
month a Dutch farmer’s house was burned near Catskill with him inside, and his wife and
son were taken captive. According to two Mohawks who knew the unnamed Indians
responsible for the act, the order came from the English to rid the area o f the Dutch.47
More information came in from Mohawk and Hackensack Indian sources, the two
generally most trusted sources o f information, linking the English with Indian attacks on
New Netherland. The Mohawks claimed that the English attacked and killed some of
their messengers. A Hackensack Indian, although not Oratam the leader o f the tribe, told
the WIC Council that he heard from a Mohawk who was on the west side o f the Hudson
River that some Englishmen went to the Esopus Indians and said “as the Dutch have so
beaten you, what will you give us, if we kill the Dutch. Thereupon the savages handed to
ah

the English a bag with wampum and promised the land o f the Esopus.”

Stuyvesant

discounted this intelligence as a ploy on the part of the Mohawks to bring the Dutch into
a war with their northern Indian enemies. He also wanted to avoid such a confrontation
because it would be detrimental to the fur trade, which was already suffering due to the
various Indian conflicts about which Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote. Stuyvesant also

46 Femow, D RCH N Y 13: 387.
47 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 356.
48 Femow, D RCH N Y 13: 392.
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continued to hold to the idea that well established boundaries, which would have to be
renegotiated, between New Netherland and New England would bring an end to such
stories. He wrote to the Directors in Holland that,
The daily quarrels, bickerings, jealousies and claims shall be avoided from
either side and a good understanding and correspondence established;
these pernicious wars between the Maquaes and the Northern savages
would then soon be settled and brought to an end and all the savages could
be made to submit or at least to deliberate, when they see the Christians
united and drawing a line, to keep the barbarians in submission or at least
quiet. 49
Unfortunately for Stuyvesant, his dream of a unified Christian front against the power of
the Indians would come to an end only weeks after he wrote these words, when an
English fleet appeared in the Hudson River demanding the surrender o f the colony.
After the Esopus Indians were defeated and they scattered to live among other
groups o f Indians in the area, the English were able to walk into a relatively easy
situation in the Esopus region, at least in regards to their relations with the Esopus
Indians. Furthermore, the English already had a foothold in the Hudson River Valley
from the English settlements in Westchester. In October 1665, a year after the English
takeover, Gov. Richard Nicolls, with Dutch leaders such as Peter Schuyler and Jeremias
van Rensselaer present, and the Sachems o f the Esopus Indians signed an agreement.
This agreement included bringing murderers to justice instead o f seeking revenge, a
concession Stuyvesant was not able to achieve prior to the war. The agreement also
called for the creation of a “convenient house” for Indians to lodge in and leave their
weapons when they came to the town. The Esopus Indians also agreed, yet again, to cede
their land in the region to the Europeans, this time to the English instead o f the Dutch.

49 Ibid., 390.
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Finally, all acts o f animosity between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians were to be
forgotten, and the English were able to reap the benefit.50
Unfortunately for the English, it would not be so easy to reap the benefits o f the
ill-fated Dutch victory over the Esopus Indians. The next obstacles in settling this land
were the relations between the English soldiers sent to protect the newly acquired
territory and some o f the Dutch and French settlers. In particular the difficulty came
between a handful o f Dutch colonists and a few English soldiers. The Esopus continued
to prove to be a difficult area in which to develop new cross-cultural landscapes. After
the physical and legal controversies surrounding the soldiers’ treatment o f the Dutch
colonists, the situation was solved by segregating the population as much as possible
according to ethnicity. The Dutch dominated the villages of Kingston and Hurley (the
newly renamed communities o f Wiltwyck and New Dorp, or the new village). The
English soldiers were then given grants to land in the newly formed community of
Marbleton.51
However, once the issues between the soldiers and settlers were dealt with, the
English were able to eventually accomplish what Petrus Stuyvesant desired to do in 1658,
which was to create a few concentrated settlements in the Esopus region and then to
exploit the land for its agricultural potential. Throughout the fall and early winter of
1668, Gov. Francis Lovelace focused on establishing these settlements and he spent a
considerable amount o f time in the region at the estate of Thomas Chambers doing just
that. Furthermore, on September 23, 1668, Gov. Lovelace met with three o f the Esopus

50 Peter R. Christoph, ed., Adm inistrative P apers o f G overnors R ichard N icolls an d Francis Lovelace,
1664-1673 (Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. co., 1980), 3-4.
51 Ibid., 40-50.
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Sachems who established a peace agreement with Gov. Nicolls in 1665. This agreement
was endorsed yet again in April o f 1670 between the Esopus Sachem Calcop and Gov.
Lovelace. The sachems were accompanied by “diverse other Indians.. .desiring to
Continue Friendship.” With this continued peace between the Esopus Indians and the
English, the English government was able to establish the towns o f Kingston, Hurley and
Marbleton.
Furthermore, the peace with the Esopus Indians allowed the English to continue
negotiations with the Mohawks, Senecas and Mahicans who occupied the land on the
fringes o f English settlement. This was especially true when the Mohawks made peace
with the Esopus Indians in July 1669 thereby placing the remnants o f the Esopus tribe
under the control o f the Mohawks, a fate the Esopus Indians, especially the Bareback
factions, fought to avoid. From that time, there were no significant conflicts between the
New York colonial government, the Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians.52 Moreover,
the Iroquois remained the only independent Indian group near the claimed boundaries of
the now English colony o f New York. Therefore, the remainder o f Indian and English
relations, whether diplomatic, military or economic, took place in the fort in the renamed
town of Albany, the old Dutch outpost of Fort Orange.
The switch from a Dutch colony to an English one did not matter all that much for
the Mohawks and the other Indians o f the Hudson River Valley. They continued to work
toward their own advantages, and they continued to do so in the same way they had under
the Dutch at Fort Orange, now Albany. Furthermore, they continued to deal with many
of the same people in Fort Albany. They were still counted on for information, although

52 Ibid., 128; and Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph, eds., Books o f G eneral Entries o f the
Colony o f N ew York, 1664-1688, 2 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. Co., 1982), 1: 304.
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the English responded to Indian intelligence with much more skepticism than the Dutch
had. Moreover, now that the Mohawks stood as the dominant Indian power in the
Hudson and Mohawk Valleys after the Esopus were subdued by the Dutch, they were
even more capable o f asserting their authority among the Dutch at Fort Orange. In the
years after New York was established, the Mohawks would speak for some Indian groups
within the judicial system o f Fort Albany, and would also work to eliminate the voices of
others within Fort Albany.
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CHAPTER 5

A “VERRY DANGEROUS JUNCTURE OF TIME” ALBANY AT THE CENTER

In 1666 two French cartographers created a map depicting French holdings in
northeast North America as well as along the coast o f New England (Figure 5). What
makes this map so noteworthy is that the cartographers prominently displayed the
settlement at Albany and the nearby Iroquois settlements, while they failed even to note
the location of any other English communities along the Atlantic seaboard.1 This 1666
map is consistent with earlier French maps that also prominently displayed Albany while
virtually ignoring the more often studied English settlements such as Boston and
Jamestown. The French map depicted a view o f a political and cultural landscape that
would not be widely shared until the next decade. However, in the 1670s the effects of
four major colonial wars combined to give Albany a much broader inter-cultural
significance. By the end o f the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Metacom’s War, Bacon’s
Rebellion, and the Five Nations war with the Susquehannocks, Albany became a new
colonial center for both Europeans and Indians and dramatically altered the colonial
landscape o f the Atlantic seaboard. As a result of this dramatic alteration, English
understanding o f the position o f Albany came into line with the French perspective from
decades earlier. Furthermore, as the English attempted to gain control o f Albany and the

1 Cartre des grands L aca O ntario et autrea, et des Costes de la nouvelle A ngletter et des p a y a treuerser
p a r M de C racy et Courelles, National Archives o f Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada; National Map
Collection, Map #1825. Albany was still identified as the Dutch village o f Orange on this map.
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Figure 5 C a r t r e d e s g r a n d s L a c a O n ta r io e t d e C o s t e s d e la n o u v e lle A n g l e t t e r e t d e s
paya treuerser par M de Cracy et Courelles, Courtesy of the National Archives of
Canada: National Map Collection, Map #1825
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surrounding regions, they were continually challenged by groups such as the Mohawks
and Mahicans who also tried to establish their authority over the region and its people.
Many noted scholars have discussed the events o f the 1670s; however, what we
have not focused on enough is how these events affected the landscape o f colonial North
America, including the movements o f displaced peoples and the creation o f new colonial
centers o f power.

As a result of these events, which took place in the short span o f five

years, both English and Indian leaders dramatically altered the landscape o f the East
Coast of America with Albany at its center. Moreover, it must be stressed that Albany’s
rise to prominence was not solely the result o f the work o f English officials such as
Edmund Andros. On the contrary, events outside of English imperial control, such as the
strategies o f the Iroquois and Algonquians, as well as the interests o f the French and
Dutch, were crucial in creating this new colonial landscape.

Third-Anglo Dutch War
The first major, and often overlooked, event o f the 1670s was the Third AngloDutch War in which the Netherlands, however briefly, re-established control over New
Netherland in the summer o f 1673. The quick negotiations that returned New Netherland
to England illustrated that New Netherland was not a crucial part o f the States-General’s
imperial plan, which expanded in other parts of the world. As Jonathan Israel has noted,
despite the loss o f Netherlands Brazil in 1654, Taiwan in 1662 and New
Netherland in 1664, the Dutch colonial empire was at its height during the
2 S ee esp ecia lly W ebb, 1676: The E n d o f Am erican Independence', and also Francis Jennings, The
Am biguous Iroquois Em pire ; Jennings, The Invasion o f Am erica: Indians, Colonialism, an d the Cant o f
Conquest; O berg, D ominion an d Civility: English Imperialism an d North Am erica, 1585-1685; Robert C.
R itchie, The D u k e ’s Province: A Study o f N ew York P olitics an d Society, 1664-1691, chap. 4; Richter, The
O rdeal o f the Longhouse: The P eoples o f the Iroquois League in the Era o f European Colonization,
chapters 5 and 6. For d iscu ssion s on the geographic im portance o f the area see B on om i, A Factious
P eople, 17-18; D .W . M einig, The Shaping o f America, 119-129; and D onna M erw ick, P ossessing Albany,
1630-1710.

210

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

second half o f the seventeenth century and first quarter o f the eighteenth.
During this period Dutch commerce and shipping expanded in both the
eastern and western hemispheres and the contribution o f colonial
enterprise to the functioning o f the Dutch trading system, as a whole,
steadily increased.3
Although the States-General showed little interest in re-building New Netherland,
Dutch settlers o f the Hudson Valley argued their case to maintain a Dutch North
American empire. The Dutch inhabitants o f the Hudson Valley asserted that families
who were ruined by the French invasion o f the Dutch Republic could come to New
Netherland to make a fresh start and to help populate the area. They argued that the
villages o f the Hudson Valley produced enough grain to provision the Dutch colonies at
Curacao and Surinam with needed wheat, thereby illustrating their importance to the
Dutch Empire. Furthermore, the burghers o f New Orange recognized New N etherlands
geographic advantage in intercepting and capturing English ships. However, the New
Netherland burghers’ plea for reinforcements to protect their fragile colony from their
French and English neighbors did not reach the States-General until March 5, 1674. By
this time, the States-General already had negotiated for the return o f the colony to
England.4

3 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 936. Here he gives a
larger discussion o f the state o f the Dutch empire in 1673.
4 For an explanation o f England’s interest in acquiring N ew Netherland in 1664 see Ritchie, The D uke's
Province, chapter 1. Corwin, E cclesiastical Records I, 635-636; O ’Callaghan, DRCHNY II: 526, 538, 538.
It is doubtful that the pleas o f the Dutch colonists would have done much good, even had they been
delivered into the hands o f the States-General any sooner. Through Decem ber and January o f 1673-1674
the States-General skillfully used N ew Netherland in their negotiations with the English crown. In a
December 15 Secret Resolution, the States-General turned over the supervision o f N ew Netherland to the
Board o f Admiralty who were to send military forces to the colony and establish Joris Andringa, Secretary
o f the Provincial fleet as its Governor. However, on December 19, 1673, the States-General dispatched a
letter to King Charles II in which they did “hereby also offer the restitution o f N ew Netherland and o f all
other places and Colonies which have been won by our arms during the present war. Firmly convinced that
your Majesty w ill be unwilling to refuse a reciprocal engagement to restore to us such lands and forts as
your subjects may have taken from us.” O’Callaghan, DRCHNYW 530-532, 535-541.
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Although the States-General did not include New Netherland in its imperial
scheme, the Third Anglo-Dutch war added a new dimension to local concerns over events
with international significance. The frequent Dutch and English fears o f a French attack
on Albany illustrate how local tensions between nations remained independent o f larger
Atlantic world events and concerns. It is well known that Albany was M ontreal’s
greatest rival in the fur trade. A French takeover of Albany would provide the French
with control over interior lands. A French-controlled Albany could possibly also provide
the French with access to New York Harbor which, unlike the St. Lawrence, did not
freeze. Due to Albany’s isolated position in the interior, local residents, both Dutch and
English, feared a French attack on Albany, which was the subject o f many rumors
throughout the 1660s. However, there was an increase in these rumors beginning with
the outbreak o f the Anglo-Dutch War. The effect of these local rumors and the outcome
of the Anglo-Dutch war are a particularly clear example o f Albany’s shift from an
isolated settlement to a colonial center that played a significant role in international
politics and conflicts.
Prior to Albany’s establishment as a colonial center in the 1670s, English
authorities in New York City paid little heed to rumors o f French attack, thereby leaving
the issue to be handled locally. In June 1671 a rumor surfaced that the French were
preparing to attack Albany. In response, Albany magistrates sent a delegation into the
Mohawks’ land “to remain there for seven or eight days and to make a diligent inspection
o f everything and with the consent of the sachems to send some Indians from there out on
the roads to spy out all condition and designs.”5 The initial rumor came from a

5 A. J. F. Van Laer, Minutes o f the Court o f Albany, Rensselaersw yck an d Schenectady, 1668-1685, volume
1 (Albany: State University o f N ew York, 1928), 259.
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Frenchman living in Albany. Several Mohawk Indians who were also in Albany
substantiated his story. In response to this threat, which Albany residents took quite
seriously, the local magistrates ordered all free men in Albany, Rensselaerswyck and
Schenectady to report to the Fort in Albany fully armed and ready to march.6
English Governor Francis Lovelace, however, upon hearing both the rumor and
the Albany magistrates’ reaction to it, quickly expressed his disbelief concerning such
French designs. Lovelace not only dismissed the rumor but also reprimanded the Albany
officials, stating that the French would not attack Albany because “there is now peace
between the two crownes, and the Concemes o f those poore parts o f the World cannot be
an introduction to make a breach between either.”7 Although Lovelace seems to have had
little regard for the safety and security o f either the land or the people he governed over,
his statement illustrates that he understood colonial events as mere extensions o f relations
in Europe. However, the reaction of the local residents suggests that they placed much
more credence in information and intelligence gathered from the Mohawks than they did
from European sources such as Lovelace. Lovelace’s lack o f understanding o f how
international events often played out differently on a local level is similar to the StatesGeneral utilization o f the newly recaptured New Netherland merely as a bargaining chip
with no real importance in the larger Dutch imperial plan.
According to Lovelace’s reasoning concerning these local developments, as long
as England and France remained on peaceful terms in Europe, it obviously would follow
that those nations’ colonies also remained on peaceful terms. Residents o f the region,

6 Ibid., 255, 259
7 Peter Christoph, ed., The Andros P apers volume 1 (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1989), 430.
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however, viewed colonial relations on more local and regional levels. For colonists in the
Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, the fact that the English and French crowns declared that
the two nations were then at peace did not necessarily ease their concerns o f a French
attack. In fact, the increase in rumors indicates that the residents o f the Hudson Valley
saw the tensions between the English and the Dutch as primarily an opportunity for the
French to pursue their interests in North America regardless o f whether it was an English
or a Dutch colony at the time. While Lovelace was right in his belief that the French
would not attack the English at Albany, he failed to win the residents o f Albany over to
his belief that the French would continue to stay away because o f the peace between the
crowns. This incident also illustrates that Lovelace was not any more successful at
ending the fractional nature o f the settlements within the colony than was Stuyvesant.
Eighteen months after the 1671 rumor o f French attack on Albany, a Frenchman
by the name o f Antony les Pinsard was arrested in Albany for writing a letter to the
French Jesuit Father Bruyas. In this letter he stated that “peace has been concluded
between the king o f England and Holland and that the Dutch here are much afraid of the
o

French in Canada.” The residents o f the Hudson River Valley continued to take these
warnings and rumors much more to heart than did Governor Lovelace residing in New
York City. The defendant’s words in this case were considered serious enough for the
Albany court to call an extraordinary session, where they voiced Albany residents’

8 Van Laer, M inutes 1: 323. Father Bruyas’s activities continued to be perceived as suspicious and were
monitored by the English authorities throughout the seventeenth century. In 1700 Earl o f Bellomont wrote
several times to the Lords o f Trade in London complaining o f Bruyas’s activities among the Mohawks and
Onondagas. Later that year, Bellom ont complained o f N ew York’s position in maintaining good relations
with the Mohawks while they hosted Bruyas. In this letter to the Lords o f Trade he stated that “Jesuit
Brouyas and D e La Valliered that were sent to me last year on pretence o f a com plem ent by the Govemour
o f Canada, were rather intended as spies to look into the condition o f our Forts and Garrisons.’’
O ’Callaghan, D R C H N Y 4: 607, 645.
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concerns over such “plots and treason.” The court fined the defendant, released him into
the custody o f Jan Frees and Omy La Grand, and proceeded to keep both les Pisnard and
his correspondence under close observation.9
The fear o f French attack became worse for those who resided in the upper
Hudson Valley when the area once again reverted to Dutch control in 1673. In November
o f 1673, Jeremias van Rensselaer expressed his concern o f Rensselaerswyck’s fragile
geographic location surrounded by its enemies, New France and New England. He wrote
to his brother Jan Baptist van Rensselaer that “We have now and then tidings that the
French from Canada intend to attack us. What there is o f it, time will show. We are
surrounded by enemies, but hope that the Lord God will preserve us.” 10 However, van
Rensselaer’s concerns continued throughout the period o f Dutch control so that in July of
1674 he again noted that the French were rumored to be on their way to the Hudson
Valley. He saw the only way for this threat to end would be for the area to revert back to
English rule and English protection. This was not because o f the current Anglo-French
alliance, but because o f England’s greater resources to ward off the French in America.
Van Rensselaer believed that the danger was so real that he would not leave his wife
alone in their home.11 This fear arose due to New N etherlands lack o f military

9 Van Laer, Minutes I: 323.
10 Van Laer, Correspondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 453. John Pynchon in Massachusetts also
received word that the French were marching toward Albany to which he replied, “I suppose it is a mere
story; and find no ground to credit it.” Being that he lived on the opposite side o f Albany from the
Mohawks and the French, Pynchon may have been less concerned with the possibility o f a surprise French
attack. Bridenbaugh, The Pynchon Papers, 120.
11 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 451, 488.
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resources. Once Albany was established as a new colonial center in 1677 under English
colonial authority, the rumors of French attack died down.

1")

The rumors of French attack that circulated in the 1670s were often related to
larger international events, such as the opportunity presented to the French to attack a
vulnerable Albany during the Anglo-Dutch war. It is significant that the rumors that
caused the colonists to react with fear and sometimes arms were connected somehow to
the Mohawks. The rumor o f French attack that resulted in a call to arms among the
residents o f Albany, Schenectady and Rensselaerswyck in 1671 was supported initially
by a Frenchmen residing in Albany, de la Rose. However it was not until several
Mohawks present in the area corroborated de la Rose’s story that the threat was taken
seriously. After several Frenchmen and Mohawks present in the area were interrogated,
the Albany magistrates decided to send a delegation to the Mohawks’ country in order to
ascertain the veracity o f the information.

11

Whether under Dutch o f English authority,

the residents o f Albany continued to rely heavily on Mohawk intelligence.
Not only did the Albany residents depend on the Mohawks to determine the truth
behind the rumors, but the Mohawks also appear to be the source o f many o f these stories
o f French attack. Records indicate that as early as 1666 Mohawk Sachems were warning
the magistrates in Albany that the French were on the w ay.14 Even when the talk of

12 Most o f these rumors seem to originate with the Mohawks. This appears to illustrate the Mohawks
ability to gain accommodations from the Dutch and English in the form o f arms and ammunition in order to
help guard against the ever-present French threat. Once Albany was established as a colonial center,
however, the Mohawks gain greater concessions from the English and do not have to use the French threat
in order to achieve their ends. Brindenbaugh, Pynchon Papers, 120
13 Van Laer, Minutes 1: 255, 259.
14 Leder, The Livingston Indian Records, 29-30. This exchange between the M ohawks and the Albany
magistrates was in response to 200 troops which were actually sent out from Canada, but who were recalled
before they made it down to N ew York or Mohawk territory. The Albany magistrates’ reply does,
however, indicate a grave concern for their own safety at the report o f the French troop movements and use

216

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

French attack did not come directly from the mouths o f Mohawks, they continued to play
a central role in dissemination o f the threat from the north. In his November 9, 1673
letter to O loff Stevensen van Cortlandt Jeremias van Rensselaer stated that the French
Jesuit Bruyas brought the news “from the Maquas country” that the French had sent ships
to Canada. He did not describe the French Jesuits’ tidings as news from Europe but was
clear that the news came from the Mohawks’ country. Less than a week after this letter,
van Rensselaer declared in another letter that, “the French from Canada intend to attack
us.” 15 This example depicts the importance o f the Mohawks and the Mohawk territory to
the north and west o f Albany as being a crucial link in relations and communications,
whether real or rumor, between the French and the English. The territory beyond Albany
remained relatively unknown to the Dutch and now English residents of Albany.
Because the Mohawks were still in firm control o f that area, they remained in full control
of what information traveled through the region. They also controlled where and when
information was delivered, keeping the Albany residents fully dependent on their
services.
It is well known that Indians were quite adept at playing one European power off
o f another in order to gain advantages for themselves, and the Mohawks were no
exception. However, the fact that the men and women o f Albany looked to the Mohawks
for accurate information concerning French movements in the 1670s is indicative o f the

this concern to limit the supply o f lead and powder that the Albany residents supplied to the Mohawks.
Shortly after the Mohawks met with the Albany magistrates to warn o f the French movements, Gov. Tracy
wrote the magistrates from Quebec telling them that he sent out and then recalled about 400 soldiers from
N ew France into Iroquois territory. The ensuing correspondence between Tracy and the English authorities
is a back and forth o f accusations and denials concerning alliances and enmity with the Mohawks.
DRCH NYIII: 129-135.
15 Van Laer, C orrespondence o f Jerem ias van Rensselaer, 451, 453.
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crucial role the Iroquois played in these international struggles beyond that o f mere
opportunists. The reality o f the residents in the somewhat isolated town of Albany
caused them to look north and west for information concerning both their livelihoods and
their lives. While the attention o f colonial officials in New York City focused on Europe
during the early 1670s, the Mohawks continued to play a greater role in the dissemination
o f information and intelligence for European inhabitants o f the Hudson and Mohawk
River Valleys. These events were also indicative o f growing complexity o f relations
between the French, Mohawks, English and Dutch in North America.
The rumored French attacks did not materialize. The constant threat o f attacks,
however, and the Albany residents’ concern over them, illustrated the vulnerability and
the fear that the settlers in this outlying region o f New Netherland and New York
continued to face. Governor Lovelace’s lack o f interest in the rumors prior to the
retaking o f the colony by the Netherlands added to the settlers’ sense of vulnerability,
leading them to raise their own militia in order to fend off any attack. The Dutch
takeover in 1673, as noted above, did nothing to alleviate the fears o f the northern
settlers, and in fact, added to those fears as the settlers knew very well the lack of
resources available from New Amsterdam.16

Indian Affairs and the Second New Netherland
Rumors o f French attack aside, the States-General was not interested in rebuilding
their North American Empire. However, local New Netherland authorities,
understanding the importance o f favorable relations with neighboring Indians, began to

16 For an analysis o f the effect o f rumor on frontier colonial societies see Dowd, “The Panic o f 1751: The
Significance o f Rumors on the South Carolina Frontier.”
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re-establish their former relationships with area Indian populations.17 Moreover, the
Indians who populated the Hudson River Valley also understood the changing power
relationships brought about by the Third Anglo-Dutch War and worked to strengthen
their own position in the region between Willemstadt (Albany) and Montreal. In the
spring o f 1674, a Mohawk delegation visited Governor Colve in Fort Willem Hendrick in
Manhattan to renew their relationship with the Dutch. During this meeting the Mohawks
made it clear that they would be willing to march against the French who, it was rumored,
were prepared to move against the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys.

18

The Mohawk

delegation then requested that Governor Colve secure a yacht to transport them back to
Willemstadt. The Mohawk delegation took its request one step further and requested that
Colve also order the burghers o f Willemstadt to lodge the delegation within the town
walls overnight upon their arrival. Colve met the requests o f the Mohawk sachems, and
the officials up river were requested to lodge the sachems within the town walls and to
treat them “with all possible favor.” 19
The significance o f Colve’s action lies in the fact that he conceded to the
Mohawks’ desire to lodge overnight within Albany’s walls, when Albany’s official town
policy forbade Indian presence within the town after a certain hour. This was the first
example o f colonial officials advocating the extended and overnight presence o f any
Indians within the town walls o f Albany. This sudden change in policy represents a
significant shift by accommodating the Mohawks, whose presence in between the

17 In the autumn o f 1673, the Hackensacks and other lower Hudson Valley Indian groups came to Fort
Willem Hendrick in Manhattan to renew their peace with the Dutch, which was originally made in 1655.
18 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 476, 479. This rumor seem s to have originated at this meeting.
19 Ibid., 480. C olve’s request for A lbany’s authorities to show this delegation “all possible favor” may have
included shot and lead, as the M ohawks requested, for their use against this new supposed French threat
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Hudson Valley and French Canada was much needed as a buffer. Even though the
Mohawks’ presence served an important function in separating the Dutch and the French
in North America, many colonists preferred that the Mohawks maintained lodgings away
from Europeans. Previous colonial leaders, both Dutch and English, worked diligently to
prevent Indians from being lodged within town walls.20 When England regained control
o f New York, the new governor, Edmund Andros, also began accommodating Indians
within town walls in the Hudson Valley.
In September o f 1675, Governor Andros issued a proclamation that called for the
building o f stockaded blockhouses, “in the most convenient place in each respective town
for a Retreat to the women & children; Into which our Indyan women and children, to
bee also received and Protected if they desire it; and that all our Indyans bee friendly
treated, and have equal justice according to law.”21 While Indian women and children
were offered protection within town walls prior to this date, this is the first statement that
combined the idea o f protecting Indians both within walls and within the law. In regards
to European-Indian relations in the Hudson and Mohawk River valleys, this combination
occurred first in Albany as the English made accommodations for the protection of
Indians not only within a military context, but also within a legal context. This new idea
put forth by Andros would later be manifested on the physical landscape by moving
Indian-European negotiations from the fort to the courthouse. Andros’s words expanded

20 This concern became particularly acute after the Esopus Wars between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch
in the early 1660s. The second Esopus War began with Indians who were lodged in the town attacking
settlers. Court Records o f Albany, Renssalaerswyck and Schenectady show that up through May o f 1672
the magistrates “expressly forbid every one to lodge hereafter any sa v a g es...” Although the directive was
given, it is not known if Albany officials acquiesced to C olve’s directive and allowed the Mohawks to
lodge within the walls overnight.
21 Fem ow, D R C H N Y 13: 484.
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the role o f Mohawks in the legal system by specifically including them, not just as
witnesses against Europeans who broke laws against illegal fur and alcohol trade.
Andros’s actions also went beyond how the Mohawks inserted themselves in the
European legal process. Andros was now introducing the Mohawks as equal players in
the courthouse, although the Mohawks’ actions over the past decades had been
imbedding themselves deeper into the European legal system located at Fort Orange and
then Fort Albany.

Metacom’s War. Bacon’s Rebellion and the Five Nations’ War with the
Susquehannocks
With the end o f the Anglo-Dutch war and the re-establishment o f the colony of
New York, the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys would once again experience
significant change as a result o f larger events outside o f their borders and immediate
control. This time, however, it was conflicts among and against various Indian
populations and not European wars that created the significant changes. Beginning in
1675, as Metacom’s War broke out in New England, and Bacon’s Rebellion began in
Virginia, and as the fighting continued between the Susquehannocks and the Five
Nations, Governor Andros began negotiations that would further affect the position of
Albany in North America. Andros, however, did not create this environment on his own.
He was responding to events outside o f his control. Moreover, he was also forced to deal
with the widely diverse desires and motivations of the different Indian groups with whom
he dealt.
Through late 1675 and early 1676, Andros met with numerous Indian groups from
outlying regions in New England and the Chesapeake in order to offer them refuge in the
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Hudson Valley. These Indians included such groups as the Susquehannocks and New
England Algonquians. For his plan to work however, Andros had first to negotiate with
the Five Nations (primarily Mohawks) and the Mahicans. Both tribes remained the
dominant Indian peoples in the Hudson River Valley at this time, in order to ensure the
safety of the refugee Indians who would be coming into the area.

99

These meetings

occurred in various locations from Albany to New York City to the head of the
Chesapeake Bay, but by the end o f the hostilities it was Albany alone that served as the
major theater o f Indian/English relations.
The immediate results o f Metacom’s War, Bacon’s Rebellion and the Five
Nations war with the Susquehannocks was the movement of defeated Indian populations
from both New England and the Chesapeake into New York territory. Twenty New
England Indians settled about twenty miles northeast o f Albany, and these were followed
by about two hundred more over the next two years, forming a new nation known as the
Scaticook Indians, who fell under the authority o f the Mahicans. As early as February
1675 Mahican Indians illustrated the changes in both European and Indian relations in the
Hudson River Valley. In a meeting between the Albany magistrates and the Chiefs of the
Mahicans, the latter were recorded as stating “the English and the Dutch are now one and
the Dutch are now English. Thus we Mahikanders, the Highland Indians, and the
‘western corner’ Indians are now one also.”

99

Although the outbreak o f Metacom’s War

22 The Senecas’ were still opposed to the idea o f ending the war with the Susquehannocks, although the
Mohawks were receptive to the idea o f the Susquehannocks m oving into the area. The Susquehannock war
with the Five Nations was primarily with the Senecas, Onnondagas and Cayugas. The Mohawks actually
supported the Susquehannocks over the other members o f the Five Nations in this war. For more
information see Francis Jennings, “Glory, Death and Transfiguration,” Proceedings o f the Am erican
Philosophical Society 112:1 (1968): 15-53.
23 Leder, The Livingston Indian Records, 37. These Highland Indians were N ew England Algonquians who
came under the authority o f the Mahicans during early stages o f M etacom ’s War. Highland Indians was a
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and the destruction that it brought to the New England Indians was the primary cause of
New England Algonquian migrations to the west, John Pynchon wrote to Governor John
Winthrop in April o f 1674 that “our Indians at Woronoco and Pojassick are generall all of
them removed to Albany; what the matter is they make so universal and general a remove
I know not.”24 While the reasons for the Woronoco and Pojassick Indians’ migration
were not known, their arrival in the Hudson River Valley added to the continuing shifts in
peoples and power in the region.
The Susquehannocks, who were involved in Bacon’s Rebellion while also at war
with the Five Nations, came under the authority o f the Five Nations.

With this large

movement o f Indian populations to New York, Albany emerged as the center o f AngloIndian relations. The migrations o f New England Algonquian and Susquehannocks to
New York occurred not only because Governor Andros offered them the protection o f the
colony of New York, but also because the Mohawks and Mahicans were willing to take
in these refugees. Without the consent o f the Indians in the region, Andros’ offer would
have been rendered irrelevant. Mohawks and Mahicans encouraged the migrations of
Indian refugees for their own purposes. Iroquois and Algonquian populations between
French Canada and English New York were reinforced by the influx o f Indian refugees,
which strengthened the position o f the Mohawks and Mahicans. This was especially true

term used for two different groups, one from N ew York and one from N ew England. The Mahicans’
statement goes on to say “Thus they pray that they w ill not be exiled or destroyed by the English,
something they have never done to the Christians.” There is no other connection between these refugee
Indians and Christianity.
24 Brindenbaugh, Pynchon Papers, 120.
25 See Jennings, “Glory”; Jennings, Am biguous Iroquois Empire, chapters 7 & 8; and Jose Antonio
Brandao, “Your F yre Shall Burn N o M o re ”, 75-113.
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because many Iroquois were also leaving the region at this time to live in Canada.26 The
growth o f the Indian population in New York also helped to alleviate the threat o f French
attack as the buffer zone between the French and English was strengthened. Moreover,
the influx o f Indians into New York not only altered relations between New France and
New York, but from 1677 on, New England and Chesapeake authorities were forced to
shift their negotiations with Indians to Albany.
John Pynchon’s correspondence concerning Indian affairs offers a clear example
of this geographical shift in Indian policy. Prior to Metacom’s War, Pynchon tried to
establish his trade into the Hudson Valley from his home in Springfield, Massachusetts,
but the majority o f his correspondence concerning Indian relations was directed to
Governor Winthrop in Hartford and to Governor John Leverett in Boston. However, in
1677 Pynchon’s correspondence concerning Indians shifted almost exclusively to
Albany.27 Similarly, as New Englanders were forced to conduct their Indian relations
west of their homes, Virginia and Maryland officials also had to shift their Indian policy
to Albany. As they did so, they encountered the consequences o f the shift in Indian
populations and authority as well as Edmund Andros’s attempt to control interactions
between Indians and Europeans.
Andros began his attempts to gain control over Indian populations during the
colonial crises. He was in communication with Maryland and Virginia authorities as well
as with Susquehannock sachems to negotiate the Susquehannocks’ move to New York.
Similarly, he negotiated with New England Algonquians to offer them refuge as well. In

26 See Richter, O rdeal o f the Longhouse, 116-136 where he describes the migration o f “Francophile”
Iroquois to Catholic settlements in Canada and the reaction o f the “anglophiles” who remained in Iroquoia.
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both instances, he offended officials from the New England and Chesapeake colonies by
meddling with “their Indians.”28 In doing so, Andros attempted to control other colonies’
access to the Iroquois and Mahicans. By establishing the Covenant Chain, under which
the participating Indians were protected by the English crown, officials from the other
colonies had to respect the position of the New York governor over the Indians o f New
York.
Although the colony o f New York increased its power by controlling access to the
new location for Indian/English meetings, this change did not occur solely as a result of
New York’s planning. The change occurred primarily due to shifts in Indian populations
as a result o f the conflicts o f the 1670s, and more importantly these shifts occurred
through negotiations with the Five Nations and Mahicans who continued to pursue their
own interests outside o f those o f New York. This process had begun under the Dutch as
the Mohawks continued to introduce new issues that concerned them into the court at
Fort Orange. John Pynchon’s letter to Governor John Winthrop in April prior to the
outbreak o f M etacom’s War indicates that New England Indians were moving into
Mahican and Mohawk land without prior consultation with any European authority.
Furthermore, Edmund Andros, who is generally given credit as the architect o f the
Covenant Chain, had no hand in the movement because Albany was then known as
Willemstadt and under the control o f the Dutch.
While Andros did wield exceptional authority in Indian/English relations when he
became governor o f New York in the summer o f 1674, he was still forced to concede to

27 Bridenbaugh, Pynchon Papers, 106-178; Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 39, 147, 148, 170.
28 Femow, D RC H N Y 13: 497; and Christoph, Andros Papers, 1: 444.
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the will of the Indians in many instances. If Andros truly had power and authority over
the Indians o f the Hudson and Mohawk valleys, it would have made more sense to
establish New York City as the center for Indian/English relations. However, the
Mohawks retained their authority in the region by dictating where meetings would take
place. Their status as an independent and formidable power in the region forced the
English to acquiesce to Mohawk demands o f retaining Albany as their negotiating center
with both Europeans and other Indians. Albany’s location north o f New York City was
crucial because it served as a buffer zone between the French in Montreal and New York
City. Moreover, because the Iroquois and Mahicans still maintained their power, and
since Albany had become the traditional place for Iroquois and Mahicans to pursue their
negotiations with the Europeans, Indian motivations played a crucial role in Albany’s rise
•

•

as the new center o f Anglo-Indian relations.

Id

Furthermore, the colony o f New York still had to work in order to establish its
power and authority over the other colonies. In order to accomplish this goal, New York
officials changed the venue for meetings between Indians and colonial authorities. Until
1677 meetings between Indians and New York authorities took place within the confines
of the forts located in Albany and Manhattan. These locations reflected the military and
contentious nature o f European and Indian affairs in the first half o f the 1670s. The use
of forts as the site o f European negotiations with the Indians also illustrated a

29 The Mohawks were also able to dictate the location o f negotiations in relations with N ew France in 1645.
In this instance, the Mohawks were able to force a treaty meeting to be held at Three Rivers instead o f
Montreal, thus making it further away from the Onondagas. B y dictating the location o f the treaty
negotiations, the M ohawks were able not only to display their supremacy in their struggle for power with
the Onondagas, but also to maintain their power in their relations with the French. Francis Jennings,
“Multiple Intrigues, The Earliest Recorded Description: The Mohawk Treaty with N ew France at Three
Rivers, 1645,” in The H istory an d Culture o f Iroquois Diplom acy: An Interdisciplinary guide to the
Treaties o f the Six N ations an d Their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, for D ’Arcy M cNickle
Center for the History o f the American Indians, The Newberry Library, 1985), 131-132
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continuation of Dutch policy when the WIC maintained control over the forts as well as
Indian negotiations. The use of the State House was reserved for resolving conflicts
between colonists.30 The Dutch magistrates of Albany continued this practice throughout
the English administrations o f Governors Nicolls and Lovelace, as well as during the
administration o f Governor Colve during the Dutch re-occupation in 1673-1674.
However, by the spring o f 1677 with the end o f the colonial crises all meetings between
Indians, primarily Iroquois and Mahicans, and officials from any English colony were
transferred to the Albany courthouse.

31

This change was significant as the courthouse

stood as a symbol o f English imperial authority on the colonial landscape o f North
America.32
By changing the venue for official interaction between colonial governments and
Indian political representatives, New York authorities increased their own power in these
affairs by controlling access to western Indians. However, at the same time the New
York government offered the Iroquois and Mahicans who participated in these meetings
greater political protection and increased ability to carry out their own policies. It is
during these meetings at the courthouse where time and again, officials from other

30 See Merwick, P ossessin g Albany, 94,104-107, 143-147. Merwick also gives an in depth analysis o f the
significance o f the town hall (stadhuis) to the Dutch residents o f N ew York during Leisler’s Rebellion.
31 Leder, Livingston Indian Records. Records indicated that the last meeting held at the Fort took place
between the Albany officials and the Mahicans on February 14, 1675 (new style). The next meeting
recorded in Livingston’s account was between Major John Pynchon and James Richards representing
Massachusetts and Connecticut respectively and the Mahican and “other River Indians” whom the
Mahicans now represented. This latter meeting took place in the courthouse at Albany, where both groups
agreed on a continuation o f friendship. At this meeting the Mahicans were recorded as promising to keep
the rivers clear down to N ew York. The two-year gap in the records reflects the fact that Andros met with
Indian representatives primarily in Manhattan during the time o f M etacom ’s War and B acon’s Rebellion.
32 It is also important to note that in using the courthouse as the symbol for English imperial power, the
English were imposing their new meaning on a primarily Dutch landscape. For more on this see Bonomi,
39-58 which discusses A lbany’s existence as a “city-state” somewhat independent from central authority
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colonies, especially Virginia and Maryland, were forced to concede to Indians’ positions.
The fact that these proceedings occurred in the courthouse at Albany reflected the idea
that the Indians and English were participating in legally sanctioned negotiations and that
the results o f these negotiations were legally binding. For example, in 1677 and 1679
Virginia representatives traveled to the Albany courthouse in order to negotiate a peace
with the Iroquois as well as demand punishment of Iroquois who were raiding English
settlements in the Chesapeake. However, in these meetings they were forced to settle for
Indians’ apologies for these incursions into Virginia. In fact, during the 1679 meeting,
Virginia delegate Colonel William Kendall, after being forced to accept an apology from
a group o f Oneidas, stated, “Thogh your Actions already done, are Sufficient Reasons to
Induce us to a Violent war against you which might Engage all our confederatt English
neighbours, subjects to our great king Charles, y e t ... we are therefore willing and have
l-i

and doe forgive all the Dammages you have done our People (though very great).”
Although he believed the Oneidas’ raids into Virginia were grounds for war, he did not
have the power to initiate revenge or demand stronger punishment. He lacked this power
both because the Five Nations had the protection o f New York, and because New York
needed the Five Nations to help the colony economically and to serve as a buffer against
the ever-present French threat to the north.
Moreover, this change in Indians’ legal standing among the English in New York
occurred at the same time that Indians in New England and the Chesapeake Bay lost their
political independence in their home regions. As Susquehannocks and New England

located in N ew York City; Joyce Goodffiend, Before the M elting Pot, 103 where she discusses the
adherence to Dutch cultural practices in Albany; and Merwick, P ossessing Albany, 144.
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Algonquians moved into New York territory, English officials simultaneously legitimized
Five Nations and Mahicans’ political and military authority within the established
English legal structure in the courthouse. For example, in May o f 1678 Albany resident
William Teller was on trial for killing a New England Algonquian refugee woman.34 The
death was ruled accidental, but during the trial itself Mahican sachems were present in
the court with the jury. The sachems served as representatives o f the Algonquian victim
and three Algonquian witnesses to the shooting.35 This example illustrates two points.
First, we can see the Mahicans’ new role over the Algonquian newcomers to the Hudson
River Valley, and second, we can see the new role o f Mahicans on the diplomatic
landscape o f the colonial city as they gained greater access to English legal protection.36
While the Mahicans gained control over the refugee tribes o f New England, the
Mohawks also utilized the meetings in the courthouse to gain authority within the Five
Nations. During Coursy’s 1677 conference at the Albany courthouse, he proposed peace
to all the Five Nations tribes. All five o f the Iroquois tribes responded to Coursy over a
period o f one month. Onondaga and the Oneida Sachems were the first to speak, and both
groups spoke in the courthouse on the same day, July 21, 1677. The first to speak was
the Onondaga Sachem Carachkondie. He agreed to peaceful relations between the
Onondagas and the colonies o f Maryland and Virginia, as well as the Indians under the

33 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 53. In 1677 Col. Henry Coursy was forced to accept an Onnondaga
apology for their forays into Virginia territory in 1677 after the Iroquois tribe promised to avoid English
settlements w hile raiding their Indian enem ies in the area.
34 The term used was actually “North Indian”. These Indians were N ew England Algonquians who, during
M etacom ’s War, fell under the authority o f the Mahicans.
35 Court Records indicate that trials involving Indians before 1677 also took place in the fort instead o f the
courthouse.
36 Van Laer, M inutes 1:327; 2:324-325; and Christoph, G eneral Entries, 523.
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protection o f those two colonies. However, he was also recorded as stating “Wee doe Let
you Know that ther is o f our four Castelles of the Senikars out a fighting aganst the
Susquahannas you may therefor waren yor Indians That thar may be no Injuryes or
damnages done hereafter and so to continue the peace and doe give two Beavers.”37
While the Onondagas agreed to the peace, they also indicated that factions remained who
were continuing their war with the Susquehannocks. After Carachkondie finished
speaking, the Oneida sachems (who spoke for the Oneidas was not recorded) said that
“wee doe absolutely approve o f that wich the Onndagoes haith now Said.”38 The rest of
their speech did, in fact, absolutely approve o f what the Onondagas said earlier that day.
A month later, on August 22, 1677, the Senecas’ and the Cayugas’ representatives
each gave a speech in the Albany courthouse concerning their relationship with Virginia
and Maryland. Like the Onondagas and the Oneidas before them, the Senecas and
Cayugas agreed to peace with the two colonies and the Indians under their protections,
but also indicated that there are warriors currently down in the area continuing their
hostilities with the Susquehannocks. They promised to end the hostilities when they
returned to their homes.

Their speeches were short, there was no indication o f which

individuals spoke for either tribe, and their recorded words were very similar to the
Oneidas and Onondagas who spoke a month earlier.
The Mohawks, however, being the closest in proximity and with the strongest ties
to Albany had a day all to themselves. They had already been able to keep meetings
between the Iroquois and the English in Albany, they now managed to display their own

37 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 44.
38 Ibid.
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power within the Five Nations during those meetings.40 The Mohawks sent eight
Sachems to the Albany courthouse. In comparison both the Onondagas and the Oneidas
sent four apiece, and there was no record o f how many representatives the Senecas and
Cayugas sent to Albany. The Mohawks’ Sachem Cannondacgoo spoke to Coursy on
August 6, 1677. In his speech he gave several indications of the M ohawks’ authority
over the other members o f the Five Nations and over the colonies o f Maryland and
Virginia. In his opening words, Cannondacgoo was recorded as saying to Coursy,
“Thankes, Especially that his honnor hath bein pleased to Grant you the Priviledge for to
Speak with us heir Seing that the Govr: Genii: & wee are one, and one hart and one
head.”41 Cannondacgoo’s words indicated both the higher authority o f Andros over
Coursy as the former granted the latter the privilege o f speaking with the Mohawks, and
by tying the Mohawks to Andros, the Mohawks also established their dominance over
Coursy and those he represented.
Cannondacgoo went on to speak against the Senecas also indicating the
Mohawks’ dominance within the Five Nations, at least in the eyes o f the English. The
Mohawk Sachem built up their authority over the Senecas by stating, “that the Seneks
war upon thar Jorney to com hither with six hunderd Men Bot ffor fear Turned back
agane Bot wee ware not affrayed to Com heir.”42 With these words Cannondacgoo

39 Ibid., 47-48.
40 A s stated earlier, in the Five Nations 1645 treaty negotiations with the French, the Mohawks were able to
dictate that the m eeting be held in Three Rivers instead o f Montreal in order to put more space between the
Onondagas and the French officials. This m ove helped to isolate the Onondagas and increase the
M ohawks’ power within the Five Nations.
41 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 45.
42 Ibid., 46.
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mocked the Senecas’ weakness. Even with six hundred men, the Senecas, according to
the Mohawks, were afraid to travel to Albany to meet with the English. Cannondacgoo
proceeded to further isolate the Senecas from the English. He admonished Coursy to:
be allwyes myndfull of what is done in ye house ordeined to that end by
the gov: genii and if ye Senekes now or any time herefter, should appoynt
any oyr place for to Speake wth you In ther own cuntry or else wher Wee
desyre yt it may not be accepted off bot that this be & remane the only
appoynted & preffixed place.... And if you have a mynd hereafter to
Speak wth us, we desyre yt it may bee heir and no wher else. 43
The Mohawks gave no warning of their warriors moving against the Susquehannocks, as
the Mohawks were sympathetic to the Susquehannocks in their war with the other
members o f the Five Nations. With this speech and with his authority to dictate the
meeting place, Cannondacgoo was able to assert the M ohawks’ authority in relations
between the Five Nations and the English as well as in relations among the Five Nations
themselves. By the time the Senecas and Cayugas appeared in Albany on August 22, the
English authorities did not find it necessary to indicate the names o f the Sachems
representing the tribes, nor were the two tribes given separate days on which to speak.
The Mohawks had succeeded in marginalizing the authority o f the other members o f the
Five Nations in relations with the English.44
The Mohawks, however, did not merely align themselves with Andros and his
government. Andros wrote a letter to the Court o f Albany, Rensselaerswyck and
Schenectady in June o f 1677 that expressed his displeasure with the Mohawks taking it
upon them selves to bring Indians under the protection o f N ew York into their land. He

43 Ibid., 46-47.
44 In September 1679, Col. W illiam Kendell traveled from Virginia to the Albany courthouse to meet with
the Mohawks because the Senecas broke the 1677 negotiated peace with Virginia. It appears that the
Mohawks instructions for the Virginians to deal with the Senecas through the M ohawks and in Albany was
w ell heeded. Ibid., 49.
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voiced his disapproval o f the Mohawks’ independent action, but Andros was forced to
“consign this to oblivion” because there was not much he could do. Andros did,
however, include a warning, that if the Mohawks “or any others forget themselves and
presume to receive any others who are in our district, I shall take it as if it were done to
Christians and to m yself and expect full satisfaction therefor.”45 With these strong words
being read, there was no indication that any Mohawks were present to hear them.

Indians within the Town Walls
As the Mohawks in particular gained greater access and authority with their
presence in the Albany courthouse, Indians were also gaining access to other spaces
around the city. One o f the new alterations to the European/Indian landscape of Albany
after 1677 was the approval and construction o f Indian houses outside the gates o f the
city. As mentioned earlier both Dutch and English authorities worked to keep all Indians
outside o f European settlements during the night. In order to provide Indians acceptable
overnight accommodations, a petition to build Indian housing outside o f the city walls of
Albany was put before the court magistrates in 1672. However, the actual construction of
the houses was put off while a committee decided where best to build them.46 Like
many tasks given to committees the work was not completed.
It was not until May 1676, as New England was experiencing the ravages of
Metacom’s War, that the Albany magistrates ordered “the burghers and inhabitants of
Albany to contribute, each pro rata, toward the erection o f the Indian or Hansioos house

45 Van Laer, Minutes, 2: 245-246.
46 Van Laer, Minutes, 1:306; Minutes o f the Executive Council 1:146-7.
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outside the gate.. .within the space o f fourteen days.”47 The residents chosen to fund the
house were the leading merchants in the town. A few weeks later the magistrates decided
to build two more Indian houses. This time, the entire town was to be held responsible
for financing, constructing and maintaining the houses. After Indians tore down and
burned fences in January 1677, traders who resided in the city were also made
responsible for supplying the Indian houses with firewood.48
Houses were built in two locations, outside the south gate and on the plain in an
attempt to control both Indian movements and the area around the gates. With the Indian
houses in these locations, their movements could be easily monitored because these areas
were relatively cleared compared to the west and north sides o f the town, allowing for an
unimpeded view of activities. Furthermore, by building the houses in these locations, the
Indians would, it was hoped, enter the city through the south gate and the first thing they
would see would be the courthouse, the new center o f all Indian/English negotiations 49
However, as the English authorities began to impose order and control over the
residents o f the area, both European and Indian, their efforts had mixed results, as Indians
continued to gain increased access to the city and colonists ignored rules they did not
necessarily like. Andros tried, like many before him, to end the presence o f drunk
Indians within the town walls by imposing heavy fines and suspending trading privileges

47 Van Laer, Minutes, 2:106-107. This order to build the Indian houses came six months after Andros
ordered blockhouses to be built to protect both European as w ell as Indians. Fem ow , D R C H N Y 13: 464.
48 Van Laer, Minutes, 2: 106-7; 2: 187.
49 There are several seventeenth-century maps o f the layout o f Albany including, Colonel Romer’s “Plan de
la V ille d’Albanie, 1698” and the plan o f “Albany” that appeared in John M iller’s N ew York Considered
an d Im proved (they are held by the Public Record Office and the British M useum respectively but can be
seen in Merwick, P ossessin g Albany, 108-109). Both maps show several structures outside o f the south
gate o f the city, but there is no indication o f their function or identity.
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to any resident guilty of having drunk Indians in his or her home. An entire street would
be punished if it could not be ascertained in whose house the Indians procured and
consumed the alcohol. And like his predecessors, Andros’ attempt at curbing Indians’
consumption of alcohol failed.50 Many Albany residents also refused to do their part in
maintaining the Indians’ houses, such as Gabriel Thomson, who was taken to court and
ordered to pay his share for the Indian houses.51 The hoped for results o f controlling
Indian movements around Albany by building Indian houses outside o f the gates was also
less than a success. Indeed, Indian activities remained outside o f colonial control and
colonists’ activities remained outside of the courts’ control. Indians continued to move
throughout the city after the ringing o f the bell, and to lodge in the houses o f traders
although such activities continued to be expressly forbidden.
However, it was not just the movements o f the Indians that Andros and the
English authorities hoped to control. In 1676, Governor Andros issued an ordinance in
Albany forbidding any new streets to be laid out or houses to be built until all the vacant
lots then in the city were built on and completely occupied. He took his ordinance further
by demanding that no houses were to be built on a street until the com er lots were
occupied. Andros also dictated the size o f the house as well as the building material.
The houses were to be no less than two rooms deep and no less than eighteen feet wide,
with the front fa9ade constructed with brick or quarry stone and covered with tiles. These
restrictions were “to be strictly observed.”52 As Andros attempted to bring order to the
city of Albany, English authorities also persisted in trying to bring order to the land

50 Van Laer, Minutes 2: 123, 244.
51 Ibid., 193,261.
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outside o f the town by forbidding trade outside o f Albany, as the Dutch had done before
them.
The English, like the Dutch before them, often considered the land outside o f the
gates o f the city to be a wild, disordered landscape. Donna Merwick has shown that the
area outside o f the town walls was becoming more attractive in the 1670s as fewer people
were able to make a living at the fur trade. However, as Merwick also noted, English
visitors and residents of the area viewed Dutch agricultural land use patterns as
disorderly, with ill defined lots and lands left unimproved.53 After 1677, the English
colonial government tried to impose its own understanding o f what an ordered colonial
landscape was supposed to be on both the Indian and European inhabitants of the area. It
did this by forcing residents to pay for the upkeep o f the Indian houses and by trying to
force the Indians to reside in them. In this way, the English attempted to bring order and
control to the area outside the gates and at the same time tried to expand their influence
over the land.54 The houses were built in order to maintain order and control. However,
as the English were trying to bring order to relations among the various Indian tribes and
Europeans in the Hudson Valley by building the houses, illicit trade continued outside of
the Albany gates. In April 1676, a month before the magistrates committed to building
the Indian houses outside of the city, Governor Andros issued an ordinance forbidding

52 Ibid., 135-136.
53 Merwick, P ossessin g Albany, 196-205; also see John Stilgoe, Common L andscape o f America, 10, and
pages 43-58 for his discussion on N ew England landscapes, and pages 58-77 for his discussion o f
Tidewater and Piedmont landscapes. Stilgoe, however, offers no discussion o f landscapes o f the
seventeenth-century Middle Colonies.
54 M iller’s and Romer’s maps both depict an ordered, improved landscape outside o f the gates, with its
layout being quite similar to that o f the appearance inside the gates.

236

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

any inhabitant of Albany, “be his capacity what it may,” to conduct any trade with the
Indians outside o f the city gates.55
It was not only merchants and traders who were difficult to control. In August
1677, several women and girls were brought before the court and fined for having been
seen in the vicinity o f the Indian houses. Mews Hoogeboom, the father o f several of
these girls, was brought into the court again in March o f 1680 “because the defendant
continually lets his children go to the Indian houses on the hill with all sorts o f trinket,
knives, paints, etc. to sell to the Indians, having caught them at it on July 12 and 22,
August 17 and February 20 last.” Hoogeboom denied the charges, but was nevertheless
condemned to pay a fine.56
The Hoogeboom daughters were part o f a larger threat to the authorities’ control
over trade between Europeans and Indians. While Andros continued to issue ordinances
forbidding trade with Indians outside the city o f Albany, the practice continued on both
small and large scales. Ordinances were written for the benefit o f Albany residents who
traveled outside the gates to conduct their illicit trade, and ordinances were “written for
the benefit o f the town o f Schenectady” whose residents often posed the greatest threat to
Albany’s advantageous position with the Indians. O f course Andros’s attempts to control
trade outside o f the city of Albany were another example in a long line o f ordinances that
were similarly ignored. However, the illicit trade that took place in the woods in the
1670s led the court to state that such trade outside o f Albany continued “at peril to all at

55 Van Laer, Minutes, 2: 91.
56 Ibid., 473.
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this verry dangerous Juncture o f time” as the English and Indians were embarking on new
forms o f negotiations, shifting alliances and power struggles.57
From 1672 to 1677 the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys experienced drastic
change as Albany’s continually changing cultural landscape was transformed into a new
diplomatic landscape that served as the center of Anglo-Indian relations between
Carolina and Canada. The real significance o f this change however is that Albany rose to
its prominence as a new diplomatic landscape not as the result o f a single person or
colonial policy, but as the result o f negotiations and conflicts between diverse groups
including English, Dutch, French, Iroquois and Algonquian. Moreover these negotiations
would not have happened without the four colonial conflicts that took place in the 1670s.
As a result o f these negotiations and conflicts, which took place in the span o f five, short
years, European and Indian leaders dramatically altered the landscape o f the East Coast
o f America. By 1677 Albany truly took its place as a prominent feature on the colonial
diplomatic landscape.

57 Ibid., 9 1 ,2 4 5 -2 4 6 , 361-362.
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CONCLUSION

“Brethren o f Virginia, Wee are come here in the Prefixed house where we are
used to make Propositions, and have understood that which is by you Represented.” 1
This statement was made by the Onondaga Sachems Carachkondie, Otrewachte,
Cachisuhtoe, and Onuerachton to Colonel William Kendall agent for Virginia in the
Albany courthouse on November 1, 1679. The meeting between the Iroquois tribe and
the English colony was the last to be held during the decade o f the 1670s, and
Carachkondie’s statement clearly illustrates the long-standing importance o f the Albany
courthouse, which was both a prefixed place and the place where the Onondagas were
used to making propositions. This meeting was also the culmination o f decades o f crosscultural trade, information exchange and warfare that established Albany as the colonial
center o f European and Indian relations.
Although not often mentioned with the other European colonial centers o f power
in the seventeenth-century like Boston, Montreal or Jamestown, by 1680 Albany stood
alone as the new diplomatic center for English and Indian affairs in North America north
of Carolina. English representatives from New England, Virginia and Maryland had to
travel to Albany to conduct business with, primarily, the Iroquois Indians who by the end
of the 1670s spoke for many o f the surrounding Indians who were now under their

1 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 60.
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protection.

2

Albany would serve as the home o f the Covenant Chain between the

Iroquois and English until the formation o f the United States over a century later.
The creation o f this new diplomatic landscape was the result o f decades of
struggle and compromise between and among Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and
Algonquian peoples both inside and outside o f the Hudson River Valley. The struggle
over the control o f land led to new understandings o f how individuals and groups o f
different ethnic and cultural origins defined proper land use and proper land ownership.
Each group came into the situation with preconceived ideas of what it meant to occupy
and control land and spaces, whether it was through occupation by individuals, legal land
titles, placing the land under agricultural production or having the power to keep others
out. All o f these notions were challenged as the different cultures encountered one
another and worked to establish their own understandings of power and control o f land.
Because o f the challenges to each other’s authority over the land no one power, either
European or Indian, was able to fully establish its own authority over all o f the land o f the
Hudson River Valley at this time. As a result o f this fluid situation new definitions o f
proper land use and ownership o f certain lands and spaces were constantly being created.
This was particularly true for the region o f Fort Orange/Albany, which held a unique
position in colonial North America.
Albany’s location as an interior settlement at the intersection o f lands claimed and
contested by several ethnic groups, including the Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and
Algonquian made it an ideal location for its formation as a new diplomatic landscape.

2 After 1664, whenever such tribes as the Esopus or Catskills needed to speak with the English, it not only
occurred at the Albany courthouse, but the Mohawks or the Mahicans were present to speak for the other
tribes. However, when it came time to renew the peace made between the Dutch and the Esopus prior to
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Albany’s relative isolation from the larger centers o f Montreal, Boston and New York
City also allowed its residents, both Indian and European, the freedom and independence
to chart their own path that led to Albany’s unique position among the English centers of
power in North America. This isolation was particularly important in the Dutch period,
and it caused communication between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam to be difficult at
best. As Stuyvesant spent a good deal o f his time fending off threats from English and
Swedish sources, especially from 1647-1655, residents in Fort Orange and
Rensselaerswyck set a precedent for independent actions, especially in their dealings with
the local Indian population.
Once Stuyvesant turned greater attention to issues dealing with Indians, such as
running in the woods, illegal alcohol sales to Indians and Indians within town walls, Fort
Orange residents continued to pursue an Indian policy to their benefit. Sometimes
officials at Fort Orange worked in conjunction with Stuyvesant and the Council in New
Amsterdam. WIC officials in both communities worked to control the problem with
runners in the woods. This issue was o f particular importance for the leaders o f Fort
Orange to retain control over the fur trade in the area. However, the leaders at New
Amsterdam and those at Fort Orange differed on many other matters, especially those
that would restrict Indian movements within the town o f Fort Orange, which would, in
turn, restrict the fur trade o f the community. Moreover, the Indian populations also
wished to retain the influence that they were gaining within the town and would not be
pleased with restrictions to their movements. The Iroquois were particularly interested in
expanding their access to the court system o f Fort Orange, and because the Dutch

the English takeover o f the colony, the Esopus Sachem, typically Calcop and his son, would speak for their
own people within the courthouse.
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depended on the Indians, particularly the Mohawks, for furs all parties involved at Fort
Orange worked to maintain the a site for open European/Indian trade and diplomatic
negotiations.
Fort Orange’s isolation also provided ample opportunity for the non-Iroquois
Indian groups who lived between these two centers to assert their own influence on how
Indian and European relations would develop. While Albany’s new diplomatic landscape
would primarily serve the English and Iroquois, the process that created that landscape
included the participation o f many more groups and individuals. These often-overlooked
players included the Indian groups o f the Esopus, Catskills, Wappingers and
Hackensacks. O f course, other non-English European colonists, such as the French and
particularly the Dutch, also contributed to the creation o f a new landscape at Albany.
Each of these cultural groups actively participated through wars, threats o f wars, trade,
religious expression, exchange o f information and diplomacy to create a new diplomatic
landscape in the Hudson River Valley. This landscape was neither purely Indian nor
purely European, but a combination o f elements from all these groups. In this way the
new landscape was navigable by all groups involved.
The process of how this new diplomatic landscape came to be has shed light on
the critical role o f Indians in seventeenth-century North America. While it would be the
Iroquois who would dominate much o f Indian affairs through the last quarter o f the
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century in this region, this was not a foregone
conclusion in the mid-seventeenth century. The actions o f and events surrounding many
other Indian groups created the environment for the Iroquois to rise to their own
dominant position in seventeenth-century North America.
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Wars between the Dutch and Indian tribes o f the lower Hudson River Valley in
the 1650s, particularly the Peach War o f 1655, ended the resistance o f those tribes to the
Dutch presence in the area. As a result, there remained no truly independent Indian
power near Manhattan Island after 1655. In this respect the year 1655 stands out as a
significant turning point in European-Indian relations in general and the rise o f Albany at
its center in particular. In response to the war Stuyvesant changed his tactics in trying to
gain control over the movements and morals of Indians and European residents of the
Hudson River Valley. He tried to restrict Indian movements within Dutch towns and
Dutch movements outside o f towns in order to keep individuals from invading the space
of other ethnic groups. This way, in Stuyvesant’s Calvinist informed view, the
wilderness of the Indians and the ordered landscape o f the Dutch would remain separate,
until the Dutch could bring order to the wilderness outside o f the towns. The Esopus
region proved to be the most significant area where Stuyvesant actively pursued the
creation o f a Dutch landscape through the takeover o f an Indian landscape. This, of
course, led to the Second Esopus War o f 1663-1664.
Stuyvesant’s exclusive reactions to the Peach War o f 1655 added to the already
fractured nature o f relations between the Dutch settlements o f Fort Orange and New
Amsterdam, as Fort Orange less than enthusiastically implemented these new tactics.
The residents o f Fort Orange were not interested in eliminating Indian power in the
region as their livelihoods depended on the Indian participation in the fur trade. They
resisted Stuyvesant’s restrictions on the merging of Indian and Dutch landscapes, thereby
allowing for the creation o f a new landscape that would eventually result in a new
diplomatic landscape.
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Furthermore, with the elimination o f the Lower Hudson River tribes as
independent powers, Stuyvesant was forced to move north first to the Esopus and then to
Fort Orange to conduct relations with remaining independent Indian powers, namely the
Esopus and the Mohawks. While he tried to conduct Indian policy out o f New
Amsterdam, the Esopus Indians, prior to 1664, and the Indians o f the upper Hudson
Valley, including the Iroquois and Mahicans continued to wield enough power to make
Stuyvesant shift his negotiations closer to their territories. However, at the same time,
the Indians were successful at keeping the Dutch, and then the English, out o f their
villages and political spaces, allowing them to retain their traditional landscapes. This
forced the creation o f new diplomatic spaces within Dutch settlements, particularly
within Fort Orange.
In the few years after 1655, hostile activity between the Dutch and Indians
occurred in the Esopus region located between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. These
hostile actions, known as the Esopus Wars, were the result o f the struggle between the
Dutch and the Indians to control the development of the landscape. As the Dutch worked
to create a Dutch, agricultural landscape, the Esopus worked to keep this Dutch influence
to a minimum. With no room to compromise because the two groups maintained
opposing and exclusive goals concerning how the land would be occupied and by whom,
the end of the Esopus Wars would result in the elimination o f one group from the region.
It was the Esopus Indians who were eliminated as an independent Indian power along the
Hudson. With the elimination o f the Esopus Indians as an independent power, it opened
the way for the Dutch, and then the English to dictate how the landscape would be
developed. This was not the case further to the north.
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During these wars between the Dutch and the Indian tribes below Fort Orange, the
Mohawks were able to take advantage o f the situation and start to impose their authority
on the landscape o f the Hudson River Valley, and particularly on the diplomatic
landscape o f Fort Orange. With Fort Orange’s natural physical isolation, and the Esopus
and Peach Wars, which further served to isolate Fort Orange from the political center of
New Netherland on Manhattan Island, the Dutch WIC authorities had to rely on Indians
as their source o f communication and information. While the Dutch did have easy access
and greater control over the waterways o f the colony, Indians, particularly the Mohawks
and the Mahicans, controlled the flow o f information over land. W ith the Dutch highly
dependent on Indian intelligence and Indian couriers for information, all Indian groups
were able to wield a certain amount o f power by controlling European access to
information.
Indian groups and individuals placed themselves in advantageous positions by
informing the Dutch how they stopped an attack on a certain settlement or how they
heard o f an imminent attack on Dutch settlements. In return for much o f this
information, the Indians often received material goods, but more importantly, they
received access to European leaders and towns and eventually into the Dutch and then
English legal systems. In this way American Indians played a prominent role in the
creation o f a new diplomatic landscape on which they asserted significant authority.
During the Esopus Wars, particularly the second one from 1663 to 1664, the
Dutch authorities continually turned to the Mohawks to find out the location and
intentions o f the Esopus Indians. They also became dependent on information from the
Catskill Indians. Stuyvesant distrusted the Catskills, but since they were under the
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authority o f the Mohawks, Stuyvesant and other WIC officials were forced to accept
Catskill intelligence as they would Mohawk information. The Dutch WIC also asked the
Mohawks to become actively involved in their war with the Esopus Indians because of
the Mohawks knowledge o f the land in which the Esopus were hiding and their ability to
travel with ease upon that land. While the Mohawks were busy with their own wars with
Algonquian Indians in New England, the events that took place in the late 1650s and
early 1660s allowed the Mohawks to increase their already valuable position within New
Netherland as the Dutch came to rely on them for information and diplomacy.
The WIC also relied upon the Mohawks to provide the company with the highly
valuable beaver pelts, the trade o f which was centered at Fort Orange. Because of this
Dutch dependence on the Mohawks, the Mohawks and Dutch created a very different
landscape in Fort Orange than elsewhere in the colony. In the Esopus region, the Dutch
and Indians fought for control o f the land with the Dutch calling for the elimination of the
Esopus Indians in order to establish a Dutch, agricultural landscape in the region.
However, Fort Orange’s dependence on trade with the Indians required the presence of
Indians in the town and required good relations with those Indians. As the Mohawks
were the closest to the Dutch outpost, it was they who were able to wield the most
influence within its walls.
With the welcome, indeed necessary, presence o f Indians within the Dutch town
at Fort Orange, the two groups had to find ways to coexist. However, their compromises
were often contrary to official WIC policy as directed from New Amsterdam. The leaders
at Fort Orange had always displayed an independence from New Amsterdam that was
also reflected in how they dealt with European residents o f the community. The leaders
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and residents in Fort Orange were more lenient with individuals guilty o f selling and
smuggling alcohol to Indians, as well as individuals who acted contrary to the moral
regulations put in place by Stuyvesant and the leaders o f the Dutch Reformed Church
such as Lutherans and Catholics. Yet because of Fort Orange’s isolation and different
circumstances in regards to their relations with New Amsterdam and with the Indians of
the upper Hudson River Valley, both Indians and the Dutch created a new cultural
landscape that was significantly different from any other in the colony. The continued
presence o f the Indians within the town walls of Fort Orange for trade purposes would
allow the relations between the Dutch and Mohawks to evolve beyond their trade
relations.
Because the Dutch were so dependent on the Mohawks for their economic
survival and gave the Mohawks concessions to maintain good relations, the latter became
more aggressive in their dealings with the Dutch and eventually began making requests
then demands from the Dutch. Moreover, they did this within the Dutch legal system
located in the fort at Fort Orange. By requesting Dutch assistance in their relations with
the French, the Mohawk began involving the Dutch at Fort Orange with Mohawk goals.
The Mohawks soon began using Fort Orange for meetings with other Indian groups.
Soon, the Mohawks established diplomatic precedents within the Fort Orange court
system and continued to build on them. This Dutch dependence and accommodation of
Indians did not occur anywhere else within New Netherland. Dutch and Indian relations
in the Esopus region were almost purely contentious and there was little to no room for
compromise. Dutch economic dependence and lack o f desire to take over M ohawks’
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lands near Fort Orange provided an atmosphere to allow the Mohawks access to the
town.
Furthermore, while doing this the Mohawks also restricted Dutch access to their
own territory. This practice had been going on for decades as Iroquois as well as Esopus
Indians worked diligently to keep Europeans from having free access to their villages and
centers o f power. Therefore the Indians o f the Hudson River Valley, not just the
Mohawks were fully in charge of the woods and their villages beyond Fort Orange and
other Dutch settlements such as Esopus. Moreover, at the same time the Mohawks were
increasing their influence over the landscape within Fort Orange.
By 1664, when the English took over New Netherland, the Mohawks had
established themselves as the dominant Indian power in the region as a result of the
Peach War, Esopus Wars and Dutch dependence on them for communication. The date
o f 1664 in this context is not as relevant for relations between Europeans and Indians in
the Hudson River Valley. However, 1664 is quite significant in this context as the year
that the Mohawks stood as the most influential independent Indian power in the region.
With the surrender and break up o f the Esopus Indians in 1664, all dealings with
independent Indian power shifted to the Iroquois and to their base o f operations with
Europeans at Fort Orange.
In this respect, 1664 becomes a crucial turning point along with 1655. Events in
both dates created a significant shift in the geography o f Indian and European
negotiations in this region northward toward Fort Orange, and then in 1664, to Albany.
While in 1664 the European powers changed from Dutch to English, it was the Mohawks
who retained and increased their control of Indian and European interactions in the area.
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The Mohawks, and the English, would continue to utilize the same negotiating systems
and locations as had been present during the Dutch period. The meetings were still held
within the confines o f the fort, now renamed Fort Albany, and the Mohawks continued to
dominate those meetings.
After the English established New York, the Mohawks and the English took
advantage o f events outside of the immediate area to increase the importance o f Albany
as a meeting place for European and Indian diplomacy. The Five Nations’ War with the
Susquehannocks, the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Bacon’s Rebellion and M etacom’s War all
allowed for the influx o f new Indian populations under the control o f the Mohawks and
for the continued use o f Albany as a site for meetings between Indians and English.
These events all took place in the 1670s and were the next significant turning point for
Indian and English relations because they helped to extend Albany’s influence beyond
the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys. Now Indians from the Chesapeake and New
England had moved into the region to live under the authority o f the Mohawks.
Additionally, English officials from Virginia, Maryland and New England all had to
travel to Albany in order conduct any type o f diplomatic meeting with these Indians.
It was also during this period that the meeting place changed from the fort, which
stood as the symbol of Dutch authority on the landscape, to the Albany courthouse, which
stood as the symbol of English power on the land. The presence o f the Mohawks in
either venue was significant because in both places the Mohawks were able to use the
European legal proceedings to further their own ends within the legal authority of
European powers. These actions by European powers gave greater validity and value to
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Mohawk actions and allowed the Mohawks to provide significant and dominant
contributions to the creation of the new diplomatic landscape at Albany.
By the time the Onondaga Sachem Carachkondie addressed Colonel Kendall of
Virginia in Albany’s courthouse on November 1,1679 years o f trade, rumors, wars,
negotiations and compromises between Europeans and Indians allowed for the creation of
a unique diplomatic landscape centered in Albany. While Indians and Europeans were
able to establish dominance o f certain areas within the Hudson River Valley and thereby
dictate how that landscape was to be used, the space within Albany became a space
utilized effectively by both Europeans and Indians.
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